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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

'SHIJIE LISHI' REVIEWS SOVIET ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

Beijing SHIJIE LISHI in Chinese No 5, 2 Oct 79 pp 9-18

[Article by Shen Yongxing [3088 3057 5281] and Qin X'iaoying [4440 2556 7751]; "Soviet Russia's Transformation from War Communism to the New Economic Policy [NEP]"]

[Text] Within half a year following the October Revolution, Lenin put forward a celebrated principle for socialist construction in his book titled, "The Current Task of the Soviet Regime." It read, "In the course of any socialist revolution, once the proletariat's task of seizing political power has been resolved and as the task of opposition to exploiters and oppressors is virtually resolved in the main, the basic task of creating an economic system that is higher than that of capitalist societies must be placed in the foremost position. This basic task is to increase the productivity of labor."¹ Once the Bolsheviks had seized power, they had to change the principal task of the party to organizing the administration of Russia, using new methods to build a thoroughgoing economic base for the livelihood of millions of people.

Because of internal counterrevolutionary rebellion and armed intervention by the imperialists, Lenin was not able to implement at once this strategic change that he had put forward. Soviet Russia was to follow an arduous and tortuous course of 3 years of civil war. But once the civil war was over, the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), under the leadership of Lenin, decided at its Tenth Congress held in March 1921 to discontinue the system and policies of "war communism" of the civil war period and to begin to implement The New Economic Policy (NEP) taking the first step in a great transformation toward socialist economic construction.

1

The central ingredient of the NEP was the substitution of a grain tax for the system of requisitions of excess grain. The object of this change was the alleviation of the burden on the peasants in this new historical period to permit free trade in farm products, and the expansion of commodity trade between cities and the countryside in order to increase the initiative of the farmers, revive agricultural production, and consolidate the alliance between workers and peasants. As Lenin said, "The essence of the NEP is an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry."²

During the "war communism" period, Soviet Russia had no choice but to institute the system of excess grain requisitions, with the government fixing the total amount of grain and fodder required to meet the country's needs, apportioning these requirements among individual grain producing provinces, and making requisition purchases from the peasantry at fixed prices. This amounted, in fact, to the requisitioning of all the excess grain of the peasantry and, sometimes, to the requisitioning of grain needed by the peasants to feed themselves. In essence, "war communism" abolished the marketplace, with the government setting up special organizations such as consumption cooperatives to organize a direct exchange of products between the cities and the countryside. During the years of economic paralysis when the fires of war filled the skies, when the government was unstable, and when famine threatened, the Soviet regime was forced to adopt such a policy to assure the needs of political and military struggle. Success or failure on these two fronts affected not only the fate of the Russian proletariat, but also ramified to the vital interests and fundamental benefits of the broad masses of peasants. Consequently, the peasantry accepted the most restrictive grain monopoly, even going so far as to hand over their entire supply of excess grain without any remuneration whatsoever. The Bolshevik party relied on this policy only because the Soviet regime was in a position of extreme deprivation and requisitioned to the ultimate limit all the goods it could requisition, particularly grain, to supply military and civilian needs so as to assure that the armed forces could continue to fight, and to prevent industry from collapsing altogether, and finally win the war.

However, the grain levy system did, after all, damage the real economic interests of the peasantry. While facing the danger of a comeback by the ancient regime, when their lives hung in the balance, the peasants--principally the middle peasants--though unhappy, were able to bear this burden at least temporarily. But their dissatisfaction gradually grew, and levies of excess grain met increasing resistance of various kinds. According to figures from the Soviet Central Statistical Bureau, in 1920 the peasants concealed an area planted to crops in excess of 20 million acres, which amounted to 14 percent of the total area planted. The amount of harvest that was hidden amounted to 33 percent of the total.³

Because of the continuous destruction caused by war and a decline in the production sentiments of the peasantry, the situation in agriculture became extremely bad. The area planted in Soviet Russia decreased by 21 million Russian acres as compared with 1917 with total yields declining from 330 pood to 17 million pood.⁴ Serious economic hardships affected not only the peasants but also aroused dissatisfaction among the broad ranks of workers, and cracks began to appear in the alliance between workers and peasants, the foundation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The occurrence in February 1921 of the Kronstadt Rebellion, instigated by enemies within the country and abroad, was a warning of danger. Some peasants newly inducted into the armed forces joined the rebellion under slogans of, "free trade," and "soviets without Bolsheviks." This demonstrated that under the new historical conditions of a virtual conclusion to the civil war, the basic

form of the original alliance between workers and peasants was no longer fitted to the objective circumstances. During the period of the October Revolution and the civil war, the political and economic foundation of the alliance of workers and peasants had been the overthrow of landlords and rule by capitalists, with the peasants gaining land, and the building and safeguarding of the Soviet political authority that represented the interests of the workers and peasants. But once the civil war had come to an end, it became necessary to consolidate the alliance of workers and peasants on a new foundation, and this required a revival of the national economy, which had sustained serious damage, providing industrial products to the peasantry, improving the livelihood of the workers and peasants, and gradually building the socialist economic system. If economic links could not be used to strengthen this revolutionary alliance, the proletariat could lose its most numerous ally--the peasantry; the alliance of workers and peasants would then be in danger of splitting. Focusing on this political situation, which appeared in the spring of 1921, Lenin felt that the proletarian regime "must at once adopt rapid, resolute, and urgent methods to improve the living conditions of the peasantry and increase their productivity."⁵ This meant "using the industrial goods needed by the peasants in exchange for grain. Only such a grain policy fitted the mission of the proletariat."⁶

On 8 October 1921, Lenin made the following proposals to the Politburo:

- "1. Satisfy the desires of the peasants, who were outside the Party, for a grain tax to take the place of the system of levies for excess grain (i.e. requisition purchases of excess grain).
2. Lower the grain tax, lowering it to the figure for requisition purchases of last year's excess grain levies.
3. Agreement with the principle of matching taxes to be paid to the initiative of the peasants, i.e. lowering the tax rate as peasant initiative increases.
4. So long as taxes are paid in full, permit the peasants to use the grain remaining after they have paid their taxes as they see fit within the regional economy."⁷

Later on, the Fifth Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) formally passed a resolution titled, "A System on Taxes in Kind to Replace Excess Grain Levies," which spelled out the principle of changing to taxes in kind, amounts of taxes to be paid, and methods of collection. These included, "permitting the peasants full rights to dispose of all grain, raw materials and fodder remaining to them after completion of full payment in kind, and to use it to improve or consolidate their own economy, or use it for industrial goods, handicraft industry goods, or farm products."⁸ On the basis of this resolution, the All Russia Central Executive Committee formally promulgated a decree on 21 March 1921 stipulating that in normal harvest years amount of grain taxes to be paid would be 240 million pood, a reduction of 200 million pood from the period of excess grain levies; this greatly lightened the burden on the peasantry.

In the wake of the substitution of a grain tax for the system of grain requisitions, permission was given for free private trade in grain and other farm products. On 28 March 1921, the Soviet government published an edict titled, "Free Exchange in Individual Provinces and the Buying and Selling of Farm Products in the Completion of the Excess Grain Collection Task," which recognized the principle of free trade and permitted the free circulation of commodities within individual regions. On 19 July and again on 9 August, further edicts were promulgated further expanding the scope of free trade among private individuals, and stipulating that handicraft products and small industrial goods also come under this principle. This policy of the Soviet regime aroused enthusiasm for production in the peasantry to a definite degree, and permitted the peasants to obtain the funds to buy farm machinery, fuel and farm chemicals for further production.

In 1922, the state began to set up various kinds of trade organizations to handle the sale of industrial goods produced by state enterprises. Consumer cooperatives, those auxiliary organizations established during the period of the civil war for purchase, supply, and distribution by the state, were now converted to the principal channels for the flow of commodities between cities and the countryside. They dealt principally in retail sales, but they also did wholesaling, purchasing, and distribution tasks for the state.

Private trade in rural villages had formerly been done only in illegal ways, but now the government issued business permits that permitted businesses to be run legally. Growth of private trade in cities and the countryside was very rapid in the earliest period, particularly during 1921. Total amount of private trade in Soviet Russia for the years 1922 to 1923, 1923 to 1924, and 1925 amounted to 3.392 billion rubles, 4.965 billion rubles, and 5.2 billion rubles respectively.⁹ But because the Soviet regime vigorously developed the state-owned sector of the economy and cooperatives, the ratio of private trade to total trade declined from 43.9 percent to 25 percent during the above 3-year period. It is not hard to see that during this period of NEP, the one who received the most benefit continued to be the Soviet state. The growth of capitalist factors through private trade was only a small danger in comparison with the economic collapse that the Soviet regime had faced. Through proper methods and by keeping within bounds, the evils could be completely overcome, making this a supplementary element for use in the socialist economy. By way of leading the peasants gradually along the path of socialism, the Soviet regime encouraged the peasants to join joint plowing bodies, farm labor associations, and farm cooperatives, but these were only experimental in nature at first.

The above series of measures adopted by the Soviet regime effected rapid improvement in worker-peasant relations, and the alliance of the workers and peasants was gradually consolidated. One good example occurred during the summer of 1921 when the masses of middle peasants joined with the working class to participate enthusiastically in the smashing of the vestiges of the rebellion of the Andongnuofu [phonetic] and Mahenuo [phonetic] bandit gangs. After some complications, agricultural production stabilized, revived and

developed. Using a farm index of 100 for the year 1913, the years 1921-1922 showed a decline to 54.4; the years 1922-1923 showed a revival to 73.6; and the years 1925-1926 reached 101.3, to exceed the pre-war level.¹⁰ With the revival of agricultural production and the lightening of the peasants' burdens, the life of the peasants showed definite improvement with some poor peasants becoming well-off. A comparison of the years 1926-1927 with 1925-1926 shows a 760,000 decline in poor households [bednyak] in the European part of Soviet Russia and an increase by more than 600,000 in the number of middle peasant [serednyak] households.¹¹ Where once the Russian landscape offered a scene of devastation everywhere, a picture of prosperity now began to appear. Some of the content of Soviet agricultural policies during the NEP years were regressive in character, but this, in no way, shook the socialist economic base. Retreat was for the purpose of advancing better, and it aroused all the positive elements within the country, giving special encouragement to the enthusiasm of the peasants for production to bring about the quick revival and growth of the national economy. The leadership of the proletariat gave expression to the leadership of policy by the proletariat. The methods used by the Russian Bolshevik Party under Lenin's leadership in effecting a change in historical conditions and in implementing a flexible policy of strategic retreat were not of the kind seen by the peasantry as a distant vision, but were workable methods that the peasantry could understand and know well under the conditions of the time. The NEP won the support of the broad masses of the peasantry for the Soviet regime, and history has demonstrated that Lenin's guiding ideology on the alliance of the workers and peasants was entirely correct.

2

During the NEP period, many fundamental measures and reforms were carried out in industry as well. Lenin steadfastly maintained that to increase the productivity of labor, it was necessary, first of all, to provide a material and technical foundation for large scale industry. In a small agricultural country, socialism can achieve complete victory only by placing the national economy, including agriculture, on a technological foundation of modernized large-scale industry.

In order to revitalize the national economy, which had sustained serious damage as a result of long warfare, and to lay a technical foundation for a socialist economy, during the NEP period Soviet Russia placed implementation of a planned economy and the development of socialist large scale industry in the most important place. In February 1920, the first session of the Seventh All-Russia Central Executive Committee approved a resolution to formulate an economic plan for electrification. The Ninth Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) resolved that, "The basic condition for the revitalization of our national economy is thorough implementation of unified economic planning for the historical period of the near future."¹² At the suggestion of Lenin, the Russian State Electrification Planning Commission [GOELRO] was established and headed by Charrichanuofusiji [phonetic and possibly Charichanovski]. Almost 200 first rate experts and

technicians went to work to draw up a detailed plan centered on electrification for which the All-Russian Congress of Soviets obtained unanimous approval. It was in a report to this congress that Lenin proposed the celebrated formula that, "Communism is the electrification of the entire country by the Soviet regime." He enthusiastically hailed the electrification plan as, "a great economic plan that shows how to put our country on the true economic footing so much needed by communism."¹³ This magnificent plan began full implementation during the NEP period. Its first project, the Kaxila [phonetic] power station was completed victoriously in 19²².

In order to assure that economic planning was done and that there was coordination among departments, Lenin also authorized establishment of a State Planning Commission [GOSPLAN]. The Soviet regime approved institution of reforms in the management system, and promotion of the revitalization and development of nationalized industries, to place socialist large industries in first place in the national economy.

During the period of the civil war, the Soviet regime exercised a high degree of centralized administration over industry through the Supreme National Economic Commission and its subordinate administrative bureaus. No matter how large or small an enterprise, the central government prescribed a uniform control over the whole process from raw materials supply to the sale of finished goods. In 1921, the 52 administrative bureaus under the Supreme National Economic Commission were reorganized into 16 new central ministries of industry, and enterprises nationwide were divided into just 2 categories. One category of enterprises continued under centralized state control, principally from the fuels and metals ministries. After 1922, this category of enterprises was reduced to include only those products supplied to the state for its use and those defense industries that had no way of doing business in the marketplace. The other category included most industries, principally consumer goods enterprises. These enterprises gradually implemented cost accounting systems, and they became completely independent from a financial and commercial standpoint. Most of them were under the leadership of the Provincial National Economic Commissions. The Soviet government also decided to replace the centralized management system within enterprises with a system of one-man responsibility, while at the same time retaining workers committees in adherence to the principle of democratic centralization, so as to be able to exercise effective supervision over all functions within plants. The distribution system was changed from the system of equal materials distribution in use during the period of war communism. While acknowledging the individual material welfare of the workers, a differential system of labor remuneration was set up, which was based on degree of expertise and ability to produce.

In August 1922, the Labor Commission and the National Defense Commission put out a resolution titled, "Basic Criteria for Measures to Revive Big Industry and Develop Production," which approved the general principle of trust reorganization of industry and guaranteed the transition of enterprises to cost accounting systems. By December of the same year, 15 major trusts had

been established.¹⁴ In 1923 this increased to 478 trusts of which the largest was Ivanov-Fuziniexiansike [phonetic] textile trust with 54,000 workers. There were 21 trusts with workers in excess of 10,000.¹⁵ On 10 April 1923, the Soviet government promulgated a law fixing the character and authority of trusts, providing that no state organization that had not yet concluded a contract or agreement would be allowed to obtain trust property or goods freely; that the Supreme Economic Commission would not interfere with the daily administrative work and the economic work of councils; and that trusts had to pay various taxes in the same way as private enterprises (including income taxes and property taxes).

At this time, one of the main factors obstructing economic recovery and development was the lack of qualifications within the scientific and technical ranks in Soviet Russia. Consequently, simultaneous with the active training of scientists and technicians from the working class, Soviet Russia decided to invite specialists, technicians, and skilled workers from abroad, and even welcomed the organization of delegations of foreign workers to come to the Soviet Union as "industrial immigrants" to join in construction. The American working class tendered technical assistance to Soviet Russia in a demonstration of great warmheartedness. The first congress of the "Society for Technical Assistance to Soviet Russia" convened in New York in July 1921. Next, electrical workers and machinists set up a special committee to send some American workers to the Soviet Union. A plan was also announced at that time providing for the lease to American workers' cooperatives of the Kuzinlecike [phonetic] coal mine, chemical plants, and some other plants.¹⁶ In November of the same year, an American workers organization signed an agreement with Soviet Russia providing for the dispatch of 5,800 skilled workers to organize industrial work teams to run the Naxuanridingsiji [phonetic] plant and some enterprises in the Kusbass for which the Soviet government would be responsible for the purchase of machinery.¹⁷ Selfless international assistance from the working class of various countries hastened the revival of the national economy of Soviet Russia.

One outstanding characteristic of the NEP period was the broad use by the Soviet government of the principles and various forms of state capitalism. During April and May of 1918, in the course of criticizing "leftwing Communists," Lenin developed the theories of state capitalism that he had created before the war, maintaining that soviet countries also had need of state capitalism. According to his views, establishment of socialism required, in addition to the occupation of a ruling position by the proletariat, i.e. establishment of the most basic political conditions for a nation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the preparation or creation of the most basic socio-economic conditions as well. Using the situation in Germany and in Soviet Russia as examples, Lenin spoke as follows about the material conditions required for the implementation of socialism: "Unless it is founded on big capitalist technology with the newest achievements of modern science, and unless there is a planned state organization that stringently upholds unified standards for the production and distribution of the goods of millions of people, there is no use even thinking about socialism."¹⁸

Lenin strictly distinguished between state capitalism under the capitalist system and state capitalism under the soviet system. In the former, monopoly bourgeoisie control the state apparatus and interfere in the national economy in order to guarantee and consolidate the position of finance capital. In such countries, capitalism is a "hard labor camp for workers," and "paradise for capitalists." In the latter, matters are entirely different; it is linked with soviet countries, "and the state is the workers, the advanced portion of the workers, the vanguard, we ourselves."¹⁹ Therefore, soviet regimes can control and use this kind of state capitalism. In short, whether ownership of the means of production lies with the proletariat or with the bourgeoisie determines the difference in character of the two.

During the NEP period, Lenin repeatedly expounded on the need to institute state capitalism. He maintained that in Soviet Russia there still existed five basic economic components, namely: patriarchal, which, to a very large extent, was the natural peasant economy; small commodity production; private capitalism; state capitalism; and socialism. He believed that in a small agricultural country, the spontaneous influence of the petit bourgeoisie was dominant. Speculators who used grain as the principal object of their speculation, as well as unscrupulous merchants, and monopoly saboteurs were the enemies of soviet economic measures. In this struggle it was not a struggle between state capitalism and socialism but the petit bourgeoisie and private capitalists, who jointly and in common, opposed both state capitalism and socialism. Still, after 7 years of civil war, complete economic destruction, plus crop failure and a fuel crisis, the immediate urgency was revival of the national economy requiring, first of all, an increase in the enthusiasm of the peasants for production. Inevitably, implementation of the NEP on a foundation of definite freedom of trade, might mean growth of the petit bourgeoisie as well as the growth of capitalism. But if capitalism, limited in its extent and the period of its existence, could be led into the path of state capitalism, then its transformation into socialism within the not too distant future could be assured. It was with this in mind that Lenin said, "As soon as the working class learns how to preserve national order by opposing the anarchic character of small owners, and as soon as it learns how to handle nationwide large-scale production organization using the principles of state capitalism," then, "the consolidation of socialism will be assured."²⁰

Lenin envisaged the Soviet regime "cultivating" many forms of state capitalism, among which the most important was the concession system. He felt this was a way for the state power of the proletariat to oppose the spontaneous influence of the small owners by forming an alliance with state capitalism. "Cultivation" of this kind of state capitalism could enhance the control of soviet authority over the quantity of industrial products, strengthen the economic bonds controlled by the state, and oppose the anarchic economic relationships of the petit bourgeoisie.

In practice, the concession system would first have to use foreign capital, technology, and equipment to develop Russia's economy. A resolution of the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) declared,

"Concessions are an effective and workable form for foreign capital to participate in the development of the resources of the Soviet Republic." It stipulated that all those sectors where there can be "clear increases in the level of development of Russia's productivity," such as forestry, coal mining, and petroleum and electric power endeavors, could be places for concessions.²¹ On 23 November 1920, the Soviet government formally promulgated a concession law, which precisely stipulated the rights of foreign concessionaires as well as their responsibilities and the conditions they must adhere to. Among the concession agreements entered into with foreign capitalists were 14 in the 1921-1922 period, 32 in the 1922-1923 period, 34 in the 1923-1924 period, 29 in the 1924-1925 period and 36 in the 1925-1926 period.²² Great Britain obtained mining rights for copper mines and gold mines in the Ural and Altai regions. The largest concession obtained by the United States was the Harriman company's mining rights in the Qiatula [phonetic] manganese mines. The agreement stipulated that that company must invest \$4 million during the first 5 years, that the period of concession was for 20 years, and that for every ton of manganese sent out within the first 3 years, the company had to pay the Soviet government \$3, after which the sum would be \$4.²³

The Soviet government also established joint stock companies with foreign capitalists, 24 of them being set up by 1923. Participating in joint enterprises were Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Sweden, Norway, Holland, and Iran. The earliest stock company established jointly with foreign capitalists was in February 1922 when the "State Domestic and Foreign Leather Trading Company," with a total capitalization of 15 million rubles was set up. Another one established fairly early was the Russo-German Jointly Owned Metals Company with a capitalization of 2 million Deutschmarks and whose principal business was the sale of ores and scrap metals.²⁴ Internally, the Soviet government permitted cooperatives, organizations, and private individuals the right to lease state-owned enterprises. According to figures dated 1 September 1922, those most leased were foodstuffs and leather industries with 3,800 such enterprises being leased and employing 68,000 people. Fifty percent of these were leased to private individuals, principally their original proprietors, with the remainder being leased to cooperatives, labor organizations and state organizations.²⁵ Most of the leased enterprises had been badly run. Simultaneously, the government announced that any enterprise hiring fewer than 20 workers, no matter whether or not it had been nationalized or taken over, could be returned to its original owner or leased to others so as to develop small industries. In December 1922, the Tenth Congress of All Russian Soviets estimated that in state-owned industries including communications and transportation industries, there were 3 million workers, and that 70,000 people were working in private and leased plants. In 1923, 84.5 percent of workers were employed in state-owned enterprises, and only 12.4 percent of workers were employed in private enterprises. Output value of state-owned enterprises was 92.4 percent of total output value; output value of private enterprise amounted to 4.9 percent.²⁶

Due to the limitations of historical conditions at that time, there was no great development of the concession system in actual fact. But the true significance of state capitalism does not lie in the concession system. The fundamental reason underlying the need for implementation of this state capitalism was that Russia was a country in which most of the farming was small in scale and the level of socialized production was backward, in consequence of which it could not "directly" make the transition to socialism. Its already advanced system of government had to put to use one form of numerous economic components as an intermediate link or supplementary means of attaining the goal of increased productivity to create the material economic prerequisites for the transition to socialism.

Experience has demonstrated that the industrial policy that the Bolshevik party pursued at this time worked effectively. After several years arduous and outstanding struggle, the Soviet regime was rescued from the brink of national economic collapse. In 1920, the total output value of registered industries showed a decline from 3.848 billion rubles in 1917 to 818 million rubles. But after the NEP period, the output value of coal, petroleum, iron ore, timber, and cement in the 1925-1926 period was close to pre-war levels, and machine fabrication and electric power generation respectfully reached 113 percent and 149.8 percent of pre-war levels. Most light industries also exceeded pre-war levels.²⁷ Taking the 1913 industrial index to be 100, the index for the 1921-1922 period was 30.1, for the 1924-1925 period 67, and for the 1926-1927 period all industrial indices exceeded pre-war levels.²⁸ Average output value per work in the 1925-1926 period was 2437 rubles, a 3-fold rise over 1920. Workers' real wages increased 36 percent within 3 years to become 134 percent of pre-war levels.

The above-cited industrial achievements during the NEP period laid a solid material foundation for socialist industrialization of the Soviet Union.

3

The transformation from war communism to the NEP was by no means all smooth sailing. Not only did it meet with fierce response both at home and abroad, but the fight within the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) was extremely violent. Prior to the Tenth Party Congress, i.e. at the time when the NEP was being liberated, the focus of struggle between Lenin and the opportunists was principally on the issue of whether war communism should be abandoned or adhered to.

The opportunists, Trotsky and Bukharin, under the guise of super-revolutionary extreme leftism, stubbornly clung to war communism, which was no longer suited to the situation that had developed. They imagined that this policy would lead to a direct transition to communism. In his 1920 book, "The Economy in the Period of Transition," Bukharin regarded as heretical Lenin's proposal for the institution of state capitalism under the dictatorship of the proletariat, even though it was based on the concrete situation in Russia, and he ignored the distinctions in the character of state capitalism under two different social systems. He maintained that state capitalism in any country

"under the dictatorship of the proletariat" was out of the question because it would have to be "premised on the existence of a capitalist country." They maintained that war communism was the ideal road on which to go from capitalism to socialism. In the "ideal society" of their design, the laws of value no longer played a role. Bukharin's colleague, Lalin [phonetic] made the absurd assertion that, "the process of the withering away of currency is proportional to the development of Soviet economic organization. Money no longer exists as the sole symbol of value, and to a rather large extent, money, as a medium of exchange, can be abolished."²⁹ They proposed devaluation of the currency as a means to speed the demise of currency and the commodity system. Pulieaobularensiji [phonetic] preached that the printing presses for banknotes are "machine guns for attacking the political power of the bourgeoisie."³⁰ Proceeding from the above stated extreme left views, they advocated continuance of the balanced distribution system for goods and opposed a wage system using currency. Their labor system would use obligatory labor and the militarization of the civilian populace to organize production, and these coercive measures were seen as "methods of self-organizations of the working class and methods whereby the working class would organize the peasantry." Even the absurd slogan of "a military dictatorship of the proletariat" was put forward.³¹ Trotsky used the trade union issue to provoke large scale debate. He advocated a series of extreme leftist methods to peddle the preposterous views of a nationalization of trade unions and the militarization of labor. Among his proposals was the advocacy of "tightening the screws," and "total elimination of trade unions," with the institution of the militarization of the working class, and reliance on "an army of workers" to bring about the revival of the economy. He even said that, "it must be explained to the workers that they should be transferred and led to wherever they are needed," and "deserters" among workers should be sent to training camps and concentration camps exactly as deserting soldiers are.

Lenin was by no means intimidated by the hullabaloo created by the opportunists, nor did he stiffly and mechanically apply one or two phrases of Marxism. Instead, he began with the living realities of a changed situation and courageously put forward a series of theses.

First of all he refuted the extreme left notions about a "direct transition" held by the opportunists. Proceeding from the actual situation in Russia where there were numerous components to the economy, notably the dominance of a small-scale agricultural economy and an inadequately developed base of large-scale industrial production, Lenin clearly showed that Russia could not use the direct transitional forms that other industrially advanced countries could use. In a later summary, he pointed out that, "We had planned to use this enthusiasm to carry out directly economic tasks every bit as great as our political tasks and military tasks. We originally planned (or put more accurately, we did not completely work out) the direct use of the laws of a proletarian country to regulate national production and the distribution of goods according to communist principles in a country of small-scale agriculture. The present living conditions show that we made

mistakes."³² Very clearly, the mistakes to which Lenin pointed were the means by which it was hoped to make a direct transition over a period of time. Lenin also profoundly illuminated the necessity of a transformation from war communism to new economic policies, pointing out the impossibility of using yesterday's wartime experiences to solve the new problems of today's construction. War communism was a necessary measure for specific historical conditions, and though it had assured military victory for the Soviet regime, economically it overstepped objective historical conditions. Were it to be continued after conclusion of the civil war, not only would it be of no help in reviving the economy, it could contribute to an undermining of the alliance between workers and peasants and could shake the political authority of the proletariat. Consequently, a strategic retreat with abandonment of "direct attacks" on capitalism and a turning instead to "outflanking" was extremely necessary. Lenin pointed out that if the opportunists, Trotsky and Bukharin, opposed a turning to this new path, the result would be a fleecing of the peasantry and becoming divorced from the peasantry, with the loss to the newborn Soviet regime of a reliable foundation. In arguments on the trade union issue, Lenin strenuously rejected Trotsky's proposals, staunchly opposing the application of methods of military coercion to the organization of the economic life of the people. He pointed out that the controversy over the labor unions was a question of how to "treat the masses, have a good grasp of the masses, and unite with the masses." Trotsky's program could only exacerbate relations between the Party and the workers and peasants, place the Party above the masses, and bring about a deterioration in the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But struggle over the issue of a circuitious transformation was by no means over. Once the NEP was instituted, the struggle between the two lines within the Party reappeared in connection with new issues. The dominant tendency came, as usual, from the "left." The opportunists bent all efforts to the villification of the NEP as an abandonment of the fruits of the October Revolution and as a retreat toward capitalism. They went out of their way to disseminate scary notions about phenomena such as the appearance of "naipuman" [phonetic]; they attacked all measures for state capitalism that were adopted at that time such as policies to permit free trade and the existence of private capitalism, saying they were an advocacy of capitalism and fostered an economy of kulaks. Whenever they attacked the Party, they usually seized on some issue and wrote big articles about it. In a book conveying his own views, Pulieaobularensiji [phonetic] slandered the NEP as enhancing the position of the kulaks, insisting that the kulaks had gained "dominance" through the hiring of labor.³³ Speaking from the "Shiyida" rostrum, Tuoluepunikefu [phonetic] publicly criticized the NEP as being premised on a sacrifice of benefits to the workers.³⁴ These "leftist" factions demanded, long before conditions were ripe, a rapid change in production relationships with the implementation of the "socialization of agriculture." Their dissemination of these false theories found definite appeal from among the masses who did not understand the true nature of the NEP and who did not understand economic laws. It may be seen that "leftist" tendencies during that period were a major peril.

Trotsky and Bukharin sometimes also attacked the Marxist line to which Lenin adhered from the right as well. For example, they characterized the NEP as a purely passive retreat, and vainly attempted to lead the NEP into a line for the restoration of capitalism. Bukharin proposed giving to private trade freedom from government restrictions; he did not want to restrict and squeeze out capitalist elements but give capitalism full development, and he endeavored to advocate abolition of the monopoly on foreign trade. On the pretext that it was a losing proposition, Trotsky demanded an abrupt halt to heavy industrial production with a closing of the large Putiluofu [phonetic] and Buliangsike [phonetic] plants. He also advocated the auctioning of some enterprises owned by all the people and the conversion of the state-owned Datuolasi [phonetic] enterprises into private enterprises.

Lenin made a vigorous counterattack and a thorough criticism of the above "leftist" alarmist notions and of rightist capitulationism. Lenin pointed out that the NEP signified a life and death struggle over "who will conquer whom" between capitalism and socialism, that it did not change the essence of the workers' state, and that it changed only the methods and forms for building socialism.³⁵ Socialist construction was built on a foundation of heavy industry made possible by advanced technical equipment, but the laying of the foundation of heavy industry must follow from the revival of agriculture, and all possible methods would have to be used including leasing of concessions, joint enterprises, permitting the growth of private capitalism, and free trade in order to achieve the goals of revival, development and capital accumulation. Without these measures, the building and development of heavy industry was nothing but empty talk. The adoption of the forms and methods of NEP were all under the supervision and regulation of the state. They were all premised on the state's firm control over the economic lifelines of the entire country such as land, the banks, the railroads, heavy industry and foreign trade. On this point, the Soviet regime was unshakeable. Thus, the NEP was no "transmutation," much less was it a retreat to capitalism. Looked at in terms of its political significance, the institution of this policy was "another form of struggle between the two antagonistic classes that are absolutely irreconcilable"--the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.³⁶ Lenin denounced the "leftist" contention that inasmuch as "naipuman" elements had appeared in free trade and would, as soon as they had the economic strength, develop to become a reactionary political force, that, in order to guard against the "naipuman" elements, the NEP had to be scrapped. Lenin said this was a vulgar understanding of the principles of historical materials. While opposing "leftist" tendencies, Lenin also led the entire Party to launch a timely struggle against the power of capitalism. He clearly pointed out, "the need to be good at controlling all negative aspects of the NEP...good at shrinking these negative aspects to the minimum."³⁷ He further emphasized "the need to strictly supervise the activities of private industry and commerce...strictly punishing any of their illegal actions."³⁸ In 1922, after the NEP had been in effect for 1 year, Lenin announced an end to the "retreat" and that the new goal was "redployment of forces" to begin to turn toward attack. Of course, this was not to say that the NEP had come to an end; it simply signified that there was to be a retreat only in permitting the existence and growth of capitalism.

To summarize, the NEP that the Party of Lenin formulated achieved success in the midst of the removal of interference of "leftist" and right tendencies. Soviet Russia's transformation from war communism to the NEP marked her entrance from internal strife to the new historical state of peaceful construction. This signified an end to the stage in which large scale armed struggle was the principal form, and a turn in the work of the Party toward the path in which economic construction was paramount. In the short space of the few years between early 1921 and the end of 1925, the Bolshevik Party, relying on correct policies and strategies, led all of the people to heal the wounds of war and lay a solid foundation for the subsequent large scale construction and the realization of socialist industrialization. The great revolutionary leader, Lenin, put forward a series of brilliant theses on how to construct a socialist economic foundation for the transition to socialism for a backward country in which small-scale agriculture held a dominant position, thereby greatly enriching and developing Marxist theories on transition periods. Consequently, this transformation was a fundamental transformation possessed of great strategic significance.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 27, p 235.
2. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 33, p 143.
3. Morris Dobb, "Soviet Economic Development Since 1917," London, 1953, pp 116-117.
4. Liangshiqinke (phonetic), "History of the National Economy of the Soviet Union," Vol 3, p 95.
5. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 32, p 331.
6. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 32, p 333.
7. "Complete Works of Lenin," Vol 32, p 123.
8. "Compilation of Resolutions of Party Congresses, Conferences of Delegates, and Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR," Renmin Clubanshe, Book Two, p 107.
9. Liangshiqinke, op cit, Vol 3, p 188.
10. Xiaolinliangzheng (phonetic), "Economic History of Soviet Society," p 366.
11. Alexander Baykov, "The Development of the Soviet Economic System," New York, 1947, p 135.

12. "Compilation of Resolutions of Soviet Communist Party Congresses, Conferences of Delegates, and Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee," Renmin Chubanshe, Book Two, p 3.
13. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 31, p 47.
14. E.H. Carr, "The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923," London, 1978, Vol 2, pp 306-307.
15. Ibid.
16. A.A. Heller, "The Industrial Revival in Soviet Russia," New York, 1922, pp 146 and 167.
17. B.A. Valikov, "The USSR and the USA," Soviet Science Press, 1965, p 113.
18. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 3, p 545.
19. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 4, p 627.
20. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 3, p 544.
21. "Compilation of Resolutions of Soviet Party Congresses, Conferences of Delegates, and Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee," Vol 2, p 110.
22. Liangshiqinke, op cit, Vol 3, p 170.
23. Valikov, op cit, p 151.
24. A.A. Heller, op cit, p 165.
25. E.H. Carr, op cit, Vol 2, pp 301-302.
26. E.H. Carr, op cit, Vol 2, p 203.
27. Liangshiqinke (phonetic), op cit, Vol 3, p 175-176.
28. Xiaolinliangzheng (phonetic), op cit, p 366.
29. Morris Dobb, op cit, p 121.
30. Ibid.
31. E.H. Carr, "Socialism in One Country," London, 1978, Vol 1, p 166.
32. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 33, p 39.
33. E.H. Carr, "The Bolshevik Revolution," Vol 2, pp 292-294.

34. Ibid.
35. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 33, p 155.
36. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 33, p 255.
37. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 33, p 400.
38. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 33, pp 151-152.

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PARTY AND STATE

PRIVILEGED CLASS POLARIZES CCP CADRES' SECOND GENERATION

Hong Kong DONGXIFANG [EAST AND WEST] in Chinese No 12, 10 Dec 79 pp 4-9

[Editorial: "On the Most Serious Crisis in Communist China--Seeing the Newly Rising Privileged Class in the Light of the 'Two Xionsg' Case in Hangzhou"]

[Text] On 30 October and 7 November 1979, the Hangzhou Municipal Middle Court, in a serious trial of an unusually serious criminal case, sentenced principals Xiong Ziping and Xiong Beiping to death and life imprisonment respectively for molesting and raping over 100 women. On 14 November, the Zhejiang Provincial High Court upheld this Hangzhou Municipal Middle Court decision in an action rejecting their appeal. Xiong Ziping had been executed, while Xiong Beiping is now serving prison terms. This was really something done to the great satisfaction of the people.

The Chinese communist authorities disclosed that the "two Xionsg" were really notorious for their wrongdoings and heinous crimes. Xiong Ziping raped a woman while he was still a "PLA" soldier in 1971. Elaborating on crimes committed by the "two Xionsg" following their retirement from active duty, the Chinese communist authorities stated: "From May 1974 through August 1978, in addition to committing felonies individually, they ganged up with Ma Shaohua, Qian Yongmin, Wang Bin, Tian Hangsheng, Zhang Yong, Cong Zhong, Yu Xinqiang, Zhang Jiping and other criminals in seducing, molesting and raping 106 young women. Among the victims were educated young women, young women workers, and female students. They were also accused of setting up a private trial court to blackmail, intimidate and bully the people. The two Xionsg, aided and abetted by other hooligans, also took advantage of their father's powerful political stature as a leading cadre and his luxurious official residence to ruthlessly carry out various criminal activities. They often appeared in twos and threes on Nanshan Road, and at the Qingbo Park and other public places in Hangzhou to lure and abduct women to the home of the Xionsg, where they threatened the victims with knives and then assaulted them and raped them by turns. The two Xionsg also used promises of jobs, and invitations to "a lecture on romance and love," "a music concert," and "a television enjoyment meeting" as a lure for achieving the same criminal end.

The two Xionsgs and their followers were angrily condemned by the masses as a bunch of criminals and shameless "playboys," and by other youths born of the families of revolutionary cadres as scum who disgraced the families of cadres. The people said: "The two Xionsgs at the Qingbo Bridge were more dreadful and loathsome than Tiger Wang, a character in the novel: 'Tiger Wang Wants to Marry a Wife Against Her Wishes.'"

The case of the "two Xionsgs" in Hangzhou was not merely a simple criminal case but a big thought-provoking problem. The twin brothers--Xiong Ziping and Xiong Beiping--were only 27 years old this year. They began to commit crimes at the age of 18, or in 1971. How could they have such guts? Was this simply a result of the pernicious influence of Lin Biao and the "gang of four"? They began to commit crimes in 1971 but were not arrested and brought to justice until 1978. Why was there such a delay? Was it because the Hangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau didn't know, or dared not handle this case? Had nearly 100 victims reported their incidents to police? If not, was it because they feared reprisals or felt it was useless to do so? Xiong Yingtang, the father of the two Xionsgs, was former 20th Army commander, former commander of the Zhejiang Provincial Military District and concurrently vice chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee. He was a famous figure when Lin Biao and the "gang of four" were in power. Now he is a mad dog in the water. Peng Zhen once stated: "All are equals before the law." But we common people would like to know that if Xiong Yingtang were still in power, would the crimes committed by his sons have been exposed? If exposed, would the court have meted out the same severe punishment to them?

Many High-Ranking Cadres' Children Commit Crimes

The case of the two Xionsgs has closed. But was it an individual and isolated case? Our response is no. The juvenile delinquency involving the children of high-ranking cadres dates back to the pre-cultural revolution days, but was never reported by the press. They were either placed in the custody of their parents or were protected by them. At that time, these young bullies from the families of high-ranking cadres also relied on the power of their parents to harass and molest women (mostly beautiful school girls and young women workers of course). Occasionally, they pickpocketed and robbed people or engaged in gang fights. Shortly after the cultural revolution, these young bullies from the families of officials became more arrogant and brazen. After putting on uniforms, they proudly called themselves "leftist," saying that their blood was nobler than others'. They also loved tormenting and teasing other students and their teachers. Those sons of high-ranking cadres in Beijing were the nucleus of a notorious "joint action group," and later formed the so-called "16 May corps," thus bringing disaster to the nation as a whole. Soon, their peers in other provinces and municipalities followed suit, and later they became champions of the ultra-left forces for the cultural revolution or leaders and stalwarts of smashers, looters, robbers, law-breakers and rapists. None of the universities, secondary and primary schools could escape their vandalism. The Chinese communist press disclosed that it was precisely these hooligans that recently led other instigators in stirring up troubles throughout the Chinese mainland. They

were arrogant and overbearing and lorded it over others, and pushed the people around everywhere. They were typical hoodlums, riff-raff and anarchists. On 10 November, a Beijing-dated AP news dispatch stated: A plain cafeteria in Beijing city has become the most attractive night scene. There, nearly 100 Chinese youths, including sons and daughters of high-ranking cadres, gathered, puffing expensive cigarettes, drinking beer and champagne, trying to expend their energy.

"A young Chinese lady with curly hair and light-colored rouge proudly puffed a cigarette, enjoying admiration from a lonely African student.

"A 35-year-old philosophy student eagerly discussed Hegel and Kant with the Westerners present, as well as "Waterloo Bridge" and other films produced in the West.

"After swallowing one cup of beer and champagne after another, a 24-year-old student boasted that his dad had never turned him down, adding: 'He is willing to buy everything I want.' He also persuaded this correspondent to sell his radio recorder to him at any price.

"This brightly illuminated cafeteria located at the heart of the city near the 'Peace Guest House' opened on 1 January this year.

"It is a meeting place for the Chinese and foreigners.

"This noisy cafeteria was usually full of college and secondary school students, workers, professionals, the unemployed, and disgruntled students from the countryside.

"A worker revealed that on the best day, his small cafeteria could do a business of nearly 3,000 yuan in Renminbi (approximately US\$1,250) for selling nearly 1,000 cups of beer and 500 cups of champagne.

"A youth who did not want to reveal his name said: 'My parents let me spend their money here.' This voice was echoed by other youths present at the cafeteria. In case of any problem, the waitresses would pass it on to the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through their manager.

"A few well-dressed young ladies (mostly students) wearing embroidered sports suits, badges or even artificial mother-of-pearls were accompanied to the cafeteria by their boy friends.

"A 24-year-old son of a high-ranking cadre jokingly asked a foreigner: 'do you have a radio recorder and camera? How much do you want for it?

"After disclosing that some foreigners sold these things to the Chinese, he said: 'My father would like to pay for them.' After gulping down more beer and champagne, he revealed that before the cultural revolution, his father was under house arrest; he and his two brothers were sent to Shanghai and then to the countryside where they spent years traveling and working.

"Like many other cadres, his father has been rehabilitated. Now he is willing to use his money to buy cameras and a good time for his children."

Did AP spread a rumor? No. It was not even denied by the press in Communist China. These sons and daughters of high-ranking cadres there have become more degenerate than the bourgeois playboys and playgirls. Although they have not committed any crimes, they are clearly leading a sinful life.

Widespread Coverup of Juvenile Delinquencies

In early November, Shanghai JIEFANG RIBAO exposed an attempt by a regimental political commissar of a certain PLA unit to free his guilty son from police detention with the following report; In early April this year, a group of hooligans and criminals led by a robber named Wang Rongai and armed with weapons committed over 20 robberies on Sinan Road, Nanchang Road, and Gaolan Road in Luwan District. They took wrist watches and cash from the masses, thus seriously threatening the lives of citizens and social order. Among these criminals was a youth named Li Yongsheng who joined Wang Rontai in committing seven robberies in addition to providing the latter with knives, firearms, and iron bars. After breaking up this criminal ring, the Luwan district public security subbureau decided to commit Li Yongsheng to a 2-year correctional education on the basis of his criminal record, pending the approval of its higher authorities.

On the morning of the second day of Li Yongsheng's detention, his father, a regimental political commissar and a regimental party committee secretary of a certain PLA unit, hurriedly arrived at the Luwan district public security subbureau, demanding to see his son. He declared: "I am doing political work for the army, and I may be in a position to help out with the case of my son." After considering that in his position as an army political officer, he might give his son a good dressing-down, the subbureau approved his request, but on the condition that he refrain from asking any questions about the legal aspect of the case during the meeting. The subbureau ordered the meeting terminated immediately after failing to dissuade him from asking such questions in flagrant violation of the public security regulations.

A few days later, that political commissar, without the authorization of higher authorities, sent the director of his political section and another cadre to the Luwan district public security subbureau, along with a letter of recommendation from his own party organization demanding the release of Li Yongsheng from police detention. The two cadres argued that Li Yongsheng's continuing detention had put his regimental political commissar-father in an awkward position. But the subbureau responded by stressing that the case in question should be handled in accordance with the laws, and no special treatment could be considered for any criminal even if he was a cadre's son. Half a month later, the two visited the Luwan district public security subbureau again, inquiring about Li Yongsheng. After they were informed of the subbureau's original decision to commit Li Yongsheng to a 2-year correctional education, which had been approved by its higher authorities, the two cadres alleged that on the basis of an investigation of the Li Yongsheng case by their regimental party committee, the commission of Li Yongsheng

to a correctional institution was a punishment too severe, and that he should be freed after a few days detention. They also repeatedly demanded "a reconsideration of the case" by the subbureau, despite its patient explanation as to why Li Yongsheng should undergo a 2-year correctional education. This unreasonable demand to tamper with the judiciary proceeding was rejected by the subbureau. On the afternoon of the same day, Li Yongsheng's parents personally lodged a protest with the subbureau for committing their son to a 2-year correctional education. In the days that followed, they continued writing letters to the party organization of the Luwan district public security subbureau, the Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau, the CCP Luwan District Committee, the municipal and district people's procuratorates, and other units accusing the Luwan district public security subbureau of not basing its verdict on Li Yongsheng on facts and handling the case not in conformity with the policy, and demanding "a reinvestigation and reconsideration of it."

Although the Luwan district law enforcement authorities resisted the pressure of that regimental political commissar, what would have happened if the pressure had come from a political commissar at the divisional and provincial military district levels?

Although the crimes committed by Li Yongsheng were not as serious as those committed by the "two Xionsgs in Hangzhou," the attitude taken by Li's PLA regimental political commissar-father against the judiciary decision was more intolerable than that taken by Xiong Yingtang. Li Yongsheng's father even went so far as to interfere with the judiciary proceeding and obstruct justice in trying to protect his guilty son. If he had been a provincial military district commander, what would he have done to the Luwan district public security subbureau? Not only did he make a personal appearance to argue for his guilty son, but he also instructed his subordinates to do the same. It was interesting to note that when his two subordinates did so, they did not even understand that they had blindly carried out an unlawful order. This fact showed that all sons of high and middle level cadres have long regarded themselves as persons "beyond the control of the laws," and that their parents' interference with the judiciary work has long been done routinely. Otherwise, how would Li Yongsheng's father dare stir up so much trouble?

Polarization of Cadres' Sons

A review of the aforementioned three cases bears witness to the fact that the commission of crimes by decadent and degenerate sons and daughters of high-ranking cadres in Communist China has become a matter of national concern and a serious social problem, a problem of how to prevent its second generation from further degenerating and a problem of how to strengthen the enforcement of law and discipline and eliminate the pernicious influence of feudalism.

Since its seizure of power 30 years ago, Communist China has concentrated on educating and caring for its younger generation. It has opened "1 August

middle schools" for its military cadres' children and "Yucai middle schools" for its party-government cadres' children. These children have received primary and secondary education at schools with highly selected teachers and specially designed teaching materials and equipment. Although there are no colleges specially designed for them, sons and daughters of high-ranking cadres have also faced no problem in entering Beijing University, Qinghua University and other first class universities. Communist China has long concerned itself with training and educating its second generation, or "successors to the revolution," which was regarded as a matter of greatest concern in the 50s. However, it is plain that its hopes for success in training the "successors to the revolution" have clearly gone up in bubbles. Not only has this type of special education failed to produce youths and "successors to the revolution" of desired qualities, but it has also resulted in polarizing sons of cadres, or dividing them into two extremely different groups. The first group is made up of those wrongdoers and playboys who like to sit on the backs of the people. They are more interested in drinking and eating and an easy and comfortable life than in "socialism." They are interested only in sensual diversions, and have never cared whether other people live or die. They are only concerned with their own material comforts, instead of the four modernizations. In a sense, they have become new nobles with an intent to oppress and enslave the people. Their malicious character is even beyond the pale of the worst character, named Gao Yanei, in the novel "Water Margin" and another worst character called Xue Pan in the novel "Red Chamber." It can be said that theirs is a generation of declining moral qualities.

The second group, contrary to the first, comprises those who haven't the slightest inclination to become the oppressors of the people, although they too have received special treatment and care. After the fervor of the cultural revolution cooled off, they began a self-reflection, and a reflection on their own problems as well as problems facing society at large. Following a thoughtful reflection on themselves, they have become rebels against the new privileged class under the existing system of Communist China, just as Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping revolted against the classes of their origins when they were young. Now they still continue a search for solutions for social problems in China. Wei Jingsheng typifies this group of youths.

Privileges, Root of Degeneration for Cadres' Sons

Why should there be a polarization of high-ranking cadres's sons into two groups? How could the two extremely different examples like the two Xiongs on the one hand and Wei Jingsheng on the other emerge in Communist China? We believe that the root cause lies in the entitlement of privileges to the cadres. According to the Marxist principles, a communist-ruled society should be one devoid of privileges or one not burdened with privileges. Now the opposite is true because privileged classes which alienate themselves from the masses have emerged in the Soviet Union, Communist China and other European and Asian communist countries. Before 1957, the people still had the guts to air their views, because they still retained at least some supervising power over the government. But as soon as Mao Zedong

carried out his celebrated "anti-rightist" tricks, the Chinese people went down on their knees and were humiliated forever. In 1958, some hot-headed people on the Central Committee set in motion the "people's commune" movement, vigorously whipped up the "communist wind," and practiced the primitive communist utopia in which commune members were served free food and were encouraged to dine together. They also drove the people to produce iron and steel with indigenous methods instead of scientific methods, and pushed the peasants to produce "10,000 catties per mu of land" in violation of the law governing production and the economic principle. They then followed this with a great leap-forward in production at the great expense of the people's energy and state funds, a leap-forward which brought an infinite disaster to the country. At that time, the central and local authorities blindly dictated orders to others without knowing what was really going on. Peng Dehuai was condemned as "a right-deviationist opportunist" at the 1959 Lushan meeting for letting loose his pent-up feelings and for frankly and honestly conveying his views on these matters to Mao Zedong. Pen Dehuai was not rehabilitated until after his death.

After the 1957 "anti-rightist" struggle and the 1959 struggle against "right-deviationist opportunism" were over, the Chinese communist cadres emerged more powerful than ever. In the second half of 1959, "a serious famine" hit China. In the face of material shortages, a policy of rationing food-grains, non-staple foods, cigarettes, wine, industrial goods and daily necessities was adopted. But the rationing did not mean that everything was evenly distributed among the people. Rather, it was distributed according to grades. Under the rationing system, the Chinese communist cadres were given more power to wield. Not only did they control the power of distribution but they also enjoyed special privileges in distribution. In distributing cigarettes, the rationing system entitled the high-ranking cadres to smoke "Red Double-Happiness," middle-level cadres, "Tall Gate," ordinary cadres, "Bumper Harvest," and the masses of workers and peasants, "Big Bell." While on a march toward enjoying more privileges, the Chinese communist cadres eventually became more alienated than ever from the masses. The rationing system also gave rise to the so-called "back door deals" in which each cadres could exchange his unwanted rations for what he wanted. For example, he could exchange his unwanted cigarettes and wine for meat and cloth and edible oil with another cadre. But the powerless and destitute masses could only watch such exchanges take place with envy and anger. The system of awarding privileges to the Chinese communist cadres began with the 50s and became full-fledged during the cultural revolution. During the cultural revolution, the power delegated to cadres not only enabled them to exchange their unwanted rations for what they wanted, but also enabled them to get whatever they wanted including wine, beautiful women, luxurious residential houses, television sets, and cars. In view of this fact, the Hua-Deng leadership has expressed an urgent desire to eliminate these privileges in the wake of the downfall of the "gang of four." But this is not an easy task due to the fact that the ideology of the privileged classes, an inevitable product of the Chinese communist system, has become too deep-rooted to be eliminated. In mainland China today, wherever cadres go, they could

receive special greetings and special treatment from the people; "egalitarianism" (literally an expression of discontent resulting from the oppression of the people and the courage to openly expose social injustice) was opposed; a theory that "privileges based on the operational needs are justified" has been concocted by the authorities concerned; and a bad situation in which one official who was criticized for wrongdoing could always count on the support of other officials in his defense has developed. On 18 July, JIEFANGJUN BAO [LIBERATION ARMY DAILY] carried the following report: "Tang Fang, a youth who pretended to be the son of the first secretary of a certain provincial party committee bilked the people of wrist watches, case, wine and vinegar, cigarettes and uniforms. He also used the fake title to win a young lady's promise to marry him. That lady is the daughter of a political commissar of a certain hospital and a young female PLA fighter."

On 11 September, WEN HUI BAO and JIEFANG RIBAO reported: "Zhang Longquan was a worker from the Zhongming farm. After telling the people that he was a son of the deputy director of the PLA General Staff Department on the day of his arrival in Shanghai, he spent the next 67 days enjoying free rides in sedans, as well as the company of beautiful women. He was really envied by the people in Shanghai." These two youths were not professional swindlers. Their success in cheating people rested only in that very prestigious name--sons of high-ranking cadres--rather than any professional skills or documentary papers. They didn't even need any forged documents.

The two swindling cases also showed that sycophants of cadres are numerous in the Chinese mainland societies today; the awarding of privileges to cadres has become a well-established tradition to which the people have become accustomed; not only cadres themselves but also their families are entitled to privileges; and the feudal hereditary privileges granted to cadres have been regarded by the people in mainland China as a matter of necessity. In his reaction to the two swindling cases, a train inspector said: "If he were really a son of a provincial party committee's first secretary, he deserved special treatment. However, please don't lower your guard against any future similar swindles."

Now let us ask: Why should the sons of the first secretary of the provincial party committee deserve special treatment? Is there any law we can refer to? If there is no such law, why did the people from all walks of life take the same attitude toward this matter? Why was there no dissenting voice against this? After his swindling plot was exposed, Zhang Longquan, that fake son of the deputy director of the PLA General Staff Department, not only broke the heart of his girl friend but also embarrassed her brother who worked at a factory. After learning that his sister had fallen in love with a son of a "famous figure," he and his other colleagues at the factory all "treated Zhang Longquan like a prince, trying to offer him a secretary position with the factory." This story not only reflected that "one's success could benefit one's relatives and friends," but also brought to light the ugly feature of the Chinese communist cadre system.

In discussing these problems, I could not help but spontaneously admire former Yugoslav Vice President Milovan Djilas' book "The New Class" and his foresight. In its third chapter, he stated: "Everything that occurred in the Soviet Union and other communist countries was beyond the expectations of their leaders, even such outstanding leaders as Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and Bukharin, who anticipated that the state would give way to democracy. However, the opposite was true. They also predicted a rapid improvement in the people's living standards in their countries. As a matter of fact, there had been a very little change in this area. The living standards in the eastern European satellite countries dropped instead of going up. They believed that the differences between urban and rural areas and between mental and manual workers would be gradually eliminated. Contrary to this prediction, these differences enlarged. They also believed that a classless society would emerge in the Soviet Union after the capitalist system of ownership was destroyed and industrialization and collectivization were achieved. When the new Constitution was proclaimed in 1936, Stalin declared that the 'exploiting classes' had ceased to exist. True, the centuries-old bourgeoisie and other classes had been destroyed. But a new class never before seen in history had taken shape.

"Like any other class in history, this new class believed that with the establishment of its power would come happiness and freedom for all people--their thinking in this way was understandable. The only difference between this new class and other classes lies in its ability to prevent the masses from proving their illusion false as early as possible. This class was resolved to build a power unmatched by other classes in history, and therefore, its illusion and prejudice were also unmatched by other classes.

"This new class is a group of bureaucrats, or political bureaucrats, to be more accurate. Although it has something in common with other classes, it also has a new unique character. Although its origin is the same as that of other classes, it still retains its uniqueness."

The CCP has ruled China for 30 years. In his article "Where To Go, China?", Yang Xiguang said: the bureaucratic group has transformed itself into a new ruling class. Refuting this allegation as highly reactionary, the CCP resolutely denied that there is any new class inside the party which conflicts with the Chinese people's interests. But we feel that not only has such a new class taken shape within the CCP, but it also has attempted to transform itself into a feudal hereditary system so that it can be handed down from generation to generation. So far, this new privileged class has produced "two Xionsgs" in Hangzhou who represent the degenerate second generation and Wei Jingsheng who represents the awakening second generation.

Although the two Xionsgs in Hangzhou and Wei Jingsheng had been suppressed, the CCP seemed neither ready to learn a lesson from these two different cases nor prepared to launch any self-criticism. It only held Lin Biao and the "gang of four" responsible for all these faults instead of blaming itself. As ordinary citizens, we would like to ask: who should be held

responsible for pampering and spoiling those youths born of the families of high-ranking officials? Who should be responsible for letting them enjoy privileges and for filling them with the ideology of the privileged classes? If no efforts are made to change the system of awarding privileges to cadres and unhealthy social practices, the execution of Xiong Ziping and the suppression of Wei Jingsheng won't change anything, because persons like them will emerge again in society.

Serious Consequence of Concealing a Malady for Fear of Taking Medicine

Mao Zedong left behind a famous proverb: "A model or an example has its infinite power." "Examples can be imitated." This is a slogan that is popular with the people in mainland China today. Over 20 years of practical experiences showed that good examples were often ignored while bad examples could be widely, quickly and ingenuously imitated by the people everywhere. In the official circles, cadres are persons proven most incapable of resisting social ills, or unhealthy lifestyle. For example, they have indulged in excessive drinking and eating, extravagance and ostentation; loved luxuries and comforts and hated manual labor; selfishly looked for various opportunities for their sons and daughters; worked the back door deals to their best advantage; fooled around with women; turned public property into private; entertained friends at feasts at the expense of the state; imposed their wills on others; ignored the importance of investigation and study; blindly dictated orders to others; practiced subjectivism and prejudged other people; sought personal fame and financial gains; practiced sectarianism and favoritism; waited for opportunities for launching vengeful counterattacks against anyone who once opposed them; used their positions to get even with others for a private grudge; paid no attention to the well-being of the masses; failed to seek truth from facts; reported only the good news but not the bad told lies and engaged in empty and boastful talk; practiced formalism and conservatism; showed no interest in study; were content with what they had learned as non-professionals; and were simple-headed and hot tempered. A survey of their implementation of the political and ideological line, and an investigation into their moral qualities, workstyle and methods of work would lead the people to believe that all those in the higher and lower positions of responsibility have become typical bureaucrats. They have become most notorious persons for fooling around with women, and have a bad reputation for indulging in excessive feasting and sensual diversions and for doing many other bad things hated by the people. This lifestyle is now an endemic affecting the party, government, army, departments of culture and education and public health. None of them could claim immunization to it. The greater the power that is delegated to a cadre, the greater will be his ability to hurt the people. Although the ugly features of Lin Biao and his sworn followers such as Huang Yongsheng have been exposed, there must be many similar cases involving prominent figures that still await exposure.

The CCP cadres have become accustomed to the special treatment in the form of privileges, and don't know that it is a shame. Wang Dongxing, vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, squandered without authorization a

large amount of state funds for building a luxurious home for his family. Chen Muhua, vice premier of the State Council, who was entitled to the privilege of flying a special plane, once refused to let an injured Chinese athlete fly her home-bound plane from a foreign country she had visited with the pretext that her plane was already overloaded with personal belongings. There were other leading members at the central levels who had abused their authority by permitting their sons and daughters and other family members to travel to foreign countries on a shopping spree at government expense. There were country-level education bureau directors and section chiefs who had put their sons through college by means of back door deals; production brigade cadres who used their authority to bully and humiliate educated young women who had settled in the countryside; supply and marketing cooperative salesmen who saved good quality commodities for their own use or held them for selling to their best friends. These facts show that the problems resulting from awarding privileges to cadres are not only widespread but also serious.

A good opportunity to oppose such privileges presented itself in the wake of the downfall of the "gang of four." By then, a movement against privileges could certainly have been launched if the authorities concerned had taken full advantage of the enthusiasm and daring spirit to think and take actions displayed by the "5 April" youths. If such a movement had taken place, it could at least have restricted and curtailed such privileges, even though it was unable to overthrow the privileged class and eliminate its ideology. Unfortunately, the Beijing authorities chose an easy way out by merely pointing their fingers of blame at Lin Biao and the "gang of four" for endorsing such privileges. The result was a great disappointment to the broad masses who anticipated a greater success in this area. Following the downfall of the "gang of four," the privileged class had become more overbearing and brazen. In this connection, some people complained that they even flaunted their privileges without shame. The Chinese people were really concerned with this tendency. Many people, especially youths, openly expressed their opposition to the granting of privileges to anyone. The emergence of the publications EXPLORATION and 5 APRIL FORUM in Beijing, which enjoy a large circulation, was a signal which could not be simply explained as a resurrection of individualism and anarchism. In summarizing the case of Wei Jingsheng, the CCP simply called him an advocate of extreme individualism and a remnant of the pernicious influence of the "gang of four." In announcing the conviction of the two Xiongs, it also identified the "gang of four" as responsible for all their crimes. Actually, behind this attempt to make a complicated case simple lurks a greater crisis. How could anyone determine the cause of a malady by just concealing it for fear of taking medicine? If no right remedial steps are taken to correct our shortcomings, how can we cure those social ills?

Cadres' Power Grows To Violate People's Privacy

Those CCP cadres who are entitled to privileges don't limit themselves to enjoying excessive drinking and eating. In the absence of a perfect legal system and as a result of the delegation of greater power to the party

committees, the CCP cadres are authorized to control not only manpower, political and economic activities but also are interested in knowing the code of ethics and sleeping schedules for husbands and their wives. This means that the ordinary people's privacy has been violated, and they live under the threat of the privileged class' interference in their private life.

A few months ago, the newspapers and journals in Communist China accused rural cadres in Shaanxi Province of beating up peasants and curtailing the food-grain rations for them. Last month, they charged the Shihezi Production and Construction Corps cadres in Xinjiang with defaming and suppressing the masses, violating their privacy and concocting the so-called the "Jiang Aizhen murder case." This month, ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY] accused a CCP cadre of slandering and persecuting a young lady. According to a ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO report, one day, Peng Taizhong, deputy director of the Guiyang County Commerce Bureau, led other cadres in launching a surprise raid on the home of his temporary 23-year-old female typist Lang Lanyun when she met her lover Zhang Zhongguo, a young member of the bureau's party committee. The raid came after she rejected his boss' suggestion that she marry his son. During the raid, the intruders interrogated her and her lover in separate rooms, trying to prove that they had committed "adultery." They also used both persuasion and force to compel the two to admit it. After denying that she had done anything wrong, Lang Lanyun asked to see a doctor to prove her chastity. After this request was rejected, she tried to commit suicide by jumping from her second floor home, without success. Both Lang Lanyun and Zhang Zhongguo finally signed a paper of "confession of adultery" under duress. After obtaining the "confession," Peng Taizhong brought the case for discussion at a meeting called by the county revolutionary committee. The meeting adopted a resolution dismissing Lang from her temporary position as a typist and putting her lover on a "12-month probation by the party." Later, Lang Lanyun underwent a physical check by both prefectural and county hospitals which issued a paper certifying her "chastity." So far, this case is still not closed despite the fact that Lang Lanyun's family has filed over 130 complaints to the provincial, prefectural and county authorities concerned. (Based on 17 November 1979 Hong Kong WEN HUI BAO Report)

This case and last month's "Jiang Aizhen murder case" brought to light serious despotic and meddlesome behavior on the part of the CCP cadres. In addition to controlling production and people's thoughts, they were also interested in knowing whether or not an unmarried young lady was a virgin. Their behavior bears a striking resemblance to the overbearing conduct of local tyrants in China before its liberation. The revelation of this serious and alarming situation is a signal which should jolt the CCP into taking quick action to enact a law banning the abuse of power by the CCP cadres and their violation of the people's privacy, especially at a time when the "legal system" has become a focus of national attention. Of course, the CCP could put everything under its command. But is it necessary for it to know whether an unmarried young lady is a virgin or not?

The aforementioned two cases also reflect the fact that the CCP cadres seemed determined to defend and protect each other from outside criticism. People had been convicted one after another on false and unjust charges because the cadres paid no attention to complaint petitions from the masses and because they only believed in one side of a dispute. Even to date, the masses still do not know how to appeal to the authorities concerned for redressing their grievances.

Communist China's Criminal Law, Article 130 stipulates: "This law strictly forbids the bringing of false charges against a cadre or a person by any means whatsoever. Whoever fabricates facts to bring false charges against another person (including a convict in prison) shall be subject to criminal sanction. A state functionary who fabricates facts to bring false charges against another person shall be subject to severe punishment." Although many people have fallen victims to false, unjust and wrong charges, so far no one responsible for these false charges has been brought to justice. This being the case, what useful purpose could be served by the promulgation of such a criminal law?

Ray of Hope for Solving Problems of Cadres

Now the CCP not only faces numerous and serious cadre problems, but also is bothered by those problematical cadres who joined the party and the Communist Youth League during the "cultural revolution," and who have thereafter presented a serious problem for the CCP leadership. These problematical cadres accounted for 70 percent of the total number of CCP cadres. How to deal with them? In his National Day speech, Vice Chairman Ye Jianying stated: "Now the problem of building the leading bodies at all levels and reforming the cadre system has been listed as an urgent task on our agenda." This statement underscored the seriousness of the problem of cadres which has come to the attention of the supreme CCP authority. But what specific methods can be devised to reform the cadre system? It seems that the CCP Central Committee still has no idea how to effectively deal with this problem. In this connection, Ye Jianying stressed: "We must unite as many cadres as possible, including those who have made mistakes but are genuinely willing to correct them, so that we can work together with them under the guidance of the correct line. As for those few cadres who still refuse to admit their mistakes and still practice factionalism despite a patient education, and a few others whose dedication to the revolutionary cause and sense of political responsibility have declined to a serious degree, we must take necessary organizational measures to prevent them from obstructing the thorough implementation of our party's line, principles and policies." But what measures should be taken to distinguish good cadres from the bad? Who should be authorized to carry out this task? Is it necessary to establish a special agency to deal with this problem?

We feel that as far as the problem of cadres is concerned, the greatest disagreement between the central authorities and the masses is that the former believe that the bad cadres are the minority, while the latter regard them as the majority, and good cadres as the disappointed minority on the basis of their personal experiences. Experiences show that the

traditional method for cadres at the higher levels to discipline those at the lower levels is no longer workable. Like using a bundle of bamboo sticks to mop the dirty floor, this method cannot be applied to clean everything up nor can it be used to inspire good young cadres to display their talents at the service of their country.

The problem of cadres is the most thorny one now facing Hua and Deng. A resolution of this problem calls for great determination and strong measures. If it is not handled properly, Communist China may have to face the prospect of either following the beaten track traversed by the Soviet Union, which would end up alienating and oppressing the people, or letting the "gang of four" stage a comeback. This being the case, the scene of terror in the "year 2000" as depicted in the political fiction "The Spring of Beijing" may come true. At present, there is still a ray of hope for a resolution of the problem of CCP cadres. That hope lies in the institution of "democratic elections" for the grass-roots units now going on in Communist China. The recent issue of ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN [CHINA YOUTH] carried a report on returns in the election of a workshop director at a factory in Kunming Municipality, a report that gave us a ray of hope. Communist China may be able to gradually eliminate those privileged elements and their ideology from inside the party if effective efforts are made to make the grass-roots elections a success, to prevent the party branches from interfering with the elections, to allow the masses to choose persons they really like, and to help those elected assume the leadership positions and do a good job, and to promote them one by one on the basis of merit. If the grass-roots "democratic elections" fail, all hopes will go up in bubbles. By then, no matter what wise men Hua and Deng do and no matter how many appeals are issued by the CCP Central Committee, it would make no difference to the 900 million Chinese people, because they still would have to live in darkness and under the threatening shadow of the privileged classes.

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PARTY AND STATE

WANG DONGXING'S SELF-EXAMINATION PAPER READ AT MEETING

Hong Kong DONGXIFANG [EAST AND WEST] in Chinese No 12, 10 Dec 79 pp 10-12

[Article: "Text of Wang Dongxing's Self-Examination Paper Read at the Preparatory Meeting for the Fourth Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee"]

[Text] The warm political weather of stability and unity has begun to cool off with the arrival of the frigid winter in Beijing. According to the reliable news sources, the convocation of the 12th CCP National Congress has been initially scheduled by the CCP Central Committee for mid-1980. During that congress, members of the CCP Central Committee and its political bureau will be chosen, the central leading body will be rebuilt, and those unsuitable members associated with the "depressed faction which follows the wind" are expected to be expelled from the CCP Central Committee and its political bureau. The "depressed faction which follows the wind" refers to those CCP Central Committee members whose ideological line needs clarification or other members who have become depressed and lost their revolutionary enthusiasm after drawing criticism.

This new term originates from the "coverup faction." After failing to cover up their seamy side, this faction has become depressed and insincere, and have discharged their duties in a perfunctory manner.

Kicking the members of this faction out of the political bureau has become a necessity. Deng Xiaoping is determined to do so. In an effort to accelerate the four modernizations and to conscientiously train the middle-aged cadres as successors to the revolution, the CCP Central Committee and its political bureau will have to select healthy and outstanding cadres with a strong party spirit, sound judgment and revolutionary enthusiasm as the members of the leading bodies. Only thus can the party weed out the old and bring in the new elements, consolidate itself and build up its strength.

Among the members of the "depressed faction which follows the wind" who will be liquidated are Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui, Chen Yonggui, Chen Xilian, Seypidin (Saifudin), Xie Xuegong (former first secretary of the Tianjin Municipal CCP Committee), Ceng Shaoshan (former first secretary of

the Liaoning Provincial CCP Committee), Liu Jianxun (former first secretary of the Henan Provincial CCP Committee), You Taizhong (former first secretary of the Inner Mongolia Regional CCP Committee), Liu Guangtao (former first secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial CCP Committee), and Li Juishan (former first secretary of the Shaanxi Provincial CCP Committee). All these former first secretaries will still be 11th CCP Central Committee members after losing their jobs. But they could not possibly be reelected to the CCP Central Committee at the 12th CCP National Congress.

Wang Dongxing, Wu De and other political bureau members would not be reelected when the 12th CCP National Congress is held next year. Wang Dongxing may be allowed to retain his CCP Central Committee membership in recognition of his participation in the long march, his assistance in arresting the "gang of four" following Mao's death, his long security service and his loyalty to the Party Central Committee. In order to stabilize the situation as a whole, Wang Dongxing is expected to be reelected to the CCP Central Committee at the 12th CCP National Congress for the sake of unity. Wu De has incurred the greatest wrath of the masses and has been frequently criticized by the big-character posters, and therefore, his removal from the political bureau is a foregone conclusion. Ji Dengkui is a cynical person and a nuisance to Deng Xiaoping. A supporter of Henan's Liu Jianxun, Ji Dengkui has been relieved of all specific jobs. He is unlikely to be reelected to the political bureau at the 12th CCP National Congress. Chen Xilian, a career army officer associated with the "Second Field Army" and now commander of the Beijing Military Region, will be treated differently than others. He is likely to be reelected to the political bureau because Deng Xiaoping is unlikely to let his old friend down. Chen Yonggui, a model of peasants, is not an important political figure, and would not be reelected to the political bureau when the 12th CCP National Congress is held next year.

The future political struggle connected with the 12th CCP National Congress would pit the "practice" group headed by Deng Xiaoping against the adherents to the "whatever" view, who are members of the "depressed faction which follows the wind." The group led by Deng Xiaoping would settle for no less than clearing them from the central leading body, in an effort to rally the nation behind the march toward the four modernizations. Wang Dongxing is a very complicated character. For a long time, he has been head of the central secret service system; his popularity was at its height during the Ninth CCP National Congress, and was elected vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee during the 11th CCP National Congress. In dealing with the people, he could combine toughness with kindness. He is sly and cunning and a Beria-type dangerous person and therefore, cannot be easily eliminated. (Note: Beria was former Soviet Secret Police chieftain) Although Deng Xiaoping regarded Wang Dongxing as a thorn in his flesh, he still could do nothing against the latter. Following the downfall of the "gang of four," the "two-whatever" view held by Wang Dongxing had been repeatedly criticized by the group led by Deng Xiaoping. But Wang Dongxing remained not visibly shaken despite this criticism. So far, he is still number 6 in the central leadership lineup. His staying power is really amazing. Deng Xiaoping once declared: there was no "whatever" faction on the Central Committee and it was not a force to reckon with. This means that the faction is there but needs to

be well organized by Wang Dongxing and his associates; the "whatever" theory is untenable and can be gradually discredited in the future. The future of Wang Dongxing and his associates depends on the decision by the 12th CCP National Congress scheduled for 1980. If they can pass examination by the congress, take a forward-looking attitude toward the future, work hard and make new contributions to the nation, they may be able to retain their positions. Their political future would be finished, if they let their "coverup faction which follows the wind" degenerate into the "depressed faction which follows the wind," and if they take a negative and passive attitude toward the future. Last month, a foreign friend arrived in Hong Kong from Beijing, bringing with him a mimeographed 16-cut tabloid he had bought on a Beijing street, a tabloid which carried the "Text of Wang Dongxing's Self-Examination" which he had read at the preparatory meeting for the Fourth Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee. Later, it was circulated to the county and higher level party organizations for discussion. It is reprinted here as reference information.

Text of Wang Dongxing's Self-Examination

"I accompanied the Chairman for 50 years. While on the Long March toward Yanan, I experienced countless battles, both large and small. Even if you say I did nothing good for the country, I still have the reputation for fearing neither hardships nor fatigue. Of course, I made mistakes. Let me just mention the mistake I made 2 years ago instead of those in the remote past. At that time, I got myself into big trouble by bringing up the "two-whatever" view in my speech. Some people accused me of being "an element not genuinely interested in holding high Chairman Mao's banner" and taking a dogmatic attitude toward speeches by the leader. I accepted this criticism. Since then, I have written two self-examinations. Comrade Hua Guofeng praised me for being able to acknowledge mistakes, while asking me to get rid of the mental burdens and march forward again. Supreme Commander Ye also privately met me twice hoping that I would forget about my profound proletarian affection for the chairman and would start everything all over again. But it was not easy. I spent years accompanying and working for the chairman. Our intimate friendship was like that between son and kind father, between student and teacher and between two revolutionary comrades, a friendship few other people could understand. I find it difficult to push all this behind me on short order. I may be able to forget it gradually, because the transformation of one's thoughts always takes time.

"I proposed the 'two-whatever' theme when I was concurrently placed in charge of the HONGQI [RED FLAG] journal. This proposal came to my mind shortly after the downfall of the "gang of four." At that time, because I could not completely clear the pernicious influence of the ultra-left line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" from my mind, I still thought that left was better than right; I even dared not evaluate the leader in a way of dividing one into two, thus unconsciously betraying his oft-repeated teaching on seeking truth from facts. I also had a bad habit of book worship, which is incompatible with the principle of dialectical materialism. I believed that the overliberalization of the discussion on practice as the sole criterion for

testing truth may lead to trouble. This belief was corroborated by incidents that erupted in various localities since the beginning of January this year as a result of the overemphasis on the emancipation of the people's minds. Eventually, the bourgeois democracy and anarchist trend of thought flooded our country. As soon as the Central Committee noted this, it proclaimed the four basic principles as 'an emergency measure' to stop this trend. In a self-examination of these incidents, Comrade Deng Xiaoping acknowledged that we committed a mistake on the propaganda front.

"Generally speaking, the "two-whatever" theme is a one-sided metaphysical viewpoint and a reflection of narrow-minded empiricism. My level of Marxism-Leninism is not too high. This is why I could not avoid making mistakes.

"I still remember that before becoming a small Red monster at the age of 13, I knew only a few Chinese characters. The name 'Dongxing' was selected by the chairman. My pet name was 'Duowa.' I once herded sheep, worked as an apprentice-carpenter, and begged for food. I began my reading lesson after joining the revolution. I learned culture under the guidance of my leaders. During the Long March, I was assigned to guard Chairman Mao and serve as his signalman. From then on, I accompanied him wherever he went. I learned a lot from him. Comrade He Zizhen once gave me Chinese language lessons. Jiang Qing also taught me the ABCs of English while we were in Yanan. Believe it or not, when I made personal arrangements for arresting her, I fidgeted, feeling sorry for her. Comrade Hua Guofeng and Supreme Commander Ye were more determined than I, reminding me that if I were soft-hearted in this case, our party, country and army would be in danger of destruction, even all of us could not save our skins. This reminder steeled my determination to tell and direct three garrison guards to arrest Jian Qing at her living quarters. Eventually, Jiang Qing was arrested without a single shot being fired. This incident reminded me that as to the ideological level, I fall far behind Supreme Commander Ye and comrade Hua Guofeng; although I have devoted my life to the revolution, my heart was still too soft.

"I made serious mistakes in the struggle against the anti-party Lin Biao clique. At that time, the chairman criticized me for failing to display high proletarian political vigilance. The chairman almost got killed twice. I held myself responsible for these two incidents. Later, I examined my faults at a meeting called by the political bureau, and was forgiven by the chairman.

"In 1958, I was dismissed from my post by the chairman for allowing the right-deviationist thought to creep into my mind and for failing to keep myself abreast of the current situation. He ordered me to go back to Jiangxi to conscientiously conduct some investigations and study. He also wanted me to assume the position as lieutenant governor of that province and help the Central Party School open a farm there. At that time, I had no idea why the chairman treated me that way. I wrote him two letters inquiring about this. In reply, he said briefly: 'You are advised to raise your

level of Marxism-Leninism through manual labor and conscientious investigations and study.' I thought that he was right. But the key point was that I was born of an illiterate family, and I had difficulties in raising my theoretical Marxist-Leninist level. I could blame a series of mistakes that I made on this background.

"Some people accused me of squandering 1 million yuan for building a country house for myself. This is purely a lie, and a distortion of facts. Before this spring festival, I had my dilapidated home repaired and white-washed with the approval of the housing management section of the general office of central organs. The repair, which was completed in a week, cost me over 700 yuan in Renminbi, half of which was reimbursed by the state. But some people spread a rumor accusing me of abusing privileges and squandering public fund. This rumor is a distortion of facts and has to be clarified.

"I have undergone three self-examinations. But some people still do not want to leave me alone. They want to destroy me. Why? Do they want to 'wield big sticks to kill people again'? Is this a sincere attempt to hold high Chairman Mao's banner? This behavior is not in line with the principle of 'learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient.' As an individual, I have nothing to worry about. I can go home to become a peasant. I am over 60 this year. I thought of retiring ahead of schedule long ago. I did want to go back to Jiangxi to enjoy a few years of peaceful life together with my old friends there. But Supreme Commander Ye and Chairman Hua persuaded me to stay. The former said: 'You have devoted several decades to security service. You have shown loyalty to us. Why couldn't you just tolerate a little criticism or frustration? You should prove yourself capable of surviving any test. A revolutionary should not entertain the idea of retirement. By now our party really needs veteran cadres like you.' Supreme Commander Ye has been helpful in educating me. From days in Yenan up to date in Beijing, he has been my good teacher. I humbly accept his criticism. From now on, I promise to forever preserve my revolutionary vigor and contribute whatever I can to the four modernizations.

"It is possible that some people are still not satisfied with my self-examinations. I don't care about that. Whatever their reactions, I have tried my best to seek truth from facts. Frankly speaking, suppose the "gang of four" had not been arrested by Supreme Commander Ye, Comrade Hua Guofeng and me 3 years ago, I really don't know, where would you be today? Had Jiang Qing been allowed to come to power, who knows how many old comrades would have been killed. The Party Central Committee is realistic. During the new long march toward the four modernizations in an environment of stability and unity, I sincerely hope that comrades will give me sincere criticism.

PARTY AND STATE

MAO'S ROLE IN 1945 CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS RECOUNTED

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[Article by Xu Dixin [6079 3321 2450]: "Triumphant Return With Laughter--
Recalling Comrade Mao Zedong at the Chongqing Negotiations"]

[Excerpts]

I. Wrestling the Political Initiative

Japanese imperialism surrendered on 15 August 1945. Thirteen days later, our great leader Comrade Mao Zedong, Comrade Zhou Enlai, Comrade Ye Jianying, and Comrade Wang Ruofei, accompanied by Mr Zhang Zhizhong, went to Chongqing city for negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang.

Chongqing was the seat of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary rule. Chiang Kai-shek himself was an indiscriminate murderer who would kill without batting an eyelid. From his coup d'etat on 12 April 1927 to the end of the war of resistance against Japan, hardly a day had gone by without his murdering some Communists, workers, peasants, and progressive democrats. The news of Chairman Mao's pending visit to Chongqing for talks had reached the ears of some of our friends one day earlier. While they looked forward to the pleasure of meeting Chairman Mao in person, they also feared for his safety. Many of them told us: "The Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao are symbols of hope for the Chinese people. If Chairman Mao comes to Chongqing, it's like walking into a tiger's den. He is facing great danger!" Many of the party members operating under ground with links to me expressed extreme worry and misgivings. The apprehension felt by many of our comrades and friends within the party was understandable. Who could guarantee that an extremely ruthless and treacherous autocrat and traitor of the people, as well as the "Military Intelligence Group" and the "Central Intelligence Group" under his control, would not pull another coup? Who could guarantee that a totally unscrupulous and extremely deceitful rascal would not try to trap Chairman Mao in Chongqing, by hook or by crook?

Then, under such political circumstances, should Chairman Mao refuse to come to Chongqing?

The political realities at that time were as follows: after the defeat of Japanese imperialism, China faced two possible fates: one, an independent, free, democratic and united new China; two, a semicolonial and semifeudal old China. Chiang Kai-shek, representing the big landlord and bourgeois classes, doggedly followed a reactionary policy of perpetrating dictatorship and civil war. He intended to take the fruits of victory over Japan away from the people and to turn China into a semicolonial, semifeudal country ruled by the dictatorship of the big landlord and bourgeois classes. The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, had only the best interests of the proletariat and the people in mind. They refused to be deceived by Chiang Kai-shek's ruses and intrigues. They were ready to counter, blow for blow, whatever preparations and steps Chiang Kai-shek was making toward a counterrevolutionary civil war. They had no illusions about the intentions of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary clique and its supporter, U.S. imperialism, and no fear of the latter's threats. They were determined to defend the fruits of the victory over Japan, fruits that belonged to the people, and to strive for the creation of a new China where the proletariat would lead and where a people's democracy would prevail. So the struggle between China's two destinies and two futures began to unfold before the Chinese people right after Japan's surrender!

In order to destroy the revolutionary armed forces led by the Chinese Communist Party, Chiang Kai-shek had relied on the United States both to supply his troops with modern weapons and to airlift his troops from southwestern China to areas surrounding our bases of operation against the Japanese forces. His objective was to claim all the rights that went with accepting the surrender from Japan and to wipe out all the liberated areas under our control. To counter such moves, our commander in chief at our Yen-an headquarters, Zhu De, in anticipation of the Japanese surrender, had ordered all our military units in liberated areas to keep up a relentless offensive against Japanese units and to make preparations to accept an offer of surrender from the enemy units. He had also ordered Yasuji Okamura, commander in chief of the Japanese invading forces in China, to prompt his men to surrender to our units in the liberated areas. However, Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang had their rumor mill working overtime to create the impression that the Chinese Communist Party did not want peace, wanted a divided China, and wanted civil war. The Chinese people, having suffered the ravages of a civil war that had lasted 10 years and then a war against Japanese aggression that had lasted 8 years were anxious to see peace and reconstruction once again in China after the Japanese surrender and to see China recover from the damages of war. Many of these people, yearning for peace but denied access to the truth, could not help being taken in by the rumors spread by Chiang Kai-shek at the expense of the Chinese Communist Party, even though those rumors never achieved "universal acceptance." Furthermore, on the advice of the United States, Chiang Kai-shek pretended "sincerity" for peace talks. On 14, 20 and 23 August 1945, he sent three separate telegrams to Comrade Mao Zedong inviting him to Chongqing for talks. Patrick J. Hurley, then U.S. ambassador to Nationalist China, also flew to Yen-an on 27 August to press the matter. How could we handle this situation? Declining the invitations of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek would lend credibility to the rumors spread by Chiang Kai-shek and would cost

us our initiative in a very complicated struggle. In deference to the wishes of the Chinese people for a peaceful settlement, with the purpose of unmasking U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek in the course of seeking a peaceful solution, and with the intention of exploding the rumors spread by the reactionary clique, the CCP Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong himself bravely decided to make the trip to Chongqing for talks.

Around 3 pm on 28 August, our great leader Comrade Mao Zedong, Comrade Zhou Enlai, Comrade Ye Jianying, and Comrade Wang Ruofei, landed at Jiulongpo airport, west of Chongqing city. The exciting news of their arrival shook not only the mountain city to which they had come but also the whole world. It gave the lie to the rumors spread by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang picturing the Chinese Communist Party as the villain opposed to peace and unity. As a result, we again had the political initiative in our hands.

II. A Tit-for-Tat Struggle

The Chongqing negotiations, an intensified tit-for-tat struggle from start to finish, lasted 43 days. The strategy adopted by our party was to give a word for a word and to return a blow for a blow. In other words, we used both hands of revolution to fight the two hands of counterrevolution. It was a struggle perfected to an art of the highest form.

Word for word, what was spoken?

Chiang Kai-shek, Patrick J. Hurley, and their ilk intended to negotiate to death the people's democratic governments that were functioning in the liberated areas and the revolutionary armed forces that had achieved a brilliant fighting record during the 8 years of war against Japanese invasion, thereby opening the way to a one-party dictatorial fascist rule under the pretext of what they termed "unity in the political command structure" and "unity in the military command structure." They could not have cared less about peace and democracy, which the Chinese people wanted. Chairman Mao arrived in Chongqing on the afternoon of 28 August. The following afternoon he settled down for talks with Chiang Kai-shek and his aides. That night, Comrade Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying and Wang Ruofei, continued talks with Zhang Chun, Wang Shijie, Zhang Zhizhong and Shao Lizu, appointed by Chiang Kai-shek. Chairman Mao, giving voice to the long-cherished hopes of the Chinese people, declared firmly: "First, China needs peace, and second, China needs democracy." Naturally, these were the last things the Kuomintang wanted. If Chiang Kai-shek had had his way, he would have wanted, first, civil war, and second, dictatorship. Unfortunately for him, the political situation at home and abroad did not permit him to contradict such a declaration. So he had to agree, and because of that, he and his reactionary clique lost the political initiative.

Then the issues of the democratic governments and the armed forces of the liberated areas came up for discussion.

The liberated areas were territories recaptured from the hands of Japanese imperialism by the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and other local anti-Japanese military and civilian groups after bitter fighting. In the dozen or so larger liberated areas surrounding Yenan, anti-Japanese democratic governments had been set up to implement policies in keeping with the concept of an anti-Japanese national united front. During the Chongqing negotiations, however, the Chiang Kai-shek clique shamelessly denied such historical facts and proposed instead that the anti-Japanese democratic governments in the liberated areas be dissolved, now that the war against Japanese aggression was over. On the surface, they seemed to want just the name "liberated areas" dropped. In reality, they wanted to get the people's democratic governments led by the Chinese Communist Party in the liberated areas out of the way. To defend such political institutions, Comrade Mao Zedong, Comrade Zhou Enlai, and others fought tooth and nail. Nonetheless, there were also practical considerations which required sacrifice of some liberated areas in exchange for political advantages. In the end we announced that we would be willing to give up eight liberated areas under our command in Guangdong, Zhejiang, southern Jiangsu, central Anhui, southern Anhui, Hunan, Hubei and Henan provinces. Later, in his report "On the Chongqing Negotiations," Chairman Mao explained the reasons. He said: "It is a great pity to concede those eight areas, but it is better to do so. Why is it a pity? Because those liberated areas have been created and arduously built up by the people with sweat and blood. Therefore, we must explain matters clearly to the people and make appropriate arrangements in the areas we are going to concede. Why should we concede those areas? Because otherwise the Kuomintang will not feel easy. They are going back to Nanjing, but some liberated areas in the south are right by their beds or in their corridor. As long as we are there, they will not be able to sleep easily and will therefore fight for those places at all costs. Our concession on this point will help frustrate the Kuomintang's plot for civil war and will win us the sympathy of the numerous middle elements at home and abroad." He continued: "Our policy is to protect the fundamental interests of the people. Subject to the principle of not damaging the fundamental interests of the people, it is permissible to make certain concessions in exchange for peace and democracy, which the people of the whole country need. In our past dealings with Chiang Kai-shek we also made concessions, and even larger ones." The propaganda machine controlled by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang churned out one rumor after another claiming that the Chinese Communist Party was interested in territorial gains, not concessions. "This time, by conceding certain areas in the south, we have completely exploded the Kuomintang's rumors before the people all over the country and the whole world."

As to the future status of the people's armed forces, the Chinese Communist Party proposed, as an interim to the achievement of political democracy, an equitable and rational reorganization of China's entire armed forces and a delimitation of military zones for the purpose of averting a civil war. The Kuomintang argued that a reorganization of the country's armed forces was being "planned," and used this argument as a grounds for rejecting our proposal. At the same time, Kuomintang propaganda went wild in spreading rumors that the Chinese Communist Party was scrambling for guns and refused to cut back

its armed forces. To deflate such rumors, we again made concessions on the issue of force reduction, in the interests of the Chinese people. Chairman Mao said: "First, we proposed cutting our present armed strength to 48 divisions. As the Kuomintang has 261 divisions, this means our strength would be about a sixth of the total. Later, we proposed a further reduction to 43 divisions, about a seventh of the total. The Kuomintang then said they would reduce to 120 divisions. We said we would reduce by the same proportion to 24 or even 20 divisions, which would still be only a seventh of the total. In the Kuomintang army, the proportion of officers as compared to soldiers is unduly large and the complement of a division is under 6,000. By their standards, we could form 200 divisions out of our 1.2 million men. But we are not going to do so. Therefore the Kuomintang can say nothing more, and all their rumors are bankrupt." ("On the Chongqing Negotiations")

Naturally, we had our principles and could not go on making endless concessions. We refused to turn over our armed men to the Kuomintang to be absorbed into their army. We also refused to give up our armed forces in exchange for a post in the Kuomintang-controlled government. Chairman Mao declared in no uncertain terms that "the arms of the people, every gun and every bullet, must all be kept, must not be handed over." The truth was that the Kuomintang merely used the call for a reduction in forces as a ruse to take over the people's armed forces. This we found intolerable. Despite our repeated struggles, the Kuomintang stood fast in their refusal to cut back their own forces or to acknowledge the legitimacy of the people's armed forces. Thus no solution was found to the issue of legalizing the people's armed forces.

So the 43-day tit-for-tat struggle failed to establish the status of the liberated areas and the armed forces in those areas. This, however, does not mean that the struggle was in vain. We forced Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang to endorse the basic principle of the Chinese Communist Party calling for peaceful reconstruction of China, to renounce civil war, to agree to work toward an independent, free, prosperous, and powerful new China, to end the political tutelage by the Kuomintang, to convene a political consultative conference, to disband the secret police, and to free political prisoners. These were terms written into the "October 10th Agreement." Subsequent developments were to prove the promises of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang worthless. Those promises were meant to deceive the Chinese people and the whole world. They served as a smokescreen to camouflage preparations for a civil war of nationwide scale. No sooner had they put their signatures on the agreement than they tore it up in shreds through the method of civil war. They might have thought they were smart in doing so, but in fact they stood to lose a great deal of political ground. Comrade Mao Zedong put it well in his report "On the Chongqing Negotiations" when he said: "If the Kuomintang launches civil war again, it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and we shall have all the more reason to smash its attacks in a war of self-defense." Subsequent events were to prove Comrade Mao Zedong right.

Here the conduct and eventual downfall of Patrick J. Hurley, the U.S. ambassador to Chongqing, deserve a passing mention. Hurley was a politician fed by the hand of U.S. monopoly capital. When the war of resistance against Japan ended,

he put on a new face by pretending interest in helping restore peace and unity in China. He told both Chinese and foreign reporters in Chongqing that he had always had a personal interest in bringing the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang together for cooperation, and that he would do his best to get the Chongqing negotiations off to a fruitful start. Thereupon he and Mr Zhang Zhizhong went to Yanan to invite Comrade Mao Zedong to Chongqing. However, as soon as the negotiations went into their third week the tide was turning against Chiang Kai-shek at the negotiating table, he dropped his mask as a "mediator." He immediately assumed the airs of a foreign dignitary. He openly criticized the Chinese Communist Party for raising "too many practical questions." He brazenly blamed the stalemate in the talks on the Chinese Communist Party. He urged us to join the Kuomintang government, to accept a few cabinet posts and governorships, and to turn over our armed forces. He threatened to "return home" in support of Chiang Kai-shek as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese Communist Party. To counter Hurley's shameless threats, Comrade Mao Zedong declared firmly: Let Chinese run China! This unequivocal reply embarrassed Hurley so much that he felt he could not stay on in Chongqing. He left for the United States on 22 September. Once back home, he received criticism from progressive Americans both in public service and in private business. In November he had to resign his post as ambassador to China, thus ending his career in disgrace. The course of action chosen by our party proved to be wise and correct in historical perspective. Our party stood firm against the international counterrecurrent that sought to bring us to our knees and make us "hand over our guns." We refused to trade the fruits of victory won with the blood of our people for political gains. We dared to struggle and deserved to win. Our party proved itself as a mature Marxist-Leninist party.

A blow for a blow; how was it done?

While Chiang Kai-shek was still at the negotiating table in Chongqing, he was already making preparations for an offensive against the liberated areas, thus plunging the nation into a full-fledged civil war. The second day of Chairman Mao's stay in Chongqing (29 August), the military organs under Chiang Kai-shek secretly printed and distributed the "Handbook on Bandit Suppression" among his force to speed up military mobilization against the Chinese Communists and for a civil war. Furthermore, he ordered Yen Xishan's forces to attack the Shangdang liberated area, hoping to destroy our forces in Shanxi Province. The attack on the Shangdang liberated area and the negotiations in Chongqing formed a double-barreled thrust in Chiang Kai-shek's pet scheme of using military pressure to force the Chinese Communist Party into making concessions at the negotiating table.

On the even of the victory over Japan, Comrade Mao Zedong had reminded our party: "Chiang Kai-shek is sharpening his knife now. We must also sharpen ours." Two days before his departure for Chongqing, he had written "On Peace Negotiations With the Kuomintang--Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China." in which he warned our comrades not to lower their guard against possible military moves of Chiang Kai-shek just because negotiations were to take place. He pointed out clearly: "If anyone attacks us and if the conditions are favorable for battle, we will certainly act in

self-defense to wipe him out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely." Before he was to leave Yen-an, he had made troop deployments against possible assaults by Chiang Kai-shek's troops. While in Chongqing, he held a press conference and solemnly declared to the Chinese and foreign reporters present that it was the intention of the Chinese Communist Party to go to great lengths to avoid clashing with the Kuomintang, so as not to hurt the chances of negotiation with the Kuomintang and not to trigger a civil war. However, the Kuomintang forces, with the aid of what was left of the pro-Japanese puppet forces, mounted a frantic offensive against the anti-Japanese military and civilian groups and captured a number of cities and towns in liberated areas. This we could not tolerate. Therefore, all military and civilian units in all the liberated areas were instructed to begin counterattacks and to force the offenders to throw down their weapons and surrender. This was a directive issued by Comrade Mao Zedong in Chongqing. When it was published in XINHUA DAILY printed in Chongqing and in LIBERATION DAILY printed in Yen-an, and became known throughout all the liberated areas, the morale of the military and civilians engaged in combat for self-defense received a tremendous boost!

When Yen Xishan's 13 divisions were making wild assaults on the liberated areas of Shangdang, the local military men and civilians, under the command of Comrades Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bochen, cleverly employed the tactic of "laying siege to a city with the purpose of ambushing reinforcements coming to the rescue." They handed the invaders a resounding defeat. They killed 35,000 of the 38,000 men sent in two directions by Yen Sixhan to the Shangdang liberated area, captured 27 ranking officers, including such army, corps, and division commanders as Hu Sanyu and Shih Zepo, and seized 18,000 firearms. The commander of the enemy reinforcements, Peng Minping, narrowly managed to escape but later committed suicide for fear of punishment when he reached Xin County. The disastrous defeat of Yen Xishan's forces dashed Chiang Kai-shek's hopes of relying on military adventurism to strengthen his bargaining hand at the negotiating table!

During the 43 days of negotiations in Chongqing, Comrade Mao Zedong smartly and dialectically combined political negotiations with military struggle. His tit-for-tat struggle of giving a word for a word and returning a blow for a blow reduced Chiang Kai-shek, a bully supported by U.S. imperialism, to a passive role.

III. Expansion of the United Front

During the 8 years of the war against Japanese aggression, the South China Bureau led by Zhou Enlai successfully forged an anti-Japanese national united front by bringing progressive forces in the Kuomintang-controlled areas and numerous middle elements into our fold, an almost impossible task. During the period of negotiations in Chongqing, Comrade Mao Zedong won even more people over to the united front. While engaging in the tit-for-tat negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang in Chongqing, he and Comrade Zhou Enlai took the opportunity to call on leaders of various democratic parties, professors, scholars, and representatives of women's and national capitalist groups. Together they had heart-to-heart talks and exchanged views about matters of importance to our nation.

Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Zhou Enlai also met with Mme Chingling Soong several times and complimented her highly for her unswerving faith in her late husband Dr Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies for Chinese Revolution, her unremitting struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's fascist rule, and her selfless dedication to the cause of the Chinese national revolution without regard to her own personal safety. Thereafter she was more firmly behind our cause of liberating the Chinese people and more resolutely in support of the revolutionary line of the Chinese Communist Party.

During the negotiation period, Comrade Mao Zedong also met with Mr Zhang Lan, chairman of the China Democratic League, and Mr Shen Chunju and Mr Huang Yenpei, leading members of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League. He also attended a reception given in his honor by leaders of the league and held several talks with leading members of its Central Committee. In these talks, Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Zhou Enlai voiced support for the struggle of the China Democratic League against Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary rule and endorsed its proposal for the convocation of a political consultative conference to be attended by all political parties and independents in China. They also explained to the leaders of the league the program envisioned by the Chinese Communist Party for the achievement of peace, democracy, and unity in China. They also convinced our numerous friends in the league that our demands at the Chongqing negotiations reflected the common aspirations of all anti-Japanese political parties and progressive people in China, and that they were put forward for the furtherance of the fundamental interests and for the fulfillment of the common will of the Chinese people.

The negotiation period also afforded Comrade Mao Zedong an opportunity to meet with progressive elements within the Kuomintang. For example, Mr Feng Yuxiang met Chairman Mao for the first time during this period. He lauded the visit of Chairman Mao to Chongqing as a symbol of unity in China. He praised the Chinese Communist Party for putting forward proposals meant to guarantee peace in China. He said this gave him great personal gratification. He then invited Chairman Mao to a welcoming dinner, which Chairman Mao accepted. Comrade Mao Zedong, in return, complimented Mr Feng Yuxiang for his progressive political activities and encouraged him to continue to promote bipartisan cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang.

During the 8 years of war against Japanese aggression, the delegation of women from all walks of life in the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia border provinces, led by Comrade Deng Yinchao, had done a good job of forging an anti-Japanese national front in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, working closely with progressive women from all walks of life and winning over to our side middle elements among them. While in Chongqing, Chairman Mao also took time out to meet with representatives of women from all walks of life in the Kuomintang-controlled areas and warmly exchanged views with them on what postwar China needed and what the Chinese Communist Party was proposing in order to address such needs politically. Inspired and encouraged by Chairman Mao, they became more determined than ever to support the Chinese Communist Party in its proposals and to work for the creation of a new China.

Before the war with Japan, there had existed a large number of commercial and industrial enterprises in Chongqing city itself. Once the war broke out, a number of larger commercial and industrial enterprises had also moved to Chongqing from "provinces down the Yangtze River." Influenced by the Kuomintang's reactionary propaganda, both local capitalists and capitalists from "down the Yangtze" had entertained doubts and fears about the Chinese Communist Party. However, facts speak louder than rumors and slanders. After they had read XINHUA DAILY, had heard Comrade Zhou Enlai speak on several occasions, and had had a chance to compare the deeds of the Chinese Communist Party with those of the Kuomintang, they began to change their minds. They had become even more disillusioned with the Kuomintang when the latter suffered a resounding defeat at the hands of Japanese invading forces in Hunan and Guizhou provinces in 1944. During that period of disillusionment, Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Wang Ruofei had invited representatives of businessmen and industrialists to various seminars, during which they were encouraged to speak out, were urged to become more involved in national affairs, and were introduced to the financial and economic policies of new democratism. These seminars had started the historical trend whereby the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party would sit down with national capitalists to compare notes on what concerns the nation as a whole.

During the period of the Chongqing negotiations, many national capitalists were anxious to see Chairman Mao and to hear what he had to say about the policies of the Chinese Communist Party toward national capitalism. The federation of factory owners who had moved to Sichuan Province, the Association of Southwestern Chinese Enterprises, and another group elected delegates for a meeting with Chairman Mao. One afternoon in mid-September, Chairman Mao received them at Guei Garden. He pointed out to them that national capital could not thrive in a colonial and semifeudal China. Only foreign or comprador bureaucratic capital could. With the surrender of Japan, we should build China into an independent, democratic, prosperous, and powerful country. Only in such a new China could commercial and industrial enterprises financed by national capital prosper. The Chinese Communist Party was the political party of the workers. There was a contradiction between the working class and the bourgeois class. It would be unrealistic to deny the existence of such contradiction. At present, we had no intention of confiscating the assets of the capitalists. Our policy was one of softening the conflicts between management and labor. Chairman Mao urged them to tell other businessmen and industrialists to improve their relations with the labor force. The Chinese Communist Party looked upon patriotic national capitalists as friends, not as enemies. These words of Chairman Mao had an eye-opening, reassuring effect on his listeners. While they did not dare spread these words freely, for fear of reprisal from the Kuomintang, they quickly relayed the message to their fellow members in their three respective associations.

Chairman Mao also attended a large gathering of people from all walks of life during the Chongqing negotiation period. The occasion was a welcoming reception given in his honor by the "Sino-Soviet Cultural Association" on the evening of 2 September. Chairman Mao, accompanied by Comrade Zhou Enlai, arrived at the reception at 6:30 pm. At the entrance to the office of the

association (Chongqing First Road Central), a large crowd had already formed waiting to get a look at Chairman Mao. There were people shouting: "Long live Chairman Mao!" The crowd made it nearly impossible for Chairman Mao's car to reach the entrance to the reception hall. When Chairman Mao finally arrived at the reception, the room immediately came alive. All the guests cheered: "Mr Mao has arrived!" The guests included such patriots as Zhang Lan, Shen Chunju, Guo Moju, Huang Yenpei, and Shi Liang, such progressive members of the Kuomintang as Feng Yuxiang and Li De who promoted unity, and such powerful figures in the Kuomintang government as Tan Zheng and Chen Lifu. Also present at the reception were representatives of writers, women, businessmen, industrialists, and journalists. It was the largest reception held in Chongqing city since the start of the 8-year war of resistance against Japan. All the guests came forward to shake hands, to talk, and to offer toasts to Chairman Mao. As it would not be nice to refuse a toast, Comrade Zhou Enlai, concerned about Chairman Mao's health, gladly drank one cup after another in behalf of Chairman Mao.

During the negotiation period, Comrade Mao Zedong also received many Chinese and foreign friends. Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Zhou Enlai met with the British, French, and Canadian ambassadors to China. At a reception held at the Russian Embassy, they warmly toasted the great victory of the anti-fascist war of self-defense led by Stalin. Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Zhou Enlai also gave a dinner party at Guei Garden for members of various foreign delegations who had helped China's war efforts and for other foreign friends. Comrade Mao Zedong had a long talk with a progressive antiwar Japanese writer who used the Chinese pen name of Lu Tiheng, and spoke highly of all antiwar Japanese friends who were living in China.

At the time, the policy of the ruling class in the United States was to use "mediation" as a cover to strengthen Chiang Kai-shek's hands. This notwithstanding, many of the American pilots who fought in the Chinese theater, having seen with their own eyes what unmatched heroism the military men and civilians in our bases of operation had displayed in fighting the Japanese invaders, had developed great sympathy toward our cause. This was especially true with the 80 or so American pilots who had been shot down and then rescued in our liberated areas and who, from such experiences, got to know us well. As soon as the Chongqing negotiations got underway, a number of American pilots, disappointed at the corruption and underhandedness of the Kuomintang, asked to meet with Chairman Mao. Three American pilots, (Howard Hyman, Edward Bell, and Jack Alderman), took several packs of cigarettes out of their rations and put them in a gift box. On the face of the box they wrote a line expressing their admiration for Chairman Mao and extending their good wishes for the success of the Chongqing negotiations. They also signed their names on the box. On their day off they took the trouble of coming to Hongyen village to look up Comrade Zhou Enlai and to tell him in person how much they cherished the friendship shown them by the military men and civilians in the liberated areas and how much they admired Chairman Mao. One afternoon Chairman Mao took time out to receive them in person. As they were warmly discussing the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, Chairman Mao expressed his confidence that such friendship would eventually flower despite the efforts of the reactionary clique to disrupt it at that particular moment. He also

gladly accepted their invitation to pose with them for a picture to mark the occasion. So they stood under a tall plantain tree by the west wing of the office of the Eighth Route Army, with two young Americans standing on both sides and one crouching in front of Chairman Mao. A few office cadres also joined them for the picture taking. This picture would go down in history as a shining symbol of the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples.

At that time, some of our friends in Chongqing were opposed to our negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek. As we knew from our own contacts, Zhen Minsu, a former commander of the 19th Route Army of the Kuomintang, was one of them. We also knew that Zhen Jiagen, a patriotic Chinese community leader living overseas, was another. They said: "Chiang Kai-shek is a great rascal. He is totally untrustworthy. No good can come out of negotiating with him." Such skepticism as they expressed was well founded. Ever since 1927, Chiang Kai-shek had massacred revolutionary people every day. The blood on his hands had remained fresh in our memory. So how could we hold back our doubts and fears under such circumstances? Nevertheless, it was necessary to look at a problem from all angles and to have an overview of a very fluid situation. In his report "On the Chongqing Negotiations," Chairman Mao pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party had fought the Kuomintang for 18 years, ever since the latter's betrayal of the revolution in 1927. "We were firmly convinced by 18 years of experience that this would be the case. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations, sure to start fighting, and sure to break with each other, but that is only one aspect of the matter. There is another aspect." There were several factors making the Chongqing negotiations unavoidable. "Among these factors, the three main ones are the might of the liberated areas, the opposition to civil war by the people in the great rear areas, and the international situation." Indeed, these three factors--in particular the might of the people's forces--had thwarted Chiang Kai-shek's wishful attempts to wipe out the Chinese Communist Party by force. So he had to resort to a different tactic temporarily. To buy time for his preparations for civil war, he had to pretend that he too wanted peace. His intentions were obvious. However, if we had refused to negotiate, we would have lost our political initiative. As long as we were aware of what Chiang Kai-shek was up to, why could we not negotiate? Facts were to prove that the Chongqing negotiations helped people to realize that Chiang Kai-shek was using a counter-revolutionary doublecross--preparing for civil war on the one hand and negotiating for peace on the other--and this enabled them to appreciate the art of struggle as practised by Chairman Mao: fighting Chiang Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary two hands with both hands of the revolution. As a result, our progressive friends and some friends among the middle elements were able to see things in the right perspective after their complicated struggle. [passages omitted]

As the domestic and international pressure to end the civil war in China and to bring about peace and democracy mounted, Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to accept our proposal to make public the points on which agreement had been reached and to defer unsettled points to future negotiations between representatives of both parties. He also had no choice but to rewrite the text of the agreement according to the conference minutes produced by our side in acknowledgement of the achievements of the Chongqing negotiations. This agreement was to go down in history as the "October 10th Agreement" so well known to the world. Thus the curtain came down on the Chongqing negotiations.

To give Chairman Mao a big sendoff on his departure for Yen-an, Mr Zhang Zhizhong held a large reception on the evening of 8 October. Chairman Mao, Comrades Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, Deng Yinchao, Dong Biwu, and Wang Jofei, and hundreds of representatives from all walks of life in Chongqing attended the reception. The reception was extremely lively. Many guests came forward to congratulate Chairman Mao for his unparalleled wisdom and courage and for his sublime art of struggle in conducting the difficult and complex 43-day negotiations and to compliment Comrade Zhou Enlai for his able assistance to Chairman Mao during the talks.

At 6 pm on 10 October, a ceremony marking the signing of the "Summary of Conversations" was held in Guei Garden. Comrade Zhou Enlai signed the documents on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, and Zhang Chun signed for the Kuomintang. After the signing, Chairman Mao received representatives from both parties present at the ceremony. As mentioned earlier, this "Summary of Conversations" left unsettled the status of the people's governments and the people's armed forces in the liberated areas. Nonetheless, it forced Chiang Kai-shek to concede to the people certain rights to democracy. This document put the Chinese Communist Party in command of the political situation and reduced the Kuomintang to a passive political role.

The early morning of 11 October saw more than a hundred representatives from all walks of life in Chongqing at Jiulongpo airport, west of Chongqing city, to see Chairman Mao off to Yen-an. Among the well-wishers were also a number of cadres from the CCP South China Bureau and XINHUA DAILY. At 9 am, Chairman Mao, Comrade Ye Jianying, and Comrade Wang Jofei, accompanied by Mr Zhang Zhizhong, took off for Yen-an. Comrade Zhou Enlai stayed on in Chongqing as a representative of the Chinese Communist Party to continue talks with the Kuomintang. At 1:30 pm, Chairman Mao safely landed in Yen-an. Military men and civilians in Yen-an and other liberated areas broke out in cheers for his triumphant return.

On 17 October, Chairman Mao gave a report to the cadres in Yen-an entitled "On the Chongqing Negotiations," in which he explained why it had been necessary and important to go to the Chongqing negotiations and why he had followed the principle of giving tit-for-tat and not giving up one inch of our territory without a fight in the negotiations with the Kuomintang reactionary clique. He summed up his experiences from the Chongqing negotiations in his report with this brilliant phrase as a conclusion: "While the prospects are bright, the road has twists and turns." These words epitomized the sum total of the confidence of the proletariat in the eventual victory of their revolutionary cause and their dauntless spirit in overcoming all obstacles lying in their path. These words showed us the way to the great victory we were to win in our war of liberation.

Written in Beijing Hospital on 17 April 1979

9055

CSO: 4005

SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

WE MUST ELIMINATE PREJUDICE AGAINST INTELLECTUALS

Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO in Chinese 13 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Xian Jun [0341 6511]]

[Text] Why is the party's policy on intellectuals not well executed in some areas? With regard to this question, we cannot satisfy ourselves with the mere fact that the poisonous impact of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" has not been eradicated. We should properly scrutinize the various prejudices toward intellectuals among some of our lending comrades. If such prejudices were not quickly eliminated, we would not be able to execute and carry through the various directives, policies, and measures of the Central Committee of the Party toward intellectuals; and any effort to activate the functions of intellectuals in the course of realizing the Four Modernizations would only be empty talk.

In the eyes of some comrades, intellectuals do not carry weight. Was it not true that the Chinese revolution relied on the great uneducated masses? If our uneducated masses were able to found a country, why could they not rule it too? Now that intellectuals have been treated as part of the working class, and they have been spared criticism and struggle, so that they can concentrate on their work, shall we consider our policy not well executed? The major reasons for the inability of these comrades to comprehend the question are that they have not thoroughly considered the relationships between intellectuals and scientific socialism, proletarian administration, and the Four Modernizations.

There will be no scientific socialist theories without intellectuals. As Marxism has told us, spontaneous mass movements lead only to consciousness in trade unionism and economic principles, but it does not produce scientific socialist theories. The theories of socialism came from the educated, propertied class, that is, from the philosophical, historical, and economic theories created by intellectuals. The founders of scientific socialism, Marx and Engels were bourgeois intellectuals based on their original social theories. Workers themselves are unable to produce scientific socialist theories because the creation of such depends on certain prerequisites, and only intellectuals possess these prerequisites. Even today, we still have to rely on the hard work of intellectuals to continue to develop and perfect scientific socialist theories.

There will be no proletarian regime without intellectuals. A proletarian regime is the product of the union of scientific socialism and workers' movements. The creation and dispersal of scientific socialist theories are impossible without the help of intellectuals, and the rise of a proletarian regime is equally impossible without them. The earliest founders of our party were all intellectuals. Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu were famous university professors; comrade Mao Zedong was an erudite scholar of great stature; and were not Chou Enlai and Dong Biwu equally well educated intellectuals? In the history of world communist movements, it is impossible not to see a proletarian regime which developed without the participation of intellectuals.

The leadership of a proletarian regime is carried out through its guidelines, directives, and policies. Intellectuals offer their hard labor and valuable contributions in laying the theoretical groundwork for these guidelines, directives, and policies. Even leaders themselves who are to shoulder responsibilities have to acquire considerable education. How can one become an expert general if he lacks military knowledge and talents in logistics? We cannot say that country rustics need no knowledge in making a nation. On the contrary, fighting a war is a kind of knowledge.

There will be no Four Modernizations without intellectuals. If we say that in the past we had to grasp the rich knowledge of people's warfare in order to topple colonialism, capitalism, and feudalism, we can likewise argue at present that we need to grasp the knowledge pertinent to the Four Modernizations in order to lead our people in working them into reality. If we do not enlist the support of the large majority of intellectuals in our working class, how can we realize the grand objective of the Four Modernizations!

We should also see that intellectuals have a great and bright future. This is because the course of human development will inevitably result in the disappearance of the difference between manual and mental labor, and this can be realized by the continuous expansion of the intellectual class through the liberation of man from onerous manual labor. Therefore, the intellectual class is the class with the best prospects. A highly advanced society is the crystal of a highly developed culture and technological knowledge. Man can truly gain access into a free kingdom when the intellectual class expands itself through the liberation of physical labor from the working class.

We can see from this that it is not that intellectuals do not carry weight, but that they do. If those comrades who hold prejudices against intellectuals laugh at what we have said about our previous lack of understanding and empathy toward the great historical role of intellectuals, it is indeed deplorable that they still hold on to their stubborn views today about our new long march in struggling for the realization of the Four Modernizations.

How did these comrades come to hold such prejudices? Not to mention such reasons as small-scale production which in our country is as embracing as the ocean, there are also deep political factors. Our country has gone through a long-continued feudal society. After liberation, though we destroyed the economic foundation of the feudal society, the remnants of feudalism, particularly the remnants of feudal totalitarianism, are still stubbornly surviving in our social life. In order to launch their dark totalitarian rule, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" also launched totalitarian rule in ideology. They suffocated academic freedom, opposed scientific democracy, advocated stupidity and backwardness, and cruelly persecuted the majority of intellectuals. The fifth they heaped on intellectuals made it impossible for some people not to be cheated and stupefied. As a result, in removing the prejudices toward intellectuals held by some of our comrades, we must thoroughly wipe out the remnants of feudal totalitarianism in our political life.

If Mr Ma Yinchu's suggestions years ago on the problems of population growth had been accepted and carried out, our rate of population increase would not have become this high. If we had allowed experts in economics to participate and lead our economic tasks, our economic construction would have become much better than what it is now. Even today, there are still very few intellectuals specialized in factory and mining enterprises who are in the position of leadership, and famous experts who are leaders in their fields. Based on the above, there is no reason to hold such prejudices as the fact that intellectuals do not carry weight, and that they are unreliable. The latter opinions are extremely detrimental to the task of socialist construction.

In order to eliminate the prejudices held by our comrades toward intellectuals, we should boldly recruit into the party's leadership structure intellectuals who possess both virtue and expertise, so that they have position, power, and responsibility to gradually change the composition of the leadership, making them develop fully their functions as intellectuals. In addition, we should evaluate the cadres in our present leadership, and use their level of education as one of the criteria in evaluation. Only when these comrades truly realize that lacking in education is a barrier to advance and better prospects can they eventually eliminate their prejudices toward intellectuals.

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'LISHI YANJIU' DISCUSSES PATRIOTISM AND NATIONAL BETRAYAL

HK100656 Beijing LISHI YANJIU in Chinese No 12, 15 Dec 79 pp 3-14 HK

[Article by Zuo Buqing [1563 2975 7230] and Zhang Mingjiu [4545 7686 0046]:
"Commenting on Qi Benyu's 'Patriotism or National Betrayal?']

[Text] A film "Secret History of the Qing Court" was shown in 1950. There were different views towards this film in 1954. Normally, free discussions of problems in the literary, art and academic spheres are permitted and there is nothing serious about the different appraisals of a film. However, contrary to normal expectations, Qi Benyu suddenly published an article "Patriotism or National Betrayal?--Criticism of the Reactionary Film 'Secret History of the Qing Court'" 12 years later, in the spring of 1967. This article picked out and made an issue of the different views towards this film in the past. It falsely accused people with trumped up charges, going to extremely shocking lengths. Qi Benyu clamoured: This "is definitely not just a question of a film" but is a struggle between two classes and two ideologies, and is the "struggle between bourgeois restoration and proletarian counterrestoration." "In the final analysis, this is a struggle to see which will win out, capitalism or socialism." Since the nature of the dispute was so serious, the comrades who had previously held positive views toward the film but were attacked by the "Leftist Hero" Qi Benyu 12 years later had committed serious crimes: so-called "bare exposure of their counterrevolutionary stand as landlords and the bourgeoisie," so-called "praise of the capitalist and bourgeois reformist road by making use of historical figures," so-called "dream of reaching a compromise with imperialism in the hope of obtaining understanding and help from imperialism" and so on and "acting as the echoers of the counterrevolutionary propaganda of imperialism and feudalism in every sense of the word." Their crimes were too many to be enumerated and were extremely serious. But in sum, all this meant that the people who took a positive view of this film regarded it as the "tool for clearing the way for carrying out capitalist restoration" in China, and "their ultimate aim was to overthrow the people's regime and sabotage our dictatorship of the proletariat."

This is probably the first case in the history of China and other countries in which comments on a film incurred such serious charges.

The matter is very clear. Qi Benyu's article is absolutely not an evaluation of the film, but is only using the evaluation of the film and in particular the appraisal of the historical events involved in it as a pretext to create

counterrevolutionary public opinion. Because of this, it is extremely important to analyze one by one and unfold before the people the historical facts distorted in Qi Benyu's article, the nonsense spread in the article and the malicious intent hidden in it.

Let Us Start With 'Where Did China Go at the End of the Nineteenth Century?'

Qi Benyu's article laid many false charges against the comrades with patriotic tendencies who previously affirmed "Secret History of the Qing Court." An encapsulated way of putting it held that the capitalist-roads in power in the party "made use of the completely traitorous reactionary film 'Secret History of the Qing Court'" to "embellish bourgeois civilization, bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois republic and propagate bourgeois reformism and the capitalist road."

"Taking the capitalist road" was the most serious charge brought against people by Lin Biao, Chen Boda, the "gang of four" and their advisor and Qi Benyu and his ilk. Once convicted, this crime is unpardonable. There are naturally very sufficient reasons for this: the Chinese people have already taken the broad path of socialism under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Is it not a heinous crime to run counter to this and vainly attempt to take the capitalist road? However, evidence is needed for the conviction of a crime. Did Qi Benyu have any evidence? Yes, he did. He said: the evidence is this: You have praised the history of "taking the capitalist road!"

Thus, a question arises: Is it necessarily wrong to "take the capitalist road" in history? Does praising the historical facts of "taking the capitalist road" mean advocating "taking the capitalist road" in socialist China now?

According to Qi Benyu's argument, the people and events of "taking the capitalist road" in history are all wrong and reactionary. This seemingly violent argument runs completely counter to Marxism. "In analyzing any social problem, Marxist theory absolutely requires the problem to be put into a certain historical scope." (Lenin: "On National Self-Determination") When the feudal relations of production and the entire superstructure had become serious shackles to the development of the productive forces at the end of the feudal society, was it erroneous and reactionary to take the capitalist road? Absolutely not. At such a stage of historical development, to take the capitalist road was the objective requirement of social development, the inevitable road in history and a great undertaking of the revolution. On the other hand, opposition to "taking the capitalist road" at this historical crisis was precisely as erroneous and reactionary action which ran counter to the objective progress of history. The facts are even clearer if we concretely analyze the conditions in China at the end of the 19th century discussed in Qi Benyu's article.

Before the Opium War, the feudal system was so diseased as to be incurable. Since the Qing government had adopted a backward reactionary policy of seclusion for a long time and seriously hindered the progress of Chinese

society, the difference in power between China and the various capitalist countries in Europe and America was becoming greater and greater. [HK100707] After the two defeats in the Opium War, the unfounded pride, prestige and influence of the "superior, heavenly kingdom" were all shattered. A defeated country with social chaos had become the perilous perspective which troubled progressive Chinese people day and night. Where was China going? This question was sharply placed before the ancient Chinese nation.

After the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, there was a rapid deterioration of the situation and China was confronted with the danger of being dismembered by imperialism. At this time, the rise of public run industries had become an irresistible trend, with the emergence of a series of light industries such as textiles, drawing silk and rice husking and heavy industries such as coalmining. The strength of the national bourgeoisie gradually developed. In this domestic and foreign situation, the development of capitalism was required in economics, and renovation and reform were needed in politics. They motivated one another and formed a new trend of the time. A handful of advanced intellectuals gradually realized that there was no other way available except to change the form of the government of feudal dictatorship and develop capitalism, so as to save the nation from destruction and to strengthen her for survival. The reformist movement led by Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong and Liang Qizhao was precisely a progressive movement which followed the historical tide and represented the trend of social development at that time. This was the first brave political attempt of the bourgeoisie in China during the period of the old democratic revolution. From the year of Jiawu (1894) to the year of Wuxu (1898), the reformist movement shattered the traditional proscription of the Qing Dynasty which "prohibited the people from using dirty words to interfere in politics" and obtained a certain degree of freedom in speech, publication and forming societies. Popular capitalist industries attained legal recognition and capitalism began to develop to a certain extent. During the Reform Movement of 1898, the directive on constitutional reform submitted to Guangxu suggested rather intrepid reforms of certain old systems and also adopted fairly radical measures toward the implementation of the new system. Since the imperialist, feudal and obdurate forces did not allow China to develop capitalism and since the bourgeoisie in China was itself weak, the movement of constitutional reform failed. However, the failure of the constitutional reform did not prove the strength and consolidation of the feudal system. On the contrary, it promoted the arrival of the storm of the bourgeois revolution. It was necessary to bury the feudal dynasty and set up a bourgeois democratic republic; this was the conclusion bought by the blood of the reformers.

This was the true historical feature of the Reform Movement of 1898. Basically, there was no question of "embellishment" here, as denounced by Qi Benyu. What other roads could be taken in China at the end of the 19th century? None. The feudal system was on the verge of destruction and the ruling organization of the Qing Dynasty was very corrupt and on the decline. In the 40 years of the reign of Cixi, private cliques gathered around her and feudal diehards grasped authority in state affairs. These people stuck to ancient ways and thoughts. They were conservative, poor of vision and hard of hearing. They

were muddled, delirious and covetous and they dreamt of restoring the policy of seclusion and blindly rejected foreign culture. They repudiated those who discussed Western learning as "dregs of the intelligentsia and people who violate Confucian etiquette." They even had to cover their noses and hurry away when they met foreigners so as to show their defense of the traditional cultural heritage. They pushed China to the dangerous verge of a conquered nation with the extermination of the entire race. This feudal, obdurate fortress definitely could not be destroyed by a peasants' war. Democratic revolution of a bourgeois nature was the sole way to bury the feudal system and save the Chinese nation. Therefore, the two-road struggle at the end of the 19th century could only be a struggle between feudalism and capitalism, and a struggle between two roads: vigorously defending the corrupt and backward feudal system, and carrying out bourgeois revolution and setting up a bourgeois democratic republic.

Qi Benyu entirely negated the progressiveness in taking the capitalist road in China at the end of the 19th century. What does this mean? Cannot it mean only a vain attempt to defend the darkest, the most corrupt and the most reactionary Qing Empire? Does not the use of a viewpoint which runs counter to historicism to comment on modern Chinese history show that the critic himself takes a reactionary feudalist stand?

What merits our attention is that Qi Benyu's article does not merely comment on Chinese history at the end of the 19th century but uses the appraisal of "Secret History of the Qing Court" as a pretext to vigorously spread the ultraleftist argument that all historical events of a capitalist nature should be negated. Everybody knows that for as long as 10 years, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" all along used this ultraleftist argument to negate the historical significance of the entire democratic revolution which had a bourgeois nature. They dug up certain policies and measures which our party adopted toward national capitalism in the course of democratic revolution, interpreted them out of context, listed the main points incessantly and cooked up the charge that "democrats are capitalist-roaders." This was the main political cudgel with which they overthrew a large number of the older generation of proletarian revolutionaries. It should be said that Qi Benyu's article set this bad precedent. [HK100716] He made irrelevant comments ranging from the Reform Movement of 1898 up to the policy adopted by our party toward capitalism in the early period of building the country. He sensationally depicted a black line, as if a large number of leading cadres in our party had wholeheartedly prostrated themselves before capitalism and unreservedly taken the capitalist road, that this had constituted a serious threat to socialist China, and that there was nothing for it but to initiate a storm of "rebellion" and "seizure of power."

In view of the seriousness of the problem, we cannot but keep Qi Benyu company, depart slightly from the theme of "China in the 19th century" and briefly discuss the problem of how our party handled the bourgeoisie and capitalism during the democratic revolution and in the early period of building the country.

Actually, the question is very clear. As early as in "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Party Committee of the Communist Party of China," Comrade Mao Zedong pointed this out clearly:

"China's private capitalist industry, which occupies second place in her modern industry, is a force which must not be ignored. Because they have been oppressed or hemmed in by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, the national bourgeoisie of China and its representatives have often taken part in the people's democratic revolutionary struggles or maintained a neutral stand. For this reason and because China's economy is still backward, there will be a need, and for a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution, to make use of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism as far as possible, in the interest of developing the national economy. In this period, all capitalist elements in the cities and countryside which are not harmful but beneficial to the national economy should be allowed to exist and expand. This is not only unavoidable but also economically necessary. But the existence and expansion of capitalism in China will not be unrestricted and uncurbed as in the capitalist countries.... However, in the interest of the whole national economy and in the present and future interest of the working class and all the laboring people, we must not restrict the private capitalist economy too much or too rigidly, but must leave room for it to exist and develop within the framework of the economic policy and planning of the people's republic."

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out clearly and correctly here that for "a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution," capitalism which is beneficial to the national economy and the people's livelihood should be allowed to exist and expand. On the Eve of the Liberation of the whole country and in the early period of the founding of the country, the party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong on many occasions emphasized these policies, which protected the national bourgeoisie and the capitalist industry and commerce. All these statements and resolutions have been recorded in the history books. These can be checked in the "Joint Program" of 1949 and in the first Constitution of 1954. In the period of the new democratic revolution, the bourgeoisie took part in the people's democratic united front under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. After the founding of the country, the party laid emphasis on the coexistence of the five economic sectors. The party's policy was "to give equal treatment to these differences," take the socialist national economy as the leading factor and permit capitalist development in the towns and the countryside. These were the actual conditions and the policy of the CCP in the early period of building the country. More than 10 years elapsed, the conditions in our country underwent tremendous changes and the socialist reforms of the ownership of the means of production were long completed. After such tremendous changes, Qi Benyu entirely ignored the historical conditions and indiscriminately distorted the historical facts. He eliminated parts of the party policies of that time, fabricated these into heinous crimes, threw the whole thing at the heads of the "capitalist-roaders" and would only be content with the death of these people.

It was especially abominable that Qi Benyu, who knew nothing about Marxism, went all out to use ultraleftist tints to disguise himself as having a certain Marxist theoretical level and angrily repeated this phrase of Marx's, "When capital comes to this world, it is a dirty thing from head to foot, with blood dripping down from every pore." He used this sentence to criticize the "capitalist-roaders" for "vigorously praising the so-called 'progress' and 'glory' of the capitalist system"; he used this statement

as the theoretical base for totally negating the historical role of capitalism. In fact, this precisely turned out to be a clumsy sleight of hand and exposed the anti-Marxist features of their ilk. Marx had indeed made this statement; Marx all along analyzed very sharply the nature of the bourgeoisie in its early stage. However, Marx at the same time affirmed or eulogized the "extremely revolutionary" role which the bourgeoisie had played in history. Comrade Mao Zedong also said, "It is not only progress but also an unavoidable path to replace suppression from foreign imperialism and feudalism with certain development in capitalism in this country." ("On Joint Government") According to the logic with which Qi Benyu dragged out the capitalist-roadsters, the praise of the bourgeoisie and the capitalist road in history was ironclad proof that they dreamed day and night of taking the capitalist road, so would not all the authors of the Marxist classics be turned into capitalist-roadsters by Qi Benyu?

[HK100723] It is not difficult to imagine that Qi Benyu was extremely complacent when he latched onto and made a fuss about the theme of "Secret History of the Qing Court." He grasped the crimes of other people in "embellishing capitalism" and at the same time decorated himself as an out-and-out hero who utterly opposed capitalism. He attained two objectives by a single move and was extremely happy! But he did not know that this ultraleft argument which entirely wiped out the historical role of capitalism was not sound. It could not show that this clique had the slightest smell of Marxism; on the contrary, it immediately alerted people to the bad odor of feudalism remnants emitted from their bodies. The "gang of four" later used opposition to capitalist restoration as a pretext to restore feudal despotism. This was precisely inherited and developed from Qi Benyu's argument of that year. If it is really necessary to use the concept of the "black line," there is a black line which permeates this article of Qi Benyu's and the articles of Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Liang Xiao, Luo Siding and their ilk. This is: to oppose capitalism with feudalism--to replace socialism with feudalism.

How To Handle Revolution and Reform?

We say that Qi Benyu's opposition to "taking the capitalist road in history" precisely proved that he took a feudalist stand. His opposition to the Reform Movement of 1898 precisely proved that he was a feudal diehard. If we say this, Qi Benyu and his ilk might not be convinced because it was very clearly written in his article that he approved of the revolution and opposed reforms, approved of violence and opposed compromise, approved of the Yihetuan [boxers] and opposed the reformists. In sum, there is the question of how to view revolution and reform. It is of great significance to clarify this question, because Lin Biao, the "gang of four" and their ilk created great ideological chaos on this question and such ideological chaos has brought extremely serious consequences.

We must still start with the question of how to appraise the history of China at the end of the 19th century. Qi Benyu also had a "theory of two roads." He said, "At the end of the 19th century, two roads emerged in the social reform of China: one was the reformist road of the bourgeoisie,

which attempted to lead to capitalism through constitutional reform and modernization from the upper to the lower levels ... This could only be a false reactionary road which did not work.... The other road was that by which the broad masses of the people rose to carry out revolution through armed struggle. The revolution of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the Yihetuan Movement both followed this road."

Qi Benyu's method is clear enough. This was nothing but discarding the actual historical conditions at that time, setting bourgeois reformism against the armed struggle of the peasants and the Reform Movement of 1898 against the Yihetuan Movement, and fabricating the two-road struggle in social reform in China at the end of the 19th century. Therefore, it was the most revolutionary historical appraisal to maintain the former as reactionary and the latter as revolutionary and to repudiate the former with an official denunciation and praise the latter with eulogy!

It must be admitted that such an allegation has a certain persuasiveness. After a moment's thought, is not revolution better than reform? What hesitation can a revolutionary have in choosing between the two? However, such logic cannot stand close scrutiny. What is the nature of the reform discussed here? And what is the nature of the revolution discussed here? Can such reform and such revolution really constitute two diametrically opposed roads? These questions cannot be answered if the actual contents of the historical events are removed. On the contrary, once concrete historical analysis is carried out, Qi Benyu's rags and tatters will be immediately exposed. Let us first talk about the Reform Movement of 1898 which was incessantly abused by Qi Benyu. The progressiveness of the class nature of the movement has already been mentioned above. The form of this movement was indeed not revolutionary but reformist, and it was an attempt to bring about a constitutional monarchy and take the capitalist road of the nature of the Meiji Restoration through political reforms from the upper to lower levels. Then, how should we view this reform? Now, people can certainly easily find many reasons for criticizing the incompleteness and the weaknesses and errors manifested in the reform movement in that year. Today, summing up the experiences of the revolutionary struggle in the past century and more, people have all the more sufficient reasons for affirming that bourgeois reformism cannot work in China. The practice of the revolution has already proved that the cause of opposition to feudalism in China can only be realized through bourgeois democratic revolution. Under the conditions of the 20th century, it can only be realized through the new form of bourgeois democratic revolution under proletarian leadership. Here revolution is undoubtedly superior to reform. However, the conclusion itself has already embodied a prerequisite. The prerequisite is that only under the historical conditions where there is bourgeois revolution or the bourgeois revolution has already started is it possible to take bourgeois reform as a comparison. If there is no such historical condition, such as in China at the end of the 19th century, where there was no bourgeois revolution, it is not possible to compare the superiority and inferiority, or the weakness and strength between reform and revolution.

At the end of the 19th century, capitalism had just emerged in China and national capital was still very weak. From 1872 to 1894, China had only 74 modern national capitalist enterprises. From 1895 to 1898, 61 new

factories, mines and other enterprises were set up. [HK100732] These 100-odd national capital enterprises were pathetically small compared with the imperialist enterprises, or the government-run enterprises, or with feudal economy with small peasant economy as the base. In step with this, the national bourgeoisie at this time was yet unable to form an independent political force. The political spokesmen of this class were mainly intellectuals converted from the landlord class and some enlightened government officials. Their ideological weapon was half Chinese and half Westernized. It consisted of traditional Chinese thinking as well as undigested doctrines of bourgeois human rights brought from the West. In sum, this class was not yet fully developed or mature economically, politically or ideologically. However, the international and domestic political situation was pressing and national crises were imminent. This immature national bourgeoisie could only hastily rush to the battlefield. Such was the condition of the class foundation of the Reform Movement of 1898. Owing to the immaturity of the Chinese bourgeoisie and their political spokesmen, and the countless ties between the bourgeoisie and imperialist and feudal forces and the hostile attitude adopted by this class toward the masses of workers and peasants, it was necessary to adopt the reformist method in the first test of political strength between the bourgeoisie and the obdurate feudal forces. It can thus be seen that the adoption of the reformist form in the Reform Movement of 1898 was stipulated and determined by the historical conditions and the conditions of class strength. It did not arbitrarily discard the revolutionary road and insist on taking the reformist road when a revolutionary situation was ready, but it was an attempt at reform before the revolution was formed and before the demands for revolution were put forth. This reformist movement was the first political movement of a bourgeois nature in the history of China. Precisely because of this, the movement shocked the feudal system to an unprecedented extent in the long feudal history of China. It could not be paralleled by certain political reforms and improvement which had taken place in the course of the development of the feudal system itself in history, nor could it be matched by peasant uprisings. The key was that it did after all express the demands of the new productive forces and the new form of production, despite its weakness.

How should this reformist movement from the upper to lower levels be justly evaluated? Obviously, we cannot describe it as a reactionary road, as Qi Benyu did. The role which it played in prompting historical progress cannot be erased, and its enlightenment role in the history of modern revolution in China cannot be negated. Stalin's words can be used here, "Evolution has made preparations and laid the foundation for the revolution, while revolution has completed the evolution and prompted the further development of evolution." (Stalin: "Amarchism or Socialism?")

If we take the bourgeois revolution which emerged after the defeat of this reformist movement as the basis for the comparison between reform and revolution, revolution is definitely far superior to reform. But this is said afterwards and is the review of history by later generations. This does not mean that there were already two opposed roads of revolution and reform at the time of the Reform Movement of 1898. What Qi Benyu used to compare with reform and to play down reform was not the bourgeois revolution but the

peasant movement, which was the movement of the Yihetuan. In order to place this comparison on a scientific and realistic foundation, it is first necessary to analyze the nature of the movement of Yihetuan and to see whether it could be considered a social revolution.

The Yihetuan Movement which broke out at the end of the 19th century was an anti-imperialist, patriotic movement with the masses of the peasants as the main force. The broad masses of the Yihetuan were shown to be extremely brave and unyielding in the struggle against imperialism and dealt a heavy blow at the imperialist, aggressive forces. However, it must be pointed out that according to Marxist principles, revolution in the strict sense of the word can only be a profound reform with the replacement of the old form of production by a new form, and the replacement of the corrupt social system by an improved progressive one. In class society, the outstanding hallmark of this revolution and reform is the transfer of political power from the old ruling class into the hands of the new ruling class. Was the movement of Yihetuan a historical event of this nature? Obviously not. The principal shortcoming of the movement of Yihetuan was that it only opposed imperialist aggression and did not oppose the feudal social system and the feudal government of the Qing Dynasty. Under the banner of "supporting the Qing and wiping out foreigners," it even drowned the spontaneous and antifeudal nature which a peasant movement should possess. It was eventually exploited by the obdurate feudal forces and fell a victim under the collusion of feudal and imperialist forces. The movement of Yihetuan never put forward a road for changing the feudal system.

Qi Benyu concealed the fact that the Yihetuan did not oppose feudalism and even fallaciously reasoned that "the anti-imperialist and patriotic struggle of Yihetuan was linked with the antifeudal struggle," "the movement against the Qing did not stop for a single moment," and "it all along persisted in the struggle against feudalism." The only method used by Qi Benyu to prove this viewpoint was to fabricate history. We can cite two examples to lay bare his tricks.

[HK100741] First example: He said that "supporting the Qing and wiping out foreigners" was "only put forth by some organizations" for "a short period of time." This was not the case. In 1898, the banners of Yihetuan in Sichuan, Hubei and Shandong read "obeying the Qing and wiping out foreigners," "defending the Qing and wiping out foreigners" and "supporting the Qing and wiping out foreigners." The banner put up by Zhu Hongdong in Shandong in 1899 and by the Yihetuan after they had entered Zhidai, Tianjin and Beijing all along read "supporting the Qing and wiping out foreigners." "Supporting the Qing and wiping out foreigners" was the general slogan used by the Yihetuan from their formation to their suppression.

Example two: Qi Benyu said that the Yihetuan advocated "killing foreigners and wiping out corrupt officials" and it could be seen that they not only opposed imperialism but also feudalism. This was again a wicked distortion. The sentence "kill foreigners and wipe out corrupt officials" was extracted from the "creed" of a senior disciple belonging to a certain altar of the Yihetuan at Tianjin. The whole text was "Don't be greedy for money and abstain from lewdness. Don't disobey your parents and don't violate the

laws of the imperial government. Kill foreigners and wipe out corrupt officials. While walking in town, you must lower your heads and should not look around. On encountering fellow disciples, you should put your palms together in greeting." Qi Benyu extracted the two phrases "kill foreigners and wipe out corrupt officials" as the complete antifeudal combat slogan of the entire Yihetuan and even went so far as to conceal the vital sentence "don't violate the laws of the imperial government."

It is an absolutely true historical fact that the Qing government organized the Yihetuan as a righteous army, and the great contingent of the Yihetuan thus degenerated into a tool of feudal diehards, but Qi Benyu had totally denied this. After the Yihequan had risen up in Shandong, its name was changed to Yihetuan because the Qing government recognized the Yihequan as a "folk organization" and a legal association which "defended their own homes and property" and "protected their native towns together" so that it could be easily controlled and exploited. The Yihetuan not only unfurled the banner of "supporting the Qing and wiping out foreigners" there but also put up a big banner with the character "Yu" of Yu Xian, the governor of Shandong, to openly carry out activities. From then on, they entered Zhidai from Shandong and from Zhidai entered the capital and its vicinity. Then under the official authorization of the Qing government, they marched into Beijing. In June 1900, the Qing government ordered Zai Xun and Gang Yi to take command of the Yihetuan, and passed the decree of "honoring the Boxer bandits as righteous people," "thus the general altar was set up at the Palace Zhuang with 3,000 to 4,000 people assembled and supported by public funds. The groups dispersed over the five towns and the newly recruited bandits were all asked to register and enroll at the Palace." Thus, contrary to what Qi Benyu said, it was not "a slander or smear" against the Yihetuan to say that the Qing government organized the Yihetuan as a righteous army.

The antifeudal struggles of the Yihetuan in the city of Beijing vigorously propagated by Qi Benyu were all fabricated. In reality, the Yihetuan did not "control Beijing city," but was controlled by the diehard forces in the Qing government. People like Zai Lan and Gang Yi attempted to use the Yihetuan to discriminate against their opponents and usurp the throne. On the fifth day after war had been declared on foreign countries, Zai Lan led a troop of the Yihetuan and rushed into the Palace to assassinate Guangxu, while the Yihetuan never carried out any "conspiratorial" activities against Cixi, the chieftain of the feudal diehards.

In the course of analyzing the events of modern history of China, all those from Qi Benyu up to the "gang of four" all along pretended to be revolutionaries by using the base method of unprincipled embellishment of the spontaneous peasant movement of the Yihetuan to deprecate the political movement of the bourgeoisie. On the surface, they seemed to most faithfully and firmly take the stand of the working people, but in reality, they most brutally tampered with the theory of class struggle of Marx and Lenin. The objective truth revealed by the theory of class struggle of Marx and Lenin is that: the historical mission of burying the feudal system can only be

accomplished by the bourgeois revolution, not by the peasant movement. The Yihetuan, as a spontaneous and patriotic peasants' movement, could not rid itself of control by the feudal system precisely because of the conservatism and spontaneity of peasants, and ruined its righteous, anti-imperialist heroic undertaking with a tragic end. The movement of the Yihetuan did not touch the feudal system in the least. Therefore, in praising it as an all-out antifeudal revolutionary road which opposed the political reforms and modernization of the bourgeois reformists, Qi Benyu was in fact propagating a road which did not oppose feudalism but defended feudalism. On this question, just like the "gang of four," he often ruthlessly exposed his thick and long tail in the course of rectifying the so-called "capitalist roaders" and abusing capitalism.

Qi Benyu had another intention in severely repudiating reforms: that was to advocate the theory of violence. He vigorously spread the viewpoint that revolution was equal to activities of violence and that revolution could only adopt the form of violence. He also spoke of the adoption of the form of violence as the absolute criterion for distinguishing between revolution and reaction. In this way, revolution could only be violence, and violence was also equal to revolution. [HK100748] Why was the Yihetuan revolutionary? Because it was armed struggle. Why was the political reform of 1898 reactionary? Because it was not armed struggle. This viewpoint of Qi Benyu's which unconditionally worshipped violence and embellished violence, this viewpoint which deliberately evaded the nature and aim of the movement but appraised the form and measures of the movement in isolation, this viewpoint which made armed struggle absolute and excluded all other forms of struggle was utterly opposed to Marxism. Lin Biao and the "gang of four" repeatedly advocated this trash throughout the Great Cultural Revolution so as to confuse and poison the people's minds, stir up violence and instigate an extremely destructive "revolution of violence" with the salient feature of all-out civil war and rebellion. Public opinion which advocated violence became more widespread and fantastic. Social order was disturbed and right and wrong were reversed. An almost unimaginable and absurd situation emerged in socialist China: it was clearly a proletarian country, but rebellion was considered justified and it had become a reactionary line to prohibit rebellion. The more barbaric, brutal and ruthless the actions of rebellion were, the more revolutionary they were considered. It was considered cowardly to observe the law and brave to create disturbances. It was considered despicable to be civilized and glorious to be brutal. It was considered reactionary to be humane and revolutionary to be cruel. Rogues in threes and fours mustered disorderly bands, and it became the major orientation to direct the spearhead upwards to seize power through violence. It became "fine" to smash the guns, "Strike down to the dust" and "shatter the dog's head to pieces" became brave words showing the revolutionary spirit. Infuriating brutal torture in a new guise became the "iron fist" for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. This unconditional advocacy of actions of violence under the fine-sounding name of "revolution" caused inestimable damage to socialist politics, economy and culture in our country. The disastrous consequences brought to the people's lives and property and to the ethics and prevailing customs in society are regrettable. Today, when we read again Qi Benyu's article and recollect the events over the past 10 years, every revolutionary and every patriot probably has a clear understanding of the calculated "theory of violent revolution."

From the viewpoint of theory, it is entirely wrong to speak of violent revolution, especially armed struggle, as the only correct form of revolutionary struggle and unconditionally exclude all other forms of struggle. Lenin said, "Marxism requires us to examine the question of the form of struggle with a historical attitude. We have not understood the minimum requirement of dialectical materialism if we put forward this question in isolation from the actual historical environment. Owing to the differences in the political conditions, conditions of national culture and custom and practices in the various periods of economic evolution, different forms of struggle are inevitably raised to the first position and become the principal form of struggle, while the various secondary and subsidiary forms of struggle accordingly undergo changes. It is a total rejection of the Marxist stand to give an affirmative or negative answer to the question of a certain means of struggle without detailed examination of the actual environment of a certain movement at a certain stage of its development." ("Guerrilla Warfare") Marxism admits multiplicity of the form of struggle. Armed struggle is a characteristic and strong point in the democratic revolution in our country. However, we cannot consequently affirm that revolution can only take the road of armed struggle under any historical conditions and in any country. Under the socialist conditions in our country, those who still oppose reforms, peace and stability and advocate armed rebellion and ruthless struggle can certainly only be careerists and conspirators who deliberately instigate counterrevolutionary rebellion.

The lessons of 10 years enable the Chinese people to understand that some people can still do many bad things under the name of "revolution." This is a very valuable lesson. We should firmly remember this lesson and forever bear it in mind.

Who Is Patriotic? Who Is Traitorous?

There is great significance in the fact that the theme of Qi Benyu's article is set on the question of "patriotism" or "national betrayal." In the history of feudal society in China, the charge of "having illicit relations with a foreign country" was always the most serious. Besides, once it is brought against a person, he can never clear himself of it. Modern China has suffered fully from raids and humiliation by imperialist powers. Patriotism filled the entire nation. "Traitors" were all the more spurned by people for their debauched behavior and they were never to be reinstated. For this reason, when the "gang of four" and their ilk did mischief, they never forgot to stick the label of "national betrayal" onto those whom they wanted to victimize. This is the moral of Qi Benyu's theme.

Two big factions emerged within the ruling class on the political stage in China at the end of the 19th century, and they carried out a violent trial of strength. These were the "dowager party" headed by Cixi and the so-called "emperor's party" headed by Guangxu. They had distinctly divergent views towards national affairs; therefore, it is not difficult to answer the question of who is patriotic and who is traitorous. However, Qi Benyu used the criticism of "Secret History of the Qing Court" as a pretext to arbitrarily impose the charge of national betrayal on Guangxu. There were

two reasons: First, he "dreamed of entering into the service of imperialism to carry out modernization and political reforms" so as to "recapture the throne and strengthen the imperial court." [HK100757] This meant to "usher the wolf into the house," and "accelerate the process of degeneration into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country" in China. Second, he deemed that "war cannot be waged against foreign countries" and put up his hands in capitulation during the invasion by the joint forces of the eight powers.

Talking about the past is for the sake of commenting on the present. Qi Benyu's repudiation of Guangxu was directed at the "capitalist-roaders in power." He aimed at using the charge of national betrayal against Guangxu to prove that affirmation of Guangxu and the film "Secret History of the Qing Court" based on the Reform Movement of 1898 was national betrayal. Furthermore, those "capitalist-roaders" who actually praised and affirmed the film as patriotic "shared the same feelings" as Guangxu and Concubine Zhen (this tragic, insignificant character in history whom Cixi maltreated to death as given the evil posthumous title of "agent of imperialism" more than 30 years after her death) and thus undoubtedly also belonged to the same clan advocating national betrayal.

Qi Benyu had no evidence in saying that Guangxu was traitorous. Guangxu was a young emperor. He lived just before the total collapse of the feudal society in China. After Guangxu "took up the government himself" at the age of 19, Cixi still held the actual power in state affairs, so all his movement and behavior were curbed. After defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, although Guangxu was in the forbidden city, he felt that the Qing Dynasty was threatened by growing crises and the country would be defeated unless there was political reform, and political reforms could not be carried out without the dismissal of the conservative "senile, unreasonable ministers" and employment of "perspicuous, courageous men." With such an ideological motivation, he was determined to resist the obstruction from Cixi and supported the reformers in carrying out social reforms. Guangxu himself also started to pay attention to bourgeois politics and culture and spent 2 months reading "Summary of the Modern History of the Western Countries" translated and compiled by Timothy Li. He was determined to adopt the suggestion of setting up a parliament. The Grand Secretary Sun Jianai said, "If a parliament is set up, the people will have power and the emperor will have no power." Guangxu answered, "I only want to save China. If it is beneficial to the country and people, what does it matter even if I have no power?" Kang Youwei rose up to defend the parliament and the diehards rose up to attack it. The Qing official Wen Ti slandered it as "an organization defending the country, not the Qing." Guangxu said, "Isn't it a good thing that the parliament defends the country?" He dismissed Wen Ti from the post of Imperial Censor. Guangxu attempted to abolish certain "promulgated laws of the ancestors" of the Qing Dynasty of the previous 200 years and more. For example, he changed the time of the assembly of courtiers at the Imperial Court from the morning to the afternoon. The officials could stand without kneeling down when they had an audience with the emperor. The close, important and old officials were granted seats and so on. Later on, he also proclaimed the abolition of tortures such as tattooing the faces of criminals, slow death by dismemberment and incrimination of innocent people in a crime and so on. All these

reforms and measures certainly met with obstacles. Some did not really materialize, but they conformed with the trend of the time and were vigorous and impressive. In the period of the Hundred-Day Reform, in face of the obstacles and sabotage by diehards of the Dowager's Party, Guangxu vigorously supported the overall situation. He boldly employed four ministers of military defense to organize the new government and issued dozens of decrees on reform in a short period. The most outstanding historical merit was that the Qing government for the first time openly recognized capitalist production by the people as legal, promoted various industries, encouraged machine-building and gave individuals the permission to run arsenals. This certainly paved the road for the development of capitalism. Is it possible to find out from these measures any evidence that Guangxu attempted to betray the country through modernization and political reform? Obviously, there is not even the slightest trace. Guangxu had numerous shortcomings as an emperor at a time when feudalism was drawing to a close. Not only did he have deep-rooted feudal concepts, he was also very cowardly and his abilities were commonplace. He could not be considered a remarkable emperor in the Qing Dynasty, but he had a strong point which by far surpassed his ancestors: carrying out modernization and political reforms. This action of modernization and political reform and national betrayal precisely exclude each other, like fire and water.

This question is even clearer when seen from the nature of the entire movement of modernization and political reform supported by Guangxu. This was a patriotic movement for national salvation initiated by bourgeois reformers. The reformers rushed about and wailed. They evaded neither swords nor knives. As expressed in their views, they had great enthusiasm in strengthening themselves and the banner of patriotism was unfurled. Kang Youwei discussed "competition in trade" in "Proposals Submitted to the Emperor" and indignantly pointed out that foreign goods were dumped in large quantities, and that "our people have exhausted all their energies and used up all their resources." In the "Fifth Communication Submitted to the Qing Emperor," he analyzed imminent foreign aggression and said, "For the past 3 years, the Western countries have talked about dividing up China. They put their views in the newspapers and openly used the pretext of justice. Their intention of dividing up China is known all over the world. This is illustrated in detail in the mural paintings without the slightest concealment." [HK100806] He criticized the ideas of relying on foreign forces such as "seeking protection from strong neighbors and relying on their aid." Kang Youwei even suggested setting up another capital on the lower Yangzi and in the region of Lake Tai and River Song, in a situation in which "the Russians and Japanese have penetrated into the interior of China" and "there are no strategic passes in the mountains on the border or strategic barriers at sea." All this shows that although the reformers had the pipedream of striving to obtain foreign support for modernization and political reforms at that time, they never had any unsavory records of entering the service of imperialism.

In socialist new China, Qi Benyu suddenly published his weird talk and wanted to stick the label of "national betrayal" onto Guangxu and the movement of modernization which he supported. People cannot help feeling that this is

wishful thinking and a strange story. However, it should be admitted that Qi Benyu's platitudes could be heard everywhere during the year of modernization and political reforms. This also meant that the feudal diehards long ago repudiated the reformers as traitors. This occurred more than 70 years before Qi Benyu's repudiation! The diehards at that time used the charge of "National betrayal" as a weapon to put the reformers to death. Some people said that the result of the political reform was national betrayal and that after the political reform, "a small problem would involve struggles launched in groups, and a serious problem would involve the pursuit of individual interests and would easily lead to national betrayal!" Some people said that the motive of the reformers in carrying out political reforms was to sell out the country and to "speedily pave the way for the westerners and lead China to greet them." Some people went a step further by saying that the reformers had been bought over by foreigners long ago and that political reforms were designed for "traitors and their ilk" so that the "barbarians can scheme against China without bloodshed." Does not the argument with which Qi Benyu slandered Guangxu and other people who advocated political reforms and modernization as traitors precisely show that he was a big "leftist" of the 1960's who had entirely inherited the mantle of the feudal diehards of the end of the 19th century?

It was indeed a historical fact that Guangxu opposed the proclamation of war by Cixi during the invasion by the joint forces of the eight powers. However, it was extremely unfair for Qi Benyu to accuse Guangxu of "worshipping, befriending and being afraid of imperialism" and label him as a "capitulationist" and "traitor."

The ruling clique of Cixi who had all along fawned on foreigners and betrayed the country suddenly reversed their attitudes in 1900 and proclaimed war on all the imperialist countries. What was all this about? Could they possibly change their nature and suddenly become patriotic heroes? In the "Chongling Collection of Records and Documents," Yun Yuding unraveled the answer to the riddle of the declaration of war by Cixi. "On the day of the proclamation of war, I reckoned that everything would end in a peace agreement some time. When the barbarians are happy in the morning, the emperor will be replaced in the evening. As long as this is accomplished ... it does not matter even if we have to cede territory as an atonement for our offense." Here, it is not only stated that the direct aim of the diehards in the declaration of war was to reject Guangxu, the spiritual leader of the reformers; it also shows that even before the declaration of war, they predicted the end of the war as betrayal of the country to sue for peace and "ceding territory as an atonement for our offense." Since the proclamation of war was already prepared for national betrayal and peace agreement, there was no need for any deployment for offense and defense before the declaration of war. Cixi and her trusted subordinates only prayed to their gods and recited chants and talked about fairies and spirits all day long. Guangxu could not help stepping out to air an opposite view to this absurd behavior of gambling with the welfare of the country and playing at war. Actually, right after the Reform Movement of 1898, he had been stripped of his power of taking part in state affairs. But now, he was dragged out by Cixi with ulterior motives to attend the conference for charting the policy of declaring war.

This emperor "who had long kept silent after withdrawing from the government" talked with confidence and composure at this time and vigorously stated the impracticability of declaring war. On the whole, he did not oppose waging a war against a foreign country, but he opposed the war "waged against different foreign countries at the same time." He stated his reasons clearly, "The strength of the various countries is 10 times that of Japan. If they join together against us, how can we resist them?" "Besides, we are only engaged in empty talk about this, how can we treat people's lives as trifles?" It seems that such criticism and opinions were not groundless in the light of the declaration of war against all imperialist countries by the diehards headed by Cixi who at the same time did not make preparations for war but only pinned their hopes upon fairies and sorcery. Thus it is similarly a trumped-up charge to take Guangxu's opposition to war as "capitulation" and "national betrayal." Moreover, the outcome of the "Eight-Power Allied Expedition" shows that those who were servile to imperialism and signed the Peace Treaty of 1901 which brought loss of power and shame to the country were precisely the diehards who were as strong as oxen and who vigorously advocated war in the past. Is it not appropriate to stick the label of national betrayal on Cixi and her clique? It is not difficult to discern how shamelessly Qi Benyu, who passed as half a "historian," reversed the achievements and crimes in history!

[HK100817] What deserves serious thought is that Qi Benyu wrote this long, copious and fluent article but only gave half an answer to the question which he raised himself: "patriotism and national betrayal?" He only repudiated Guangxu and the reformers as traitorous and not patriotic. Then, let us ask who is truly patriotic. Were those who opposed Guangxu and Kang Youwei in political reforms and modernization patriotic? Were those who vigorously advocated and decided to declare war on other countries patriotic? In the entire article, Qi Benyu totally adopted the method of ambiguity and vagueness and dared not give a definite answer to these questions. However, it is not difficult for clear-minded, intelligent people to discern the other half of the answer hidden between the lines of Qi Benyu's article: the diehards headed by Cixi were true patriots!

Lin Biao, Chen Boda, the "gang of four," Qi Benyu and his ilk long worshipped the diehards headed by Cixi! However, it was difficult to admit this outright before the time was ripe. It is interesting that such admiration for diehards was half hidden and half revealed and muttered and mumbled about in Qi Benyu's article. His basic method was to let people study and understand his praise of the patriotism of the diehards, which "cannot be conveyed through words but must be perceived spontaneously" amidst his repudiation of the reformers for national betrayal.

Qi Benyu, in particular, relied on a cane in using this fairly ingenious method to embellish the diehards through the distortion of facts. This cane consisted of referring to exclusionism as patriotism. Certainly, it is not convenient to openly eulogize the exclusionism of the diehards, so what Qi Benyu vigorously commended was the exclusionism of the Yihetuan. There was another advantage in doing this--he could at the same time receive credit for awarding the laurels of patriotism to the peasant movement. What

is abominable is that Qi Benyu extolled the exclusionism of the Yihetuan as "deliberate" because the quotation from Comrade Mao Zedong which he cited clearly pointed out that the Yihetuan advocated "indiscriminate exclusionism." Qi Benyu's article appeared to eulogize "anti-imperialism" and "patriotism" but was actually advocating blind, indiscriminate exclusionism. He affirmed, without analysis, all the blind antiforeign activities of the Yihetuan such as "killing foreigners," "cutting off the heads of foreigners," "rejecting foreign goods," and "changing the name of Dongjiaomin Lane, where foreign embassies are located, into 'Street for Cutting Foreigners' and the name of Imperial River Bridge into 'Bridge for Cutting Foreigners.'" If this was an unavoidable error of exclusionism committed by the Yihetuan, which represented the Chinese peasants in the 19th century during the early stage of their understanding of imperialism, people who claimed to be Marxist leftists in the 20th century had ulterior motives in eulogizing and advocating this exclusionism. Moreover, this indiscriminate exclusionism of the Yihetuan expressed the conservative and backward aspects of the peasants. This was precisely the ideological foundation on which the Yihetuan echoed the feudal diehards and was influenced and exploited by them. Therefore, in deliberately eulogizing this indiscriminate exclusionism, Qi Benyu was embellishing and eulogizing the feudal diehards in a roundabout way.

Blind exclusionism is an ideological trend and has deep historical roots. Towards the end of the 18th century, the Qing government implemented the policy of blocking the passes and closing the country. It stubbornly rejected western thought, culture, science and technology, boycotted economic and cultural exchange between China and other countries and deemed that "the important policy in controlling barbarians first lay in closing the passes." At the same time, it attempted to isolate the Chinese people from foreigners, so as to safeguard the feudal, natural economy built on the foundation of small agricultural industry and small handicraft industry. Not only were such policies ineffective in "controlling barbarians," they could also only bring very serious dangers, causing the Chinese people to be totally ignorant of the outside world and keeping them backward forever. "Closing passes to control barbarians" seems to be patriotic but is in fact traitorous. This conclusion has already been proved by the history of the latter half of the Qing Dynasty. After the Opium War, some advanced elements who split off from the ruling class gradually recognized the absurdity of this policy of closing the country and thus rose up to advocate "learning the strong points of the barbarians to subdue the barbarians." They advocated learning from foreign countries and studying the advanced bourgeois culture of the west. This new ideological tendency developed to a new stage between 1894 and 1898. The struggle between Chinese and western learning and between ancient doctrines and modern theories became a sharp ideological cleavage between diehards and reformers. Those who sang aloud exclusionism at this time were precisely the diehards. If the advocacy of exclusionism by the Qing rulers before the Opium War was mainly due to presumptuous self-conceit and ignorance of the outside world, the principal motive of the feudal diehards in insisting on exclusionism around the time of the 1898 Reform Movement changed to the unsurpassed fear of outdated and backward feudal forces towards new advanced, capitalist events and things, although there was also an element of ignorance and self-conceit. On the political stage of China at the end of the 19th century, the struggle between exclusionism and anti-exclusionism was in essence the two-road struggle between feudalism

and capitalism. The diehards insisted on exclusionism and used it as an important weapon for dealing a blow to the reformers. [HK100823] They were in fact maintaining and defending the crumbling feudal system. This reactionary nature of exclusionism is very clear. However, diehards themselves painted it in patriotic tints of loyalty to the ancestors and to the country. This was the main reason why exclusionism could mislead so many people. In the socialist period, Qi Benyu still wanted to advocate exclusionism as patriotism. This meant imitating the diehards of bygone times and opposing all advanced things and events under the pretext of opposing "fawning on foreigners and worshipping things foreign" and opposing "national betrayal" so that China would forever remain in a state of backwardness and ignorance, so that they could exercise their feudal, despotic and atrocious rule as they pleased. Later, this blind exclusionism advocated by Qi Benyu was even more wildly and crudely propagated for a time by the "gang of four." When the "gang of four" were in power, they acted even more recklessly and unscrupulously than Qi Benyu did when he defied and revolted against the authorities. Therefore, they laid bare the words which Qi Benyu hid in the bottom of his heart in the past. Jiang Qing openly stated their admiration for Cixi and there was even a time when the streets were filled with talk of "reappraising Cixi."

Certainly, it was precisely at the time when the "gang of four" unfurled the combat banner of "patriotism" and started a big brawl that people recognized even more clearly the trash of their "patriotism" which was also the trash of Qi Benyu. It was precisely at that time, when the labels of "fawning on foreigners and worshipping foreign things," "national betrayal," "slavish comprador philosophy" were pinned everywhere, that our motherland lagged even further behind the economically advanced countries of the world. Our national economy suffered serious losses and damage.

The court of practice is most just. The practice of revolution in our country has already passed the sentence: Lin Biao, the "gang of four" and their ilk who all along falsely accused innocent people of treason over 10 years are out-and-out traitors. And those of the older generation of proletarian revolutionaries, who were falsely accused by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," who were broad-minded, who projected their views into the world, who were vigorous and courageous and were bold in absorbing all the advanced things in other countries to build our motherland, who promoted the development of the socialist cause of our motherland and changed her backward outlook, are the true great patriots forever revered by the Chinese people.

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SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

CONFERENCE OUTLINES TASKS OF POPULATION CONTROL

Serious Problem Today

Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO in Chinese 15 Dec 79 p 1

[Article by Correspondent Li Jiajie [2621 1367 2638]: "Nationwide Demographic Science Discussion Conference Held in Chengdu"]

[Text] The second National Demographic Discussion Conference was held in Chengdu from 7-13 December. The conference revolved on "Population Problems Facing Our Country's Four Modernizations and Ways To Solve Them" as the central theme for inquiries.

The unanimous opinion reached by delegates to the conference was that the population problem still exists objectively in our country at the present stage, and the problem is serious. The principal thing revealed was that the population increase and the increase in material resources are not proportionate, creating employment problems, education problems, housing problems, problems in improving the people's living standard, etc. Most of the comrades agreed that the principal reason for the appearance of the population problem was that our economy is technically backward and is developing too slowly, but it could not be denied that a too-rapid increase in population was also an important factor. Secondarily is that for a long time, population theory has been presented in an extraordinarily one-sided way, for example regarding a large population as an absolute benefit; it was felt that population problems could fundamentally not exist in a socialist country; people were regarded only as producers and were overlooked as consumers; we even erroneously considered talking about or researching population problems as the equivalent of Malthusianism, and so forth. This threw people's thinking into disarray and seriously affected control of population increases.

Another important question discussed was the proposition that there are two theories of production itself, one being the production of the necessities of life and the tools needed for this, and the other being mankind's production of itself. At the first National Demographic Science Discussion Conference, no one was sufficiently clear about the two kinds of production, production of material resources and mankind's production of itself, that exist in

society. At this conference, after a year of study, most comrades affirmed Engels' analysis of the two kinds of production in the preface to "Home, Private Ownership, and the Origin of the State," pointing out that this is a basic principle of Marxism. They said that this can not only be further explained theoretically, but many examples can be found in real life as well. Therefore, the production of people must be connected to the production of materials in our consciousness, and we must simultaneously take charge of material production and people production in the actual work; controlling population growth while developing production is just such a simultaneous grasp of the two kinds of production.

An outstanding characteristic of this current demographic science discussion conference was that demographic theoretical work and actual work were combined in carrying out the research, which was much better than had been done at any previous time. The comrades attending the conference started from facts and ascended to the heights of theory in their research on the problems of population increase. For example, with regard to the problem of demographic laws, many comrades carried out deep and meticulous analysis on the basis of large amounts of investigative data, ratios of persons to materials, and from the standpoints of men as producers and as consumers. This was a great advance in the use of theory to guide actual work. Many comrades analyzed the relationship between population increase and economic development on the basis of the relationship between accumulation and consumption. A great many comrades engaged in practical work suggested that as the country must set up a plan for capital construction items each year to guarantee expanded reproduction of material resources, why couldn't a sum of money be set aside for human reproduction, to guarantee that mankind's production of itself will proceed according to plan? All agreed that the proposal of this question held great theoretical and actual significance.

At the conference, theoretical workers also discussed all aspects of population reform. They especially proposed many methods as population control measures could be implemented, what kind of concrete measures could be deferred, etc. They believed that conscientious development of research on this would be extraordinarily beneficial to rational and effective control of population. Some comrades also used mathematical methods and statistical methods to estimate development trends in population, to study the optimum ratio between population development and economic development, and attracted a great deal of interest among comrades attending the conference.

Attending this scientific discussion conference were more than 200 persons representing scientific research organs, higher level schools and colleges, party schools, and planned parenthood organs in all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, and of the armed services, the state council, and concerned departments of the Central Committee. They said what was on their minds, spoke without inhibition, and courageously stated their views even though they related to matters of implementation of policy, going ever deeper into the questions discussed at the conference. More than 100 scholarly papers were received by the conference.

The circumstances of discussion made it clear that research in demographic science is receiving a high degree of attention from research workers in literature, history, philosophy, economics, geography, mathematics, systems engineering, cybernetics, medicine, health statistics, and other departments. This will cause demographic science to develop gradually into a comprehensive discipline that straddles many other disciplines.

The conference established a preparatory team for a Chinese Demographic Association and selected Xu Dixin [6079 3321 2450] as team leader.

Twelve Suggestions Outlined

Shanghai WEN HUI BAO in Chinese 25 Dec 79 p 3

[Article by Correspondent Yu Songnian [0205 2646 1628]: "Population Increase Must Be Appropriate to the Production of Goods"]

[Text] The second National Demographic Science Discussion Conference was held recently in Chengdu. At the conference, delegates proposed 12 suggestions concerning the population problems facing our country's Four Modernizations and ways to solve them, and on how our country can control population rationally and effectively.

The first proposal was that the proportional relationship between population increase and economic development should be dealt with well and properly. When the nation sets up its plan for investment in construction for development of the national economy each year, it should simultaneously consider investment in population, which is to say that at the same time as we are guaranteeing expanded reproduction of material resources, a certain sum should be set aside for use in human production, to guarantee that mankind's production of itself proceeds according to plan and to produce a correspondence between population increases and the society's production of materials resources.

The second proposal was that the relationship between production of people and production of goods should be dealt with well and properly. We must grasp material production on the one hand and population production on the other. Thus, the production of people and the production of materials must become connected in our consciousness, and we must expend a great deal of effort and devote much time to develop production and slow the rate of population increase. We must overcome the contradiction of having production develop according to plan and having population increase according to no plan, and promote the progress of economic development.

The third proposal was that the unity of opposites relationship between producers and consumers should be dealt with well and properly. For man to be a producer, he must mature as creator of material wealth and must be of a certain age and technical and cultural level, and he must be combined with the means of production, so there are some conditions; as for man as a

consumer, he must be fed and clothed from the moment he is born, and before he reaches an age when he can participate in production, he will consume a certain amount of the necessities of life. It is one-sided to perceive man as a producer only, and ignore his role as a consumer.

The fourth proposal was that we must be foresighted about the population problem. Population is not equivalent to labor force, for it takes 10-odd years for a newborn baby to mature into an able-bodied worker; once an able-bodied worker has matured, he can work continuously for several decades. The newborn population certainly has no effect on the present requirements for labor force, so to determine the resources of labor force 10-odd years in the future, we must establish strategic objectives, and only then can we avoid having population increases occur without government sanction.

The fifth proposal was that we improve the population, raise the quality of the whole Chinese race. The advances of society and the advances of science and technology demand that persons who are going to be producers have a high degree of scientific and cultural accomplishment, be familiar with the productive skills of labor, and be physically healthy. We should give serious attention to eugenics research as a way to serve our improvement of the population and effective nurturing of talent.

The sixth proposal was that we transform our high birth rate, low death rate, and high rate of increase into a low birth rate, low death rate, and low rate of increase, and beginning immediately, place the emphasis of national planned parenthood work on "only one child for each married couple," to realize a rate of natural population growth of 5 per 1000 by 1985 and zero natural population growth by the year 2000.

The seventh proposal was that we carry out a single nationwide census to provide a basis for the development of demographic research by academic departments and for setting of population policy by the state. On the basis of the nationwide census, we should make scientific forecasts of our country's population development trends to set up a scientific population program.

The eighth proposal is to set a population policy that is feasible for our country. In consideration of our country's actual situation, a population control policy specified for our country at the present time should be implemented on the principle of combining ideological education, administrative measures, and economic measures. A policy for development of population in the regions of the minority nationalities should discriminate between the different circumstances and suggest different requirements.

The ninth proposal was that we should have an urban population policy. Starting from the actual circumstances in our country, the large municipalities must be controlled and there should be active development of satellite cities and medium sized and small towns. Simultaneously with our striving to develop production, we should, according to actual circumstances in each area, make up a program for urban population and set a population policy for the cities.

The tenth proposal is to strengthen maternity and child hygiene and develop preschool education. At the same time, social insurance work should be well handled. This will eliminate worries by childless women and old people with young children about who is going to look after them later, and will solve the problem of "support for the aged."

The eleventh proposal was to establish and amplify a relevant population agency to oversee population work, as a means of supervising planned parenthood, the census, population programs, population forecasts, population statistics, demographic education and demographic research, as well as international exchanges concerning population problems, at the same time organizing cooperation between natural science workers and social science workers in joint promotion of demographic research.

The twelfth proposal was to correct the long-standing onesidedness in the propagandizing of population theory and vigorously strengthen demographic research work. Population problems concern a borderline science, located between the natural sciences and the social sciences, and population problems are also a comprehensive science, concerned with economics, history, ecology, the study of natural resources, the study of personal abilities, sociology, systems engineering, etc., and we must assimilate the lessons of our experience in demographic research and establish our work to control population increases on a scientific foundation, by establishing our country's demographic system.

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CSO: 4005

SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

EMULATE SICHUAN'S SUCCESS IN FAMILY PLANNING

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 16 Dec 79 p 2

[Report by Zou Tao [6760 3447] and He Yunteng [0149 6663 7506]: "As Industrial and Agricultural Production Increases, the Rate of Population Growth Decreases; Notes From a Study of the Family Planning Experience in Sichuan Province"]

[Text] Recently we accompanied a study group organized by the Provincial CCP Committee and composed of some of the leading comrades from Provincial, Prefectural, County, and Municipal CCP Committees on a visit to Sichuan Province to learn about the successful experience in family planning work there. During the 10-day visit we saw in both the cities and the countryside the enthusiastic spirit of the people in "the land of plenty," thriving production, a prosperous economy and exuberant vitality. We also saw how special attention has been given to family planning in Sichuan. Its high standards, long-range vision, correct management, boldness, numerous methods, and successful results have opened our eyes.

After the "gang of four" was smashed more than 3 years ago, industrial and agricultural production in Sichuan Province began to increase and the rate of population growth began to decline. Grain production kept on rising. Last year and the year before last it totaled 10.3 billion jin, a 20 percent increase from 1976 and one which surpassed the previous record. There was a concurrent drop in the rate of population growth from 1.23 percent in 1976 to 0.6 percent last year. The estimates for this year are that grain production will rise another 2 billion jin and population growth will slow to 0.58 percent. Sichuan will become the province with the nation's greatest margin of increase in grain production and the largest decrease in the rate of population growth. This combination of increasing production and declining population growth will clearly result in increased distribution of income to commune members. The nation, the collectives, and every person will benefit. A consciousness of the need to practice family planning will take hold among the vast numbers of cadres and the broad masses, and there will be an upsurge of enthusiasm for increasing production.

Why has the population growth rate in Sichuan decreased so dramatically? Our comrades from Guangdong put this question to leading comrades in the Sichuan Provincial CCP Committee and a number of prefectural and county CCP committees, as well as to cadres and the masses in communes and production brigades. Their feelings were as follows:

The Whole Party Has to Keep a Tight Hold on "The Two Kinds of Production" At Once

Sichuan is the most populated province in the country. The amount of cultivated land in the province averages only a little more than 1 mu per person. The population of the province increased from 58 million in 1950 to 97 million last year. Although grain production doubled during that period, the number of people increased by 70 percent, so two-thirds of the increment in grain production was consumed by the newly added population. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that during the 10 years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the net increase in population was 25 million, while grain production remained about the same. This unchecked population growth put great pressure on the labor force with respect to employment opportunities, education, and the basic necessities of life. It also seriously affected efforts to accumulate funds for China's construction and efforts to raise living standards.

Sichuan Provincial CCP Committee First Secretary Zhao Ziyang [6392 4793 7122], Provincial CCP Committee Secretary Du Xinyuan [2629 1800 3293], Provincial Revolutionary Committee Vice Chairman Liu Haiquan [0491 3189 3123], and other comrades in responsible positions all discussed the aforementioned state of affairs in separate interviews with Guangdong comrades. Comrade Zhao Ziyang said that unchecked population growth is a major problem and that if the population growth rate does not fall it will have a disastrous impact on the Four Modernizations.

The Sichuan Provincial CCP Committee frequently stresses the major significance of family planning and constantly seeks to enhance this understanding party committees at all levels, and especially among those in command. They have also adopted a method of calculating and contrasting for determining the ratio of population growth to increased grain production, the hardship caused by unchecked population growth, and the benefit derived from the promotion of family planning and the consequent drop in the rate of population growth. When we visited Shifang County, comrades in charge of this work in the county CCP committee briefed us on two sets of figures which they have computed: One set shows that during the 14 years from 1956 to 1970, grain production in the county increased by 33 million jin but per capita grain production declined from 1,014 jin to 968 jin. The other set shows that the rate of population growth dropped from 3.2 percent in 1970, when the family planning drive began, to 0.26 percent last year. More than 60,000 fewer people were born than would otherwise have been the case, and this has meant an average of 120 more jin of grain per person. These comrades in Shifang County said that they are using their method of calculating and contrasting to educate themselves, educate the masses, and progressively enhance understanding of the importance of putting family planning into practice.

A complete understanding has been reached throughout Sichuan Province in party committees at all levels that family planning is to be on the agenda of important items, that it shall be the central task for party committees, and that it is to be regarded as a strategic mission to be accomplished.

The Provincial CCP Committee keeps a constant watch on those with primary responsibility in prefectural, municipal and autonomous prefecture CCP committees and requires the secretaries of those committees to report personally on the status of industrial and agricultural production and family planning at every meeting. Leading comrades in the Provincial CCP Committee and the Provincial Revolutionary Committee check up on industrial and agricultural production and family planning. Those in subordinate positions follow the examples set by their superiors in what has become a system. Party committees at all levels, from prefectures down to counties and communes, are following the lead and grasping this work the same way. At the same time, they are combining the aim of controlling population growth and industrial and agricultural production goals with the national economic plan, transmitting the entire matter to lower levels for implementation, and working for unified planning, deployment, criticism, and appraisal. After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, the Provincial CCP Committee explicitly stated that during the period of national economic readjustment, "the two increases" (increasing agricultural and textile production) and "the one decrease" (bringing down the rate of population growth) are to be regarded together as the focal point of work throughout the province. The Provincial CCP Committee also said that it would convene several meetings every year for the special purpose of reviewing work in family planning. Four such special meetings were held this year, and as a result of these meetings family planning work has taken on a superior aspect in which one level takes charge of the next level, one level leads the next, one level inspires the next, and together they keep a tight hold on "the two kinds of production" at once. The people involved in this work are persevering in their efforts to systematize it by putting somebody in charge at each level and bringing everything under control.

Meanwhile, vast numbers of cadres and leading cadres in particular have been playing leading roles in family planning--conducting publicity campaigns, initiating planning, and taking the lead in implementation. They do what they ask the masses to do. Thus they forcefully promote the successful development of family planning. In Provincial CCP Committee and Provincial Revolutionary Committee organizations, for example, there are 115 married couples with one child each, and all have said that they will not have a second child. The masses cheerfully say, "All the talk in the world is not as good as cadres setting examples." Of the 14 cadres who hold vice chairmanships or higher ranks in the Shifang County CCP Committee, there are 13 who are able to have children, and all of them practice birth control. Their example has strongly influenced the whole county. In response to the urging of the county's leading comrades, 99.6 percent of the 5,500 plus cadres in production brigades and at higher levels throughout the country have adopted birth control practices. The man who is presently first in command in the Guan County CCP Committee and the man who was his predecessor have both had vasectomies. All comrades in responsible positions in the county CCP committee who are able to have children have adopted family planning. Everywhere we went during our visit to Chengdu, Chongqing and Wenjiang Prefecture we saw and heard about instances of cadres setting examples by adopting family planning. These cadres consider family planning honorable and having only

one child commendable. Both ideas have become common practice throughout the province. Last year the rate of population growth in Chongqing, which has 6.1 million people, was held to 0.35 percent. In some parts of the city no married couples have had a third child within the past 3 years, and more than 90 percent of all married couples able to have children in the city have adopted family planning.

Whip Up Public Opinion and Reduce Resistance

Implementation of family planning is a profound revolution that will transform social traditions and remake society. It will affect countless families. Therefore, family planning will translate into conscious action by the masses only if information is disseminated on a widespread basis, public opinion is whipped up, and the broad masses are fully roused. Sichuan has had plenty of experience in this respect. They have stressed "three in one" or coordination among leading cadres, workers, and technical personnel, as well as the combination of education about the Marxist theory of population and education about the method of calculating and contrasting, the combination of shock propaganda and day-to-day propaganda, and the combination of education through extensive publicity and model education. This kind of education through propaganda has great strength and impetus, meets little resistance, and achieves good results.

Leading comrades in the Sichuan Provincial CCP Committee pointed out during a discussion of the population growth situation that the ideological roots of unchecked population growth in the past were the feudal notion "the more children the more good fortune" and metaphysical views on issues related to population theory, such as the idea that population growth is absolutely good and that whoever advocates controlling it should be considered to be "denying the superiority of the socialist system." This outlook caused serious confusion in understanding ideology. For the past few years the authorities in Sichuan have conducted study classes in population theory at every level from provincial to county, and party schools at all levels have offered courses in population theory. More than 200,000 key people have been trained to publicize population theory. Their work in propagating Marxist population theory among the vast numbers of cadres and the broad masses, publicizing the party's general and specific family planning policies, and criticizing feudal ideas has broken through all kinds of "forbidden zones." While publicizing population theory, they have kept in close contact with practice and used facts that the masses can see and to which they can relate. They have explained the crucial significance of family planning by relating it to grain production, accumulation of funds, women's liberation, educating the next generation, employment, improvement of living conditions, and other aspects of society. "Lift a lamp and the light is bright; calculate the figures and everything is clear." Wenjiang Prefecture's effort to educate people by publicizing calculations and contrasts, in which it made a comparison of its economic development and its population growth since the founding of the People's Republic and computed trends in population development, convinced cadres and the broad masses that unchecked population growth is indeed

disastrous. They have expressed their feelings: "Everybody wants to know why production is increasing but income is not. The explanation is that babies are being born in unrestricted numbers. If we want better living conditions, we must produce more grain and fewer people." This prefecture is asking party committees at all levels to keep a tight hold on "grain, money, and people" at once, increase grain production and economic growth year by year, and bring down population growth year by year. Last year the population growth rate in Wenjiang Prefecture had already dropped to 0.28 percent.

Party organizations at all levels in Sichuan also understand that relying only on family planning departments and public health departments to educate people about family planning through propaganda will not get the job done. Family planning will be successful only if party secretaries take command, the entire party mobilizes, and the party, the government, soldiers, the people, all fronts, and every department cooperate closely and make joint efforts. Sichuan has applied the slogan "Open channels of communication, wage a general war" to this goal. At the same time the Sichuan authorities are giving attention to two basic worker branches which have been established--one consisting of propaganda teams and the other made up of birth control surgery teams. Both branches are active in the front line, from the provincial, prefectural, and county levels down to every commune and basic unit. The teams go wherever they are needed and do whatever needs to be done. A propaganda worker who had gone to Langshan Commune in Jiangjin County studied sign language in order to be able to teach birth control to a mute woman. The worker showed interest in the mute woman's life and after 3 months of painstaking work finally succeeded. The woman was cheerfully practicing birth control. Now this mute woman uses sign language herself to teach other people that having one child is best. She has become an enthusiastic family planning propaganda worker and has been praised by her commune.

Implement a Policy of Clearly Defined Rewards and Punishments

Another important lesson learned from Sichuan's family planning experience is that economic measures must be adopted, the party's policies conscientiously implemented, and the force of the policies fully brought into play in order for family planning to be a success. The local people say: "Sharpening a knife won't harm the woodcutter but will steadily lead to the fulfillment of policy." "A person can discipline only one other person, but a policy carried out disciplines 10,000 people." For the purpose of carrying family planning another step forward, encouraging married couples to have only one child, and strictly limiting unplanned births, Sichuan this year began issuing "Formulations of Questions About Family Planning." Now there are rules to follow. Party organizations at all levels are vigorously promoting the fulfillment of policy through the implementation of these rules, and the vast numbers of cadres and the broad masses enthusiastically support this effect. Every prefecture awards a rosette to women who set an example by planning to have only one child, places them on an honor roll, gives each a certificate of merit, and gives them cash awards or awards in kind.

Staff and workers in cities and towns who express their willingness to have only one child receive a child health subsidy of 5 yuan per month and have priority in housing arrangements. Farmers who practice family planning receive a monthly health care subsidy and an extra private plot of land each. Implementation of these policies has caused the masses to feel that the Communist Party is conscientious in its work and stands by what it says. They consciously practice family planning with ease of mind. There are many moving examples of parents teaching their children about family planning and of husbands and wives discussing birth control. This past year, 1.2 million married couples of child-bearing age who have already had one child--70 percent of all such couples in the province--have agreed not to have another. At the same time, those who have not accepted family planning have been educated through criticism and subjected to economic sanctions. Those who have kept to the old way and thus made a very bad impression on the masses have been subjected to disciplinary actions. A deputy director of the Wangcang County People's Bank who deceived his organization and continued to have children was dismissed from his post by the county leadership, deprived of the pay raise he received last year, and criticized in the newspaper. Severe punishment of people who don't accept family planning gives a powerful impetus to the successful development of family planning.

Rouse Ourselves and Try Hard to Catch Up

The comrades who visited Sichuan Province all felt, after 10 days of on-the-spot study, that party committees at all levels in Sichuan thoroughly understand family planning and that their determination, bold vision, numerous methods, rich experience and good results are worth serious studying. Everybody is concerned with practice in Guangdong, and we feel that although family planning in our province has achieved a certain success, it suffers for comparison to Sichuan's work. We have many problems and heavy responsibilities. According to a population structure survey of our province, we have entered a peak period of births. Last year there were more than 500,000 marriages among young people entering childbearing age, and this number will increase to 700,000 or 800,000. If all these couples conform to the ideal and have one child, or in some cases have a maximum of two children, the average rate of population growth will be 1.2 percent by the year 2000. In exceptional years it might be as high as 1.6 percent. Population growth is a very serious problem and must be given serious attention. If we don't do something about unchecked population growth, we will increasingly suffer for it. It will hurt production and construction and lower our standard of living. We must seriously study Sichuan's experience and make family planning a success.

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CSO: 4005

SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

GUANGDONG PLANNED PARENTHOOD WORKERS DISCUSS POPULATION RISE

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 11 Nov 79 p 1

[Article: "Guangdong Provincial Revolutionary Committee Convenes Telephone Conference on Planned Parenthood, Calls on Local Areas To Do Well in Planned Parenthood Work This Year"]

[Text] On the evening of 9 November the Provincial Revolutionary Committee convened a province-wide telephone conference on planned parenthood work and called on all areas of the province, while arranging production plans for this winter and next spring, to centralize leadership, set aside time, and concentrate technical strength to conscientiously grasp planned parenthood work for this year and provide a firm guarantee that the birth rate in our province will not rise again, and even strive for some decrease.

Comrade Li Jiaren [2621 0857 0086], vice-chairman of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, chaired the conference, and Comrade Liu Tianfu [0491 3944 1133], provincial party secretary and vice-chairman of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee spoke on behalf of the Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Revolutionary Committee.

During the past year, party organizations on all levels in our province have further strengthened the leadership of planned parenthood work, and the province's planned parenthood work has continued to develop in depth. From January to September, more than 711,600 explanations of four planned parenthood techniques were presented throughout the province, an increase of more than 81,900 explanations over the same period last year, most of them in Foshan prefecture, which accounted for more than 124,500. In August, after the Shunde planned parenthood on-the-spot conference for exchange of experience, Guangzhou completed the tasks assigned by the province relatively well, including an overfulfillment of the tasks on remedial measures assigned to Zhengcheng County and Huaxian County. Because remedial measures have been vigorously promoted in all areas, a downward trend in the birth rate in some areas began during the fourth quarter. However, there are still a number of unplanned pregnancies throughout the province, and if effective remedial measures are adopted with regard to these unplanned pregnancies, we could guarantee there would be no continued increase in the birth rate this year, and there might even be a slight decrease.

In his speech, comrade Liu Tianfu said that our province had established many good methods and much good experience in our planned parenthood work. Principal among these were the implementation of planned parenthood by mobilizing the whole party under the command of the party secretary, with cadres taking the lead, grasping two kinds of production simultaneously, large-scale use of public opinion, and the use of balance sheets for comparison purposes as a means of educating the cadres and the masses. All areas have also employed economic methods, combined ideological education and economic measures, established rewards and punishments, and made it possible for there to be a plan for births and measures so there need not be births. Originally, the planned parenthood work in Zhengcheng County and Huaxian County was extremely backward, but because they conscientiously summarized the lessons of experience, and let the person in command take personal charge, they turned around their passive situation relatively quickly. Their experience is worth studying. If Zhengcheng and Huaxian could do it, all localities should be able to do it. It is hoped that all areas will, after the methods of Zhengcheng and Huaxian, summarize the lessons of their own experience, be sufficiently determined, adopt strong measures, and lower the birth rate for this year to as great an extent as possible, as well as set a foundation for large-scale reduction next year.

Comrade Liu Tianfu pointed out that the planned parenthood policies must be carried out conscientiously. The Provincial Revolutionary Committee had previously issued 30 stipulations concerning planned parenthood to be implemented thoroughly in all areas, and to be the subject of awards when carried out well, or criticism and education, or even economic sanctions and disciplinary measures, when someone refuses to implement them, but there must certainly be rewards and punishments, and we must be strict and impartial in awarding them. Anyone destroying the planned parenthood work must be restrained by force of law when necessary. To encourage the implementation of the planned parenthood policies, all areas should organize a planned parenthood policy implementation inspection team to carry out an investigation before spring festival.

Finally, Comrade Liu Tianfu emphatically pointed out that there is not much time left this year, and while they are conscientiously arranging the production plans for this winter and the next spring, all areas should employ some of the energy devoted to production to grasp the planned parenthood work hour-by-hour and day-by-day and strive so that our province's birth rate will not continue to rise this year, and may even be reduced.

Zhengcheng County and Huaxian County party secretaries each described their personal experiences to the telephone conference.

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CSO: 4005

SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

LABOR FORCE INCREASED TO 2.5 MILLION IN BEIJING

Beijing BEIJING RIBAO in Chinese 3 Oct 79 p 1

[Article: "Labor Force in Beijing Increased to 2.5 Million in Past 30 Years--Number of Dependents Steadily Decreases; During Early Years of Liberation, Each Employer Person Supported an Average of 2.8 Dependents; In 1978, Each Person Employed Supported an Average of 0.62 Dependent"]

[Text] Since the founding of the People's Republic 30 years ago, the socialist construction of Beijing has gone through greater development. The number of employed has increased from 433,000 during the early years of liberation to 2,949,000, an increase of 5.8 times. The average number of dependents each employed person supports has decreased from 2.8 to 0.62.

During the Kuomintang rule, Beijing had a large number of unemployed people. After the liberation, Beijing Municipality established a Labor Employment Committee and a Job Introduction Agency which conducted a unified registration of the unemployed and made efforts to place all unemployed in the city. From 1949 to 1957, in pace with the revival of the national economy and the gradual development of large-scale economic construction, the youths who had grown up in the city were systematically sent to state or privately operated enterprises each year. The 230,000 unemployed who stayed in Beijing during the days of old China were also gradually placed. From 1958 to 1965, the employment work for the urban labor force in Beijing was put on the right course. The youngsters who grew up each year were employed. In 1965, the employed population reached 1,757,000.

From 1966 to 1976, due to the interference and sabotage of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," the development of national economy suffered a serious setback, and the urban labor force placement work was seriously affected, resulting in the accumulation of many unresolved problems. After the crushing of the "gang of four," although 271,000 were employed from 1977 to 1978, there were still 400,000 in the city waiting for jobs in 1979. The Beijing Municipal Party Committee grasped the task of placement of people awaiting employment as an important link in urban

work. Since the beginning of this year, in addition to sending 92,000 people waiting for employment to collective enterprises, 59,000 youths were employed by way of organizing different forms of production service cooperatives and replenishing street enterprises. It is predicted that by the end of this year, jobs will be found for most of the people who are waiting for employment.

In the last 30 years since the founding of the republic, the urban population of Beijing has increased rapidly, but jobs were found for a large number of the labor force, and the number of people supported by each employed person has been decreasing. Immediately after the liberation, Beijing had a population of 1,649,000, of whom 26.2 percent was unemployed. At that time, in each family of five, only an average of 1.3 persons was employed, and each employed supported 2.8 persons. In 1965, the urban population increased to 4,478,000, of whom 39.2 percent was employed. At that time, in each family of five, an average of 1.9 persons was employed, and each employed supported 1.54 persons. In 1978, the urban population increased to 4,671,000, of whom 60 percent was employed. In a family of five, an average of 3.01 persons was employed, and each employed supported 0.62 person.

1004

CSO: 4005

SOCIOLOGICAL, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

CONNOTATIONS, SIGNIFICANCE OF 'ECONOMIC BASE' EXPLAINED

Beijing ZHIXUE YANJIU in Chinese No 11, Nov 79 pp 31-36, 40

[Article by Yang Changfu [2799 7022 4395], "On the Meaning of the Economic Base"]

[Text] Whether by economic base one means production relationships or the mode of production indicates one's understanding of the important principles of historical materialism and political economics, and therefore has ramifications as to how to use the basic contradictions in society to resolve the real problems that exist today; for these reasons it must be clarified.*

I. Marxist Understanding of the Meaning of Economic Base

A popular view among philosophers and economists is that the economic base means production relationships, and thus when the superstructure needs to be adopted to the requirements of the economic base, it has to be suited to the requirements of production relationships. Most of them cite a passage from Marx's "Foreword to 'A Criticism of Political Economics'" to prove their views. This passage reads, "In the social production in people's own lives, there develop relationships that are fixed, inevitable, and immutable by the exercise of will; these are production relationships that fit in with definite development stages of their material productive forces. The sum total of these production relationships forms the economic structure of society, which is overlaid with a legal and political superstructure and which has a definite base with a compatible social ideology." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 2, p 82) I feel that one cannot conclude from this that the economic base of which Marx spoke meant only production relationships and did not encompass productive forces, because Marx did not separate production relationships but spoke of production relationships geared to

*During the late 1950's and early 1960's, our country's academicians held discussions on this issue. The majority view at that time was that the concept of economic base does not encompass productive forces. I feel that this view does not fit realities and consequently is incorrect.

definite stages of development of material production forces. In the first volume of his "Das Kapital," Marx referred to the "Critique of Political Economics," which he had written in 1859, saying, "I already spoke in that book of definite modes of production as well as of the production relationships connected to them--briefly, 'the economic structure of society which is overlaid with a legal and political superstructure and which has a definite base with a compatible social ideology'." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 23 p 99) Here Marx refers to "a definite mode of production as well as a production relationship compatible with it." Clearly, when he says "overlaid with a legal and political superstructure and which has a definite base with a compatible social ideology," he does not mean simply production relationships but modes of production first and foremost. Immediately following this passage, Marx says, "Modes of production in material life regulate the entire process of social life, political life, and cultural life." Here Marx clearly says that the determinants of "social life, political life, and cultural life" and such parts of the superstructure are "the modes of production of material life," by which is meant not just production relationships but productivity as well.

When Marx's "Critique of Political Economics" was published, a German-language newspaper in the United States criticized the above thesis of Marx, saying: "Granted, it applies to the world of today, in which material benefits occupy the dominant position, but it certainly did not apply to the Middle Ages, when Catholicism was dominant, or to Athens and Rome, when politics were in the dominant position." Marx felt that "it was truly amazing" that there were still some people who did not know the common knowledge known to all. He refuted [the writer], saying: "Quite clearly one could not rely on Catholicism during the Middle Ages to earn a living, and in ancient times one could not rely on politics to make a living. On the contrary, the modes and means of making a living during those two eras demonstrate just why politics played a dominant role in ancient times, and why Catholicism played a major role during the Middle Ages." (ibid) In accordance with this truth revealed by Marx, we want to raise the following question about the view that removes productivity from the economic base: Can society live on production relationships? Very clearly, every society can live only on the goods produced for material life, and if only production relationships existed, with no productivity, how could the production of material goods take place?

In a discussion of the materialist view of history, Engels wrote: "Production and the exchange of goods derived from production constitute the foundation of all social systems. In every society that has appeared in history, the distribution of goods and the division of that society into classes or ranks were determined by what was produced, how it was produced, and how goods were exchanged. Thus, the ultimate reason for all social change and all political reform may be found not in the minds of men but in the steadily increasing understanding by men of eternal truth and justice, and should be sought in changes in modes of production and modes of exchange." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 3, p 307) In a letter to [Zhiwa Boerjiniagsi [5286 3907 0590 1422 0679 7680 2448] Engels said, "The economic relationships that we see as determinants of social history bespeak the modes of production

used by people of a particular society to produce the means of livelihood and for the mutual exchange of goods (under conditions of division of labor). Consequently this encompasses all technical facilities of production and transportation. These technical facilities, as we look at it, also determined the way goods were exchanged as well as the way they were distributed, and thus, following the disintegration of society based on clans, were determinants of the division into classes, determinants of relationships between those who governed and the governed, and determinants of nations, politics, laws, etc." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 4, p 505)* The foregoing two passages from Engels talked of determinants of the social system and the basis of social history as being modes of production and modes of exchange. Inasmuch as modes of exchange are determined by modes of production, modes of production play the major determining role. In the following passage, Engels clearly said, "Included here are all the technical facilities of production and transportation." By these technical facilities is meant, of course, the forces of production.

Certainly, when Marx and Engels spoke of the economic base that determines the superstructure, they sometimes referred to production relationships. This was because production relationships play a more direct role in determining the nature of the superstructure. However, neither Marx nor Engels ever clearly proposed removing production forces from the economic base. Therefore, we most certainly cannot maintain that only production relationships determine the superstructure, and that production force play no determining role at all in the superstructure. The determining role of which we are speaking here does not entirely mean the final determining role of production force. For Marxists this poses no problem, because the forces of production have been the determining forces in the historical development of society, and they are, of course, the final determinant of the political and legal systems as well as of the associated ideology of the superstructure. The determining role of which we are speaking encompasses a direct determinant role, which is to say that the superstructure is subject not only to the determinants and restrictions of production relationships, but is also subject to the determinants and restrictions of the forces of production. It is just as Marx said: "A specific form of material production produces, first, a particular social structure, and second, a particular relationship between man and nature, with the state systems and the cultural modes of people being determined by these two aspects, and thus the character of cultural production is also determined by these two aspects." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 26 (1), p 296) The reaction of the superstructure on the economic base is

*This passage from Engels is a denial of the view that holds that the economic base does not include productive forces. Some comrades who hold that view defend it by saying that one ought not confuse the base of the existence and development of the whole society with the direct determinant of the economic base of the superstructure. Such a view, which divides a single base into two bases, they themselves cannot back up, and it can create theoretical havoc. I feel that production relationships and economic relationships are different terms for the same relationships, and that base and economic base are different terms for the same base.

not only a direct reaction on production relationships, but also a direct reaction to production forces. Thus, for a completely accurate understanding of the Marxist meaning of the economic base, it is necessary to view it as a unity of production relationship and production forces.

Some comrades protest, saying: "Can production forces directly determine the superstructure? If so, then according to the principle that the economic base determines the superstructure, the kind of superstructure you have will follow from the kind of production forces you have. But reality is not like this. The truth is that societies with the same level of development of production forces can produce different social ideologies. For example, in feudal societies, the level of development of the forces of production in the handicraft industries, with their small-scale production, produced the completely antithetical ideologies of the landlord class and the peasant class." ("Teaching and Studying," first quarter 1964, p 11)

There are no grounds for such a protest, because first of all no one maintains that the economic base consists only of production forces, brushing production relationships completely aside to say that only production forces can determine the superstructure. If such a view does exist, it is wrong, of course. Don't forget that to maintain that production forces can directly determine the superstructure is not to maintain that the total character of the superstructure, in all its aspects, is determined directly by production forces, but to maintain that the superstructure is determined by the economic base that includes both production forces and production relationships. To learn which aspects of the superstructure are directly determined chiefly by production relationships and which are directly determined principally by production forces requires concrete analysis. Second, this protest has actually been answered by an example that these [comrades] themselves raised. "The completely antithetical ideologies of the landlord class and the peasant class" are produced, of course, in the production relationships of feudalism, and are directly determined by their different individual economic positions. But didn't the formation of feudal production relationships with landlord and peasant classes, as well as their ideologies, derive from the "level of development of the forces of production in the handicraft industries with their small-scale production?"

II. A Real-Life Look at the Meaning of the Economic Base

In real life, social production, production relationships, and the forces of production are dialectically united, with production relationships being social forms of production and the forces of production being a material ingredient in production. Take away either production relationships or production forces, and there can be no real production, and without production, society's superstructure cannot survive. Therefore, the economic base on which the superstructure depends cannot be just a social form stripped of its material ingredient (production relationships), but rather it must be a production mode that unifies both production relationships and the forces of production. Though we may use abstract methods in our scientific research to study the relationship of production relationships to the superstructure, this does not deny a direct relationship between the forces of production and the superstructure.

Those comrades who term the economic base production relationships, however, maintain that only production relationships have a direct bearing on the superstructure, creating a set of contradictions, and that production forces cannot have any direct determining role on the superstructure unless they function through production relationships to act on the superstructure; contrariwise, they maintain that the superstructure cannot play a direct role on production forces, and that it can react on the forces of production only through production relationships. Whether such a view really accords with the true situation merits consideration. Looked at from real life, we certainly cannot deny a direct determining role by production forces on the superstructure and a direct reaction by the superstructure on production forces.

The status of production forces determines to a definite degree the extent of the development of cultural education, and it determines, to a definite degree as well, the state of political democracy. We are a socialist country in which, given a high degree of development of cultural education, the working people have become the masters of the nation, and in which, politically, there is full enjoyment of democratic rights. But since the level of the forces of production in our country is presently low, requiring that the preponderant majority of workers use their time to produce the goods that they themselves require in their material lives, they are limited in the amount of time they can devote to the study of culture and science and to the performance of activities in culture and science; consequently, generally speaking, the state of cultural education in our country is presently rather underdeveloped. This situation directly affects and restricts conditions for their participation in political activities, and so they have no choice but to entrust the various functions of running the country to a minority of people who possess knowledge of culture, science and management skills. This situation requires that on every level in management and leadership organizations, full play be given to democracy so as to guarantee and create the conditions that will permit the broad masses of workers to exercise their democratic rights. If this is not done, the enthusiasm of the workers for production will be adversely affected to a degree, and the development of production forces will be obstructed. Only by giving full play to socialist democracy can the workers themselves realize that they are the masters of the country, can their political consciousness be raised, and can they cheerfully and energetically engage in production and participate in the management of production to advance the development of the forces of production. Hand in hand with the development of the forces of production will go further increases in the workers' cultural development and scientific knowledge, which will strengthen socialist democracy. The more socialist democracy grows, and the greater the enthusiasm of the workers for production, the more the development of the forces of production can be promoted.

Under the socialist system, in addition to the indirect relationship to productivity of the line, programs, and policies of the Communist Party, there are other programs and policies such as correct cadre policies, policies toward intellectuals, policies for rewarding scientific and technical inventions and creativity that can directly motivate the cadres, intellectuals, and scientists and technicians, and can also give free play to their expertise and directly promote the development of production forces. On the other hand,

we have seen the destruction wrought upon the socialist economic base by the extreme leftist line of the superstructure of Lin Biao and the "gang of four." Is it possible that only socialist production relationships were directly destroyed, with no direct destruction of production forces? It cannot be denied that they sometimes directly destroyed socialist production relationships, thereby destroying production forces as, for example, their unconditional practice in rural villages of "poverty transition" that destroyed distribution based on labor, and the prohibition of country-fair trade, which seriously disrupted the growth of productivity. And their practice of beating, smashing, and looting, the instigation of anarchy, the stopping of production time to conduct "political campaigns" and "political study" did not destroy the forces of production by destroying production relationships; they destroyed production and the forces of production directly. We have made this distinction in order to reply to those who hold that the superstructure cannot have a direct bearing on productivity. In the production process, the forces of production and production relationships are united. In destroying production, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" had to destroy both the forces of production and socialist production relationships.

In a socialist society, the chief function of the proletariat in its dictatorship over the country is to organize socialist economic construction, and consequently the reaction of a socialist superstructure on the economic base will be stronger than in the old society. This is manifested principally in the policies and plans of the proletariat's dictatorship over the country with economic policies and economic plans having a direct bearing on the growth of production. In the case of plans, if the state economic plans formulated by leadership organizations accurately reflect objective economic laws and take account of the planned proportional growth of the national economy, they can promote the high-speed growth of production. And just the opposite, if leadership organizations do not handle matters in accordance with objective economic laws but rely instead on the "desires of senior officials" and blindly give directions and subjectively formulate plans, such as setting excessively high norms (high norms and high requisition purchases), this may lead to the destruction of the forces of production. Everyone is very familiar with this. And is it not also true that in concrete planning, when planning is done poorly, with resulting insufficient output or overstocking, or machines and equipment lying idle or broken, or great waste resulting from the inequitable distribution of production, productivity is directly impeded or destroyed?

Not only is the party's line, programs, and policies affected, but the forces of production and the ideology that goes with them is also affected. Lenin said, "The state of material productivity is the fountainhead of all ideology and trends." ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 2, p 586) This thesis of Lenin's derived entirely from materialism. Material goods determine thinking, and social being determines consciousness. This is a fundamental principle of materialism. Although productivity is not all there is to material goods and social being, it is a major integral part of material goods and social being, and consequently it plays a determining role in thinking and social consciousness. A socialist system already exists in our country, and proletarian ideology already occupies a governing position. Even though the

socialist system is superior to the capitalist and feudal systems, and even though proletarian ideology is much more greatly advanced than bourgeois or feudal ideology, inasmuch as our country's level of production is not high--particularly in agriculture, where hand labor still predominates--and though the means of production are publicly owned in this socialist system, nevertheless, among production forces that impact on the superstructure, it has not been possible as yet to eradicate feudal vestiges rapidly. Influence peddling through the female line, family relationships, privilege, and back-door dealings in influence are difficult to stop all at once, and bureaucracy, egalitarianism, anarchy, and feudal ideology likewise cannot be eradicated within a short period of time. Furthermore, the old superstructures react to influence and restrict the growth of productivity.

Let us talk about the scope of the production force and the superstructure as well as the speed of their development. The growth of productivity is directly related to the size and growth of the nonproductive sector of the state structure, because personnel in the nonproductive sectors of the state organizations must depend on the workers in the productive sector of the clothes, food, shelter, travel, and items of consumption that they require to maintain their lives. Additional reliance is placed on the production sector to provide the capital that goes to pay for the large government administrative and military expenses. When productivity does not grow, or when the rate of labor productivity is not high, workers in the goods production sector are not able to produce many goods for consumption beyond their own needs and the needs of their families, and the social wealth they create that they are able to provide to society is also not much beyond that used in further production. As a result, the state apparatus cannot become excessively large, administrative and military expenditures cannot be too great, and the non-productive sector of culture and art cannot be very large, either. If they become too large or spend too much, the livelihood of the workers will be affected and the growth of productivity will be impeded.

The growth of these nonproductive sectors is also directly determined by productivity. In the case of the armed forces, for example, it is precisely as Engels said: "Nothing depends on the state of the economy quite so much as armies and navies. Their equipment, organization, tactics, and strategy all depend on the levels of production and transportation at the time." "During the 14th century, the Arabs' introduction of gunpowder into Europe brought about a total transformation in methods of combat. This is something that every schoolboy knows. However, the adoption of gunpowder and firearms was not an act of violence but an industrial and economic step forward." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 3, p 206) Or take newspapers and magazines, radio and television, and such enterprises for the dissemination of culture whose development depended directly on the development of paper manufacture and printing technology right up to electronic technology. These technologies were, in themselves, clearly a part of the forces of production. But the development of newspaper and magazines, radio and television, brought benefits in the exchange of culture and in the popularization of scientific and technical knowledge, and both raised the productive capacity of the workers and increased the zeal of the workers to promote the growth of productivity. At the present time it is hard to predict exactly how great a role and effect will be played on the superstructure by the modern

scientific and technical advances that are taking place by leaps and bounds in the fields of atomic energy, electronic computers, and space technology.

Some of the points treated above are quite incomplete, and possibly some of the examples given are not correct, but it may be seen that the determining role of the forces of production on the superstructure need not necessarily go through the intermediary of production relationships, nor does the superstructure's reaction to production forces necessarily have to go through the intermediary of production relationships.

In the foregoing I have demonstrated principally the direct relationship between productivity and the superstructure without eliminating the intermediary link through production relationships, and particularly without eliminating the aspect of production relationships determining the character of the superstructure. Many comrades have addressed themselves to that aspect in the past, so there is no need to discuss it further.

III. Clarifying the Significance of the Meaning of the Economic Base

Theoretically speaking, the economic base is a major category in historical materialism. Clarification of the meaning of the economic base is not only helpful to an accurate understanding of the fundamental principle of historical materialism, but it also helps one to understand the basic contradictions in society. Up until the present time, theoreticians have treated the basic contradictions in society as contradictions between production forces and production relationships, and contradictions between the economic base and the superstructure. Basic social contradictions became two sets of parallel contradictions. In actual fact, only the contradictions between production forces and production relationships are the basic contradictions. No matter what the society might be, the production of material means is man's most fundamental practical activity, as it determines all his other activities, and all his other activities derive from the base of his production activities. Therefore, contradictions between production forces and production relationships constitute the basic contradictions in whatever society, and all other contradictions are rooted in these basic social contradictions. The superstructure is erected on the economic base. Only by regarding the economic base as the unity of opposites of production forces and production relationships can the superstructure have a firm material base, and only then can the issue of the superstructure be resolved through the contradiction of production forces and production relationships. The view that the economic base is simply a production relationship--as though only production relationships, i.e., the social forms produced, can determine the superstructure, while the forces of production, i.e., the material content produced, is conversely not a determinant of the superstructure--simply cannot be argued convincingly, matter what; it does not conform to objective reality.

Marxism was produced in the historical conditions of capitalist development, so Marx of course saw that capitalist production relationships were relationships for the exploitation of hired labor. But this was not enough. He also saw the representatives of socialized productivity, the proletariat, and he saw, as well, the contradiction between the socialization of production and

capitalist ownership. Capitalist production relationships were established during the 17th century, and the evils of these production relationships were soon exposed. Yet, from that time until the 18th century, the forces of production continued in the cooperative and workshop handicraft stage, with production not yet having been socialized. It was not until the era of large machinery in the 19th century--when, along with the development of machine production, machines actually gradually took over the manufacture of machine tools, and most particularly during the middle of the 19th century, with the development of railroad building on a large scale and the navigation of distant oceans--that production became socialized and the basic contradictions in capitalism began to sharpen. This also explains why the 19th century was able to produce only utopian socialism, and why it was not until after the decade of the 1840's that Marxist scientific socialism was born. Doesn't this also explain why the Marxist superstructure is determined by the contradiction between production forces and production relationships?

We can see from experience, having acknowledged that the economic base is the unity of production forces and production relationships, that the superstructure has to fit the economic base and serve the economic base before it can have clear goals and a clear direction. At the present time the focus of the work of the entire party and the entire country has begun the shift to socialist modernized construction. Every leadership area in the superstructure is seeking to work for the implementation of the Four Modernizations. In his report on the government's work to the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Comrade Hua Guofeng said: "Realization of the Four Modernizations during this century, and the rapid increase to modern levels from our country's presently low levels of productivity, with improvements in our country's production relationships in order to achieve this, together with improvements in that part of the superstructure that block realization of the Four Modernizations, and eradication of the old forces of habit that are of no benefit to the Four Modernizations--these are the principal contradictions that our country must resolve during the present stage, and these are also the central tasks of the people of the entire country at the present stage. In order to complete these central tasks, adherence to the dictatorship of the proletariat and adherence to class struggle are essential. But class struggle is no longer the main contradiction in our society. In the conduct of class struggle, we should rally round the central task of socialist modernized construction and serve this central task." (see RENMIN RIBAO, 26 June 1979) These words by Comrade Hua Guofeng scientifically analyzed our country's main contradiction at the present stage, and correctly stated the relationship between class struggle and the Four Modernizations. Moreover, those who adhere to the view that the superstructure cannot be directly linked to production forces may easily come to the conclusion that class struggle cannot directly serve the Four Modernizations, and this would not be good for socialist modernized construction. In actual fact, class struggle determines production struggle and serves production struggle, though it reacts both on production relationships and on production forces. The second part of this article discusses several aspects of the superstructure, all of which are directly related to production forces, and all of which can directly serve modernized construction. Consequently, our political system, political

political ideology work, the programs and policies of the party, the state economic plans, and the scale of government organizations, etc., not only should be suited to the requirements of socialist production relationships, but also must be suited to the current growth levels of production, for only then can they better serve socialist modernized construction.

Some of the problems in the superstructure can be correctly solved only if the economic base is regarded as the unity of production forces and production relationships. For example, the reason that classes and class struggle presently exist and will continue to exist in our country for a rather long time must be sought in the economic base (the mode of production).

Lenin said: "The fundamental indicator of class distinctions is the position they occupy in social production and their consequent relationship to the means of production." ("Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 6, p 233) Productivity is the be all and end all of production, and it is the material foundation for production relationships. People frequently define as the exploiting class those who own the means of production and those groups that exploit others, and this is quite right. But just what kind of exploiting class is the exploiting class that owns the means of production and exploits others? If divorced from the forces of production and from the material content of the means of production, it is not sufficiently clear. Only by combining ownership of relationships and ownership of the means of production can it be seen just what kind of exploiting class it is. Those who own the land and the tools of production (people's bodies being included as production tools) and exploit slaves are the slave master class; those who own land (or also own the main farm implements) and exploit the peasants are the landlord class; those who own plants (including, of course, the means of production, whether they be handicraft tools or machine equipment) and exploit hired workers are the industrial bourgeoisie. This is just as Marx said: "The existence of classes is related only to a particular historical stage in the development of production." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 4, p 332) That is to say the economic base for class existence is the mode of production at a particular stage of history.

The reason that classes and class struggle presently exist in our country and will continue to exist for a rather long time cannot, however, be fully explained simply in terms of production relationships or relationships in the system of ownership. Because our country has long since put into practice socialist public ownership of the means of production, no one can rely on private ownership of the means of production to exploit others. And even if vestiges of the past exploiting class still exist, they will continue to die off. Well then, how can the continued existence of classes be explained? In particular, how can the continued existence of classes for a rather long period be explained? All we need do is take a good look at the present situation of the production forces in our country and it can be readily understood why the extinction of classes will still be a long process, and thus why class struggle and class contradictions are also rather long enduring. It is when production forces develop to a certain degree but do not develop fully that classes are produced and exist. Only through the proletarian revolution, with

the eradication of private ownership of the means of production and the high-speed development of the forces of production, can classes be finally obliterated. Very clearly, our country is still a long way from rapid development of its forces of production. Only by striving to develop productivity can we create the material conditions for the extinction of classes.

In the study of the significance of the economic base, it is not enough simply to say that the economic base is the unified mode of production of production relationships and production forces. Further understanding is especially required of the concrete significance of the economic base, and there must be penetrating analysis and study of the economic structures of society, including the relationship and structure of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, of industrial organizations, the internal structure of each industrial sector, regional economic organizations, the structure of economic organizations, etc. None of this has been touched on in this article, and it must await exploration in another article.

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